

The background of the cover is a painting of a landscape. The sky is a mix of teal, green, and blue, with a rainbow-like arc of light. Below the sky, there are dark, rolling hills or mountains. In the foreground, there is a body of water or a wet, reflective surface, showing a mix of dark and light colors, possibly representing ice or snow. The overall style is impressionistic and somewhat abstract.

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# Reconciling divergent normative orders

## The struggle for recognition regarding Customary Law among indigenous peoples<sup>1</sup>

*Tom G. Svensson*  
(University of Oslo, Norway)

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### Abstract

The contemporary processes of nation-building among a great number of indigenous peoples presume recognition of diversity, reconciliation and codification of special rights. In my view, customary law is a workable starting point in connecting society and law focusing on indigeneity, thereby shedding light on the complexity of divergent legal arrangements, or legal pluralism. Following Clifford Geertz (1983) law-generating customs represent the cultural foundation of law, which should be perceived as a necessary prerequisite in attaining special rights, even culture-political autonomy. This form of indigenous nationhood does not counteract nation-state sovereignty, on the other hand, it may be viewed as a condition of anomie *vis-a-vis* the nation-state pointing to the dynamic creation of new social orders presumed in meeting new demands initiated by indigenous peoples. The argument to follow will be built on three case

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<sup>1</sup> Fieldwork on which the following chapter partially is based was carried out among the Nisga'a in the autumn 2000 financially supported by a Faculty Research Award (Canada) and the University of Oslo. Fieldwork among the Ainu was done during the first half of 1994, preceded by a short survey in 1990, supported by the Institute for comparative culture research and the Nansen foundation, but also Scandinavia-Japan Sasakawa foundation (1990). I hereby acknowledge with gratitude financial support offered. Besides continuous research on the Sámi since the 1960's, my role in the Sámi case was quite explicit as head of the steering committee of the research project focusing on Sámi customary law 1996 - 2000 (Svensson, ed., 1999 and NOU 2001:34).



studies: the Sámi in Norway, the Nisga'a in BC, Canada, and the Ainu in Japan.

**Key words:** Customary Law, Indigenous peoples, Nationhood, Anomie, Sámi, Nisga'a, Ainu

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*When government asks us to surrender our title and agree to its extinguishment, they ask us to do away with our most basic sense of ourselves, and our relationship to the Creator, our territory and the other peoples of the worlds. We could no longer do that without agreeing that we no longer wish to exist as a distinct people. That is completely at odds with our intentions in negotiating treaties* (Chief Edward John, First Nations Summit of BC, quoted in McKee, 2000).

## Introduction

In recent years there has been a noticeable increase in studies focusing on indigenous rights issues among legal anthropologists. In-depth analysis, critically scrutinizing court procedures as well as court decisions, represents one field of inquiry (see e.g. Culhane, 1998; Asch, 1997; Cassidy, 1992; and Svensson, 1997, just to mention some of the most topical ones); another equally important area focuses on processes of negotiations and parliamentary inquiries. In terms of theory-building this branch of anthropology and the development it has recently undergone represent a new phase in the progress of legal anthropology. A study emphasizing recognition of divergent normative orders and how they may be accommodated addresses itself primarily to this sub-disciplinary orientation (Svensson, 2002).

Indigenous people have their own legal perceptions which frequently are contrasted with the legal system of the dominant nation-state. Such difference in terms of law has a value in itself; it reconfirms cultural uniqueness and autonomy. Normative orders to which indigenous people adhere are founded on custom,

regulating social relations and traditional resource use. Customary law is the legal property reflecting such indispensable regulating, or ordered form of behavior.

The question of *difference* is a predominant feature in the attempt at explaining the close interrelationship between society and law, and here a stage of anomie may play an explanatory role.

A positive aspect of anomie points to boundlessness, i.e. the quality of breaking formally established borders, not least important in reference to the legal system of society (Herbert, 1991:69). In a structural sense anomie connects to autonomy, i.e. cultural and political self-determination. When it comes to law, in concrete terms this has to do with finding legal solutions outside official state law orders. This does not mean replacing one normative order with a new and entirely different one; the attempt at penetrating the set legal boundary should rather be viewed as a supplementary addition to the existing, but somewhat inappropriate, legal system. Thereby an alternative normative order may be created, accentuating empowerment and appropriation, i.e. relative autonomy for the group of people in question. Since my major concern is to discuss the situation of indigenous peoples, the point should be made that I deal exclusively with collective rights, not individual rights.

What has been said so far brings us back to difference, and how decisive that perspective is for cultural survival among various indigenous peoples. To be meaningful difference, whether political, cultural or legal, requires *recognition* from an external party. Such recognition is presently a major objective for very many indigenous people globally. To acquire recognition is a strategic action, a process adequately referred to as the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1992).

Moreover, difference calls for continuous management (Geertz, 1983:216), i.e. the manner in which people make use of it as an asset. In terms of legal arrangements, difference provides necessary legitimacy connected to stated claims. In other words, it

is a point in itself to emphasize difference in cultural terms, in most instances based on aboriginality; it is only thereby that an indigenous people will have a voice which calls for special treatment, in the end special rights. However, without recognition from the mainstream, dominant society, difference in this respect is bound to lose its meaning, possibly leading to a negative effect.

The aspect of recognition in connection to difference needs to be qualified further. Parick Macklem (2001) has discussed this problem, as it is related to the Canadian situation, at great length. According to Macklem, indigenous divergence should not be reduced to cultural difference in the more narrow sense of the word (op.cit: 75). In order to gain actual political influence for any First Nations people, difference is far more comprehensive and includes the questions of territory and unique relationship to land, sovereignty and the treaty process. Constitutional protection of difference on that level is what is at stake, not merely that of cultural difference per se. And, constitutionally, protection ideally follows upon formal state recognition, or in Macklem's phrasing: "Constitutional recognition of indigenous difference promotes a just distribution of constitutional power" (op.cit: 287).

To adequately apprehend what is to be recognized and protected by means of efficient legal instruments, where no doubt constitutional protection certainly appears as the superordinate agent, a holistic perspective is warranted. As a starting point, such a holistic view goes far beyond that of narrow jurisprudence, it encompasses features of culture, politics, ecology, system of beliefs and social structure; in the words of Clifford Geertz (1983: 175) it constitutes the cultural *foundation of law*, part of which relates to custom and customary law, the central legal perspective to be treated in this chapter. Built on customary practice and traditional knowledge, customary law is the legal constituent to which is attached the most apparent cultural dimension; this, notwithstanding, it constitutes part of law and legal perceptions sustained over time.

Referring to indigenous rights viewed holistically, in addition to customary rights we can discern certain key terms; these can be, for example, land rights, rights to self-government, inherent rights, treaty rights, and aboriginal title, which show how complex the legal component indigenous rights really is. Common for all these conceptions are that they refer to communities, not to individuals. In the same way, customary law gains its meaning as a group-defined right, as it is founded on the principle of shared customs, some of which are law-generating.

The concepts of *treaty* and *title* are less general than the rest and call for a clarification as they connect specifically to the situation in Canada. *Aboriginal treaties* are binding legal agreements/contracts resulting from the process of negotiation between the larger society on the one hand and an aboriginal nation, properly acknowledged, on the other. The case of the Nisga'a in BC to be discussed further on elucidates plainly contemporary treaty-making processes. *Aboriginal title* refers to the right to occupy, use and enjoy their land and resources (Cf. McKee, 2000). And aboriginal title, whether it is to be extinguished or perpetuated, frequently forms part of the issues being negotiated, eventually leading to a treaty. To most indigenous peoples their title has a real as well as a symbolic value, something which must not voluntarily be given up, whereas to the state authorities the explicit policy aims at the extinguishment of the title. Aboriginal title is, by the majority state, often conceived as an obstacle to various kinds of development, which ought not to be impeded.

The process towards nation-building stands out as a superior aim for most indigenous people, a goal-orientation which assumes the clarification and establishment of a legal base as identified above. The conception "nation" should in no way be confused with that of "nation-state", which would imply complete separation as an ultimate goal. Nation represents a people, defined according to cultural criteria, to which is added the prerequisite

aboriginality. If these requirements are not met it is difficult to talk conceptionally about the statement "people equals nation".

In order to obtain this kind of nationhood, in contrast to statehood, recognition of distinctiveness in all its stages must be attained by the people in question. This has both a real and symbolic value as it gives the impression of empowerment as well as equity. The ultimate goal is to acquire firm self-rule and authority without abandoning being part of a nation-state, a stage of "domestic dependent nationhood" going back to Chief Justice Marshall's illustrious phrase regarding tribal sovereignty in the US (quoted in Russell, 2000: 67). Dan Russell has also introduced some general tenets specifying further this type of "nationhood"; the two most basic and relevant for our purpose are: a) inherent right to self-government, and b) inherent jurisdiction over both criminal and civil law matters.

Nationhood in this respect means a large degree of autonomy without undermining state sovereignty. Here we are referring to a relational condition founded on mutual respect and comprehension, which is distinguished by moving frontiers, or disregarding formally established obstacles concerning rights and authority, at the same time as boundaries between an indigenous people and the outside world out of necessity may be sharpened and made more explicit. In other words, indigenous nationhood may be perceived as a condition of anomie vis-a-vis the nation-state, but it does not lead to what is called anomic disorder. On the contrary, as will be shown by the empirical accounts, it has to do with dynamic creation/recreation of new social orders, or arrangements, to meet current justified demands initiated by indigenous peoples.

Summing up at this stage, nation-building presumes: *recognition* of diversity, *reconciliation* and eventually *codification*. And in my view, customary law among indigenous people is a workable starting point for trying to elucidate and explain the connection between society and law in reference to nation-building processes.

The argument to follow will be built on three case studies: the Sámi in Norway, the Nisga'a in BC, Canada, and the Ainu in Japan. In order to substantiate some general points, these cases show enough differentiation but also a certain similarity as to fundamental nation-state frameworks to justify an attempt at comparative analysis.

## **Empirical cases**

### a) The Sámi

Since 1980 we can observe in Norway a process towards consolidation and acknowledgement of non-state normative orders referring in particular to the question of land rights. In this process, customary rights has been introduced as a legitimate factor recognized by the state authorities. Prior to the appointment of the Sámi Rights Commission (1980), demanded by the Sámi in a time of most severe conflict, its terms of reference were negotiated between the Norwegian Government and leading Sámi organizations. This kind of negotiation was formerly unheard of and represented a certain recognition. Created to meet claims explicitly stated by the Sámi, the Sámi Rights Commission was primarily to investigate in depth all relevant aspects concerning Sámi rights. At this stage the Sámi were able to exert some influence in pointing to certain pertinent issues to be inquired, such as 1) to what *historical rights* could the Sámi people refer? 2) to what degree would Sámi *customary rights* play a role in defining present Sámi rights? and 3) what relevance did *international law* have?

In 1984 the first report was presented, giving suggestions for a few general transformations focusing on structural and legal preconditions (NOU 1984: 18). These proposals were formally adopted by legislative procedure and resulted in: a) the establishment of an elected representative assembly named *Sámi*

Parliament; b) the institution of a *Sámi Act*, formulating in more precise terms than ever before the status of the Sámi as aboriginal people; and c) as a consequence of the Sámi Act, a *Constitutional Amendment*, § 110a, meaning that the main objectives in terms of general Sámi rights stated in the Act are constitutionally protected and guaranteed. No doubt, at this stage the Sámi rights process had shown great progress, which was reinforced even further by the *Sámi Language Act* 1990. The latter Act recognized Sámi as an official language, equal to Norwegian, to be used in all circles of life in core areas of Sámi habitations, if so desired. The intent and purpose of the Sámi Act concludes with the following phrase: "It is the duty of Norway as a state to facilitate and see to it that the Sámi as a people will be able to secure and develop their own culture".

As a political body the Sámi Parliament is restricted to advisory functions unless a clearly defined power base is attached to it. Such a power base relates very much to law; i.e. Sámi rights must be both *identified*, *recognized* and eventually *codified* to make the Sámi Parliament operative.

In 1997 the Sámi Rights Commission delivered its report dealing with the material basis for the maintenance of the Sámi culture in Finnmark, i.e. Sámi rights to land and water (NOU 1997: 4). A special report on international law in connection with indigenous peoples' land rights was presented as a supplement (NOU 1997: 5). As it turned out, the Sámi Rights Commission failed to comply with the mandate on the crucial question of customary rights; the issue was considered far too complicated, and for this reason it would require new basic research. After several years of inquiry this omission was first announced in 1993 by the group of legal experts formed to provide required groundwork material on which the commission's own argumentation and proposals were to be based (NOU 1993: 34). To the newly instituted Sámi Parliament this neglect of an important issue was unacceptable; consequently it requested that a

new research project, focusing exclusively on Sámi customs and Sámi legal perceptions, as stated in the original mandate, should be carried out independently of the Sámi Rights Commission.

The research brought new insight and knowledge concerning local custom and how it influenced landuse patterns related to diverse Sámi specific means of livelihood. After less than three years this interdisciplinary research was completed in 2000, and it was published as a separate report connected to the Sámi Rights Commission by the end of 2001 (NOU 2001: 34).

Following upon a far-reaching hearing process, finalized in 1999, and the completion of the research project on Sámi customary law in 2000, the Ministry of Justice could at last, after lengthy preparations, introduce a proposition for legislation, mainly based on NOU 1997: 4, to the Norwegian Parliament, "Stortinget", in April 2003 (Ot.prp.nr 53).

In the following I will point out the main points of the law; as a comment I will, moreover, discuss its eventual connection to the Sámi rights process preceding the Bill for legislation; finally, it is necessary to inform about the Sámi internal, as well as cross-cultural, debate the proposition has caused<sup>2</sup>. The law is called "Finnmarksloven", the law regarding Finnmark (the northernmost county in Norway). The submitted law consists of four chapters divided into thirty-one §§. As a preamble the government asserts that the proposed law is a direct follow up of NOU 1997: 4, from the Sámi Rights Commission, dealing exclusively with questions related to the natural/material foundations of the Sámi culture. In the main, the law has to do with clarification of the legal situation and administration of land and natural resources. As can be seen, already the naming of the law departs markedly from the original intent and purpose of the Sámi Rights Commission. After more

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<sup>2</sup> Media attention this proposition drew was primarily related to the region. And the Sámi newspaper *Ságat* has been a most valuable source in its continuous and very detailed recordings of various aspects of the debate.



than twenty-two years of preparation for a clarification and explicit definition of Sámi rights, not even the name *Sámi* is retained in the proposed law. Instead, the Sámi as an indigenous people with an undeniable historical right to vast territories in the county of Finnmark are reduced to one of several kinds of people regionally attached to Finnmark.

Chapter I specifies some general provisions. § 1 sets the tone by offering the Sámi no exclusive rights but placing them on equal level with other regional inhabitants and the public in general. Hereby, Sámi empowerment in vital areas of Sámi cultural sustenance is impaired, which is in noticeable contrast to what had been expected after all these years from the Sámi rights process. § 3 makes a common statement that this law is in accordance with stipulations of international law. This is far from convincing, since the law firmly contradicts international law in so many areas; consequently this paragraph is void of meaning.

In addition Chapter I contains instructions for the administration of the commonage and the fact that the law will not violate, or interfere with, already existing rights, private or collective, based on *inheritance*, or *immemorial prescription*. It also indicates basic presumptions in terms of regulating and managing rights to resource use; the remaining part of the law has to do with specifications as to territorial management. As we see, then, the government has chosen to give more emphasis to the question of management than to the one concerning rights; it bears an unmistakable characteristic of bureaucracy rather than that of law. This is dubious and highly unexpected in view of the fact that the proposed law is supposed to be the end result of a lengthy Sámi rights process.

The law speaks about Finnmark property, "Finnmarkseiendomen", which is supposed to be defined as its own legal subject, administered by a Board consisting of 3 members appointed by the Sámi Parliament, 3 by the Finnmark County with a chair person alternating annually. The original

proposal of an additional member representing the Norwegian Government, but without voting power, was removed after Sámi pressure. The authority and tasks of this Board point to limited Sámi influence, also in Sámi relevant affairs. The Board will, furthermore, be subject to a Controlling Committee consisting of 3 members, one of which appointed by the Sámi Parliament.

In questions referring to national parks and expropriation generally, as well as rights to hunting, trapping and fishing, Sámi influence and controlling ability are curtailed. This means that established rights based on practice over time, by anyone irrespective of ethnic origin - a sort of open-ended rights - will by this law acquire codification, or at least affirmation. If so, the question remains: did we really need such a comprehensive, very time-consuming and costly, Sámi rights process, to have it confirmed once and for all that the Sámi do not have any specific rights founded on ethnicity and aboriginality with the exception of rights to reindeer pasture and related rights. This is thought-provoking considering that Norway is a state which, for several years, has placed itself in the front line when it comes to the development of international law concerning both human rights and aboriginal rights.

As demonstrated, the law offers no *clarification* of Sámi specific rights; as a consequence, with few exceptions, there is no *recognition* of Sámi specific rights. Considering the objective of the entire Sámi rights process, this is highly problematic. The law put forward does not open for any substantial change; therefore, *reconciliation* between different legal perceptions, normative orders, is still far from realization. As a result of this flagrant redundancy by the state authorities, showing great disregard for the Sámi as people and the Sámi Rights Commission and its profound and detailed work, the issue of *codification* is readily put aside, since there are no Sámi aboriginal rights to be codified at this stage. Exclusive rights to herd reindeer and rights to pasture, recognized as a traditional

Sámi means of production, are already codified by a special Reindeer Pastoralist Act (1978).

As it appears, the law is a compromise more than anything else. Key factors are balance, equality and regional economic development. It is a *property rights law*, "tingrettslig lov", and with that position the government has chosen to lay stress upon management procedures rather than on rights and the legal aspect generally: an apparent divergence from the primary mandate of the Sámi Rights Commission.

Without further explanations/discussion, the Ministry of Justice commits several important omissions. First of all, the suggested law does not in any satisfactory, or convincing, way follow the intentions in relation to recent developments of international law. To be close to the workable legal instruments embedded in the body of international law, a specification of Sámi indigenous rights, as well as Sámi empowerment, are minimum requirements. By defining away the ultimate question of Sámi entitlement to a set of special rights according to international legal standards, to which Norway officially agrees, the Norwegian Government places itself drastically on the side line. Moreover, the rights of the Coastal and Fiordal Sámi in addition to the East Sámi, issues scrutinized in great detail by the Sámi Rights Commission following its terms of reference, are equally neglected. In a similar way the aspect of *customary law* is completely invisible in the law. The total disregard for the latter subject is similarly astonishing considering that the government, after Sámi pressure, agreed to include the issue of customary law in the mandate. Furthermore the government accepted the demand by the Sámi Parliament to carry out and financially support the research project when that was needed, due to failure of the Sámi Rights Commission.

This substantial research report (652 pp.) is only referred in brief (2 p.) in the introductory text as background discussion to the proposed law. The same is valid for practically all abundant material/analysis emerging from the inquiry. (Besides the law itself,

7 pp., the proposition consists of a grounding text of 107 pp., in part summing up the contents of the various reports brought forth in the process, in part discussing the choice of delimitation made of the complex subject matter. See Ot.prp.nr 53, 2003.)

As to the research report focusing on Sámi customs/Sámi legal perceptions, the account in summary form of each study shows a correct understanding of the essence in terms of knowledge generated. The value of the research is summed up as follows: "The project has documented that in large parts of Finnmark there existed formerly specific Sámi customs. These customs were perceived as collective rights and up till the 1850's these customs were by and large respected by the Norwegian authorities. The research also shows that at present particular Sámi customs and legal perceptions do exist. These customs are kept alive in local communities and are still experienced as law-generating" (Ot.prp.nr 53:Ch. 3, p 5). The question still remains, why is not anything of this knowledge-generating contribution reflected in the law? And how is it possible to deny the Sámi any special rights based on aboriginality if their customary rights are still very much retained as normative orders locally? Local variations, Sámi cultural diversity, are, and have always been, a factor to consider, an obvious circumstance to follow up by the Sámi Rights Commission. It must, moreover, be underscored that if equity regarding the Sámi is advocated, special rights allocated to the Sámi are a prerequisite. Then, one must conclude that most of the components of this law seem to be built on erroneous premises. For example, empowerment of the Sámi Parliament, a specification expected ever since 1989 when this assembly was instituted, is now constrained merely to the right to appoint members to the Board and the Controlling Committee. This comes close to a status quo solution.

The proposal for such an encompassing and new law concerning the Sámi, awaited with great expectations among the Sámi for over twenty years, is highly questionable and has caused

an extensive and heated debate still going on. The Sámi Parliament immediately initiated a process aiming at a common, firm reaction to the proposal. Information meetings were arranged in all significant, relevant local areas, where local Sámi Associations/Sámi political parties could express their opinion. The Parliamentary Council, "Sametingsrådet", then prepared a comprehensive statement to be presented for open debate during the plenary meeting of the Sámi Parliament some six weeks after the Bill was introduced on April 4, 2003. The main point the Sámi Parliament wants to get across is that the Bill, as it stands, should not be passed by the Norwegian Parliament but sent back to the Ministry of Justice for further preparations. In spite of more than six years of basic preparation and deliberation, the end product is condemned as a hasty piece of work. The question of legitimacy is also raised. And in this respect the National Parliament must act with responsibility and caution, because, considering the objections expressed by the Sámi Parliament, there is no doubt that the legality of the law will be questioned if it is passed. Attention is also called to the ideological issue of *reconciliation* with earlier injustices the Sámi have suffered, in terms of an active assimilation/Norwegianization policy, which is not at all met by this law. On the contrary, the law serves more as a confirmation of the same negative policy.

Let me end this part of the argument by summing up the main points emanating from the statement recently adopted after lengthy debates by the general assembly of the Sámi Parliament. The statement is almost unanimous with the vote of 34 out of 37 in favor.

First of all, the Sámi Parliament cannot accept the law and demands appreciable alterations. To improve the proposed law the Sámi Parliament asks for extensive consultations, an opportunity so far missing. What the Sámi Parliament needs is decisive influence in regard to encroachments in and changed utilization of what the Sámi conceive as their land areas. Such influence

allocated to the Sámi is mandatory if the protective aspect of the law is ever to be increased. The Sámi Parliament, furthermore, demands that the law more clearly must be anchored in the Sámi Rights Commission and its thorough investigations. In the same way Sámi legal claims must be built on *custom, immemorial prescription, usage* and *aboriginal rights*, key conceptions not sufficiently reflected in the law. Important points totally missing are also referred to, such as those of a holistic identification of Sámi areas, rights to fishing and, finally, the situation of the special group of East Sámi. The latter group must be given special assurance for the continuation of their culture and community life. Lastly the statement calls for respect for the acknowledged fact that Norway is founded on the principle of two peoples, nations if you wish, Norwegians and Sámi, as constituting the state.

Thinking of the immediate future concerning Sámi rights the Sámi Parliament calls for *negotiations*, both to reformulate a law text which is more in tune with international law and contemporary Sámi reality and to establish an administrative regime for land management, i.e. a social contract between equal parties, the Sámi Parliament can accept.

The proposal discussed is, as expected, of great international interest and has activated engagement and endorsement for the Sámi cause both by the cross-national Sámi Council, represented by members of the Sámi political assemblies in the four nation-states having Sámi populations, and the UN-Forum for Indigenous Peoples.

As a most timely event, the UN-Forum held its annual large-scale conference just a few weeks after the Finnmark law was presented. And a major point on the agenda was a recurring and expressly stated critique of Norway for missing the opportunity to take the lead in the improvement and clarification of aboriginal rights to land and water, the material foundation for cultural survival, which to very many indigenous peoples remains the number one issue. In particular delegates from developing

countries reacted with discouragement and great worry. Strong sentiments expressed a consensual feeling at the conference: Norway, believed to be a leading country and example for the rest of the world in pointing to indigenous rights issues and their gradual improvements, is now about to betray its former ideal, thereby surrendering its front line position. As it was phrased, by such a law Norway not only deceives the Sámi but also indigenous people all over the world. The anticipated law could have served as an example for others to refer to and follow. Now with a legal framework for action which implies no change to speak of, the process towards progress in the continual struggle seems to have come to a stop, at least for an unforeseeable period of time. This in itself is an issue which is bound to be brought up in the approaching debate in the Norwegian Parliament, where Norway's international reputation may be questioned by effective lobbying on behalf of Sámi interests. In other words, what the UN conference brought up could very well work to the advantage of the Sámi; an additional means to inhibit legislation at this stage can hereby be discerned. Obviously the Norwegian Parliament will lend a sensitive ear to such negative criticism.

Before closing this section, two other modes of reaction against the proposed law are worth noting. First, as the Finnmark law to such great extent is in opposition to recent verdicts in the Supreme Court, most favorable to the Sámi as they have broken new legal grounds, the Selbu case (2001) and the Svartskog case (2001), an appeal for confrontation in court has been suggested, assuming the law is passed by the Norwegian Parliament in its original form (Åhrén, 2003: 86). According to Mattias Åhrén, a young Sámi trained in law and specializing in indigenous rights, the progress made in court should serve as an effective means to influence the further process towards final legislation. Second, the issue is considered so serious that traditional ritual thoughts and practice have been actualized. Sámi shamanistic power has been mobilized as a clear voice against the Finnmark law - a *mantra*. This

"strength of thought for Sámi rights", as it is called, should be repeated by as many as possible once a week at the same day and hour, explicitly urging the government to present a far better proposal for legislation concerning Sámi rights.

The original intention of the Norwegian Government was to have the introduced law passed by the Norwegian Parliament in June 2003, before closing for summer vacation. However, due to the ongoing public debate and the extremely critical reaction to it by the Sámi Parliament, such a time table proved unrealistic.

As an end product the proposal is full of palpable shortcomings and remains, to a great extent, an unfinished piece of work. It should be noted that in 1995 the former Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, gave a speech to the Sámi Parliament in full assembly, in which she made it clear that the outcome of the projected research on Sámi customs/legal perceptions, concurrently with the investigations by the Sámi Rights Commission, were to form the basis for further political dealing with proposals for new legislation, in particular focusing on land management in Finnmark. Here we observe an authorized promise from the very highest political level. The previous discussion shows without doubt that the Finnmark law, as it now appears, has broken most promises and obligations formerly stated. Therefore, we can conclude that without *specification* and *recognition* of special Sámi rights, there can be no *codification*, which means legal ambiguity will remain as it has been; at the same time the Sámi Parliament will continue to lack a sufficient power base.

In the end the Sámi were able to exert enough pressure to have the legislation postponed, demanding consultations and further inquiries to central issues, especially related to international law. In this way they managed to have the final product for legislation to comply more closely with the initial intent and purpose. In the process towards improving the original proposal for a law (Ot.prp. 53, 2003) the Sámi demands were met a long way. The settlement, which to a certain degree shows willingness



to compromise, as the law must deal with issues concerning all original inhabitants of the county, not only the Sámi, nevertheless provides the Sámi with a legal framework for action, serving as an efficient instrument for protecting their aboriginal rights. Thereby the Sámi Parliament is assured a reasonable power base.

On Mai 24, 2005 the Finnmark Act was finally passed by the Norwegian Parliament by a great majority, in other words about two years later than first intended. Prior to enactment 4 substantial consultations were held between the Parliamentary Committee and the parties involved, i.e. the Sámi Parliament and the Finnmark County Administration. The Sámi proved very active in this process handing in no less than 7 so called working documents in preparing for the continual dialogue. In this fashion the Sámi influence is shown particularly in reference to the leading aspects of international law principles and Sámi customary law. At the same time, by means of such consultative process the Norwegian Parliament created a new model in preparing for legislation. In other words, it is no overstatement to regard the enactment of the Finnmark Act as unique in terms of the history of the Norwegian Parliament, and thanks to Sámi pressure a new era in policy-making vis-à-vis the Sámi has been established.

## b) The Nisga´a

A court case, drawing great attention both nationally and internationally, preceded the treaty process regarding the Nisga´a Nation in BC, Canada. The case (Calder), named after Chief Frank Calder, who was the initiator in choosing the strategy of making use of the white man´s court system, ended with a Supreme Court verdict in 1973. In many ways this has been considered a landmark decision; it is, furthermore, viewed as a moral victory, mainly for the Nisga´a but also for First Nations in Canada at large. The issue to be tested was *Nisga´a Aboriginal Title* and the claim that it had never been lawfully extinguished. The question of land rights was

in focus, in particular the Nisga'a perception concerning rights to land to be held commonly by a tribe or clan in contrast to Canadian common law and its view on private property rights.

The Nisga'a were still a non-treaty indigenous people; in furthering a Nisga'a political program, therefore, a test of their fundamental rights in the legal arena of the majority society was required. The ultimate aim of the action dealt with *clarification*, *confirmation* and *recognition* of specific Nisga'a rights, derived from their Aboriginal title. Even if it was a split decision, the conclusion of the Supreme Court was a significant novelty at the time; "Nisga'a had concepts of ownership indigenous to their culture and capable of articulation under the common law" (Calder 1973/SCR 373). Moreover, the court reasoned that the Nisga'a had Aboriginal title to their ancient lands in the Nass valley before British sovereignty was asserted (McKee, 2000: 26). In this way Nisga'a cultural distinctiveness and the legal strength of their customary law are acknowledged by the highest legal authority of the nation-state. In addition, the Supreme Court admitted that the Nisga'a had always used and occupied the territory they claim to be theirs. The outcome of the Calder case broke new grounds and showed unexpected strength. It placed the issue of aboriginal rights on the political agenda as never before.

Soon after Calder, the federal policy vis-a-vis indigenous people was transformed; for example, already in 1975 it was decided that native land claims negotiations were to occur throughout Canada, settling the land rights issue with most non-treaty indigenous peoples, and with the verdict in Calder as a basis. By this change of formal policy the Federal Government acknowledged certain key organizing principles, such as Aboriginal self-determination, treaty rights and self-government. Not unexpectedly, the Nisga'a appeared as one of the first aboriginal peoples to enter negotiations (1976), referring to the above mentioned principles as a point of departure. In other words, influenced by the Nisga'a trial on Aboriginal rights, the Federal

Government was prepared to adopt a new policy on *Aboriginal title*, a process focusing on treaty-making. In the following, an account of the Nisga'a treaty process will be offered, as well as the implementation of the Final Agreement reached between the parties involved, i.e. the Nisga'a on the one hand, and BC and Canada (the Provincial and Federal Governments) on the other.

The negotiation process turned out to be most complicated and lasted for twenty-two years before a conclusion was reached - first an Agreement in Principle (1996), later on a Final Agreement (1998), eventually referred to as the Nisga'a Treaty. An important aspect of the negotiation was the continuous reference made to the Nisga'a ancient code of laws and customs still very much sustained and practiced in everyday life among the Nisga'a. Their customary rights to land and resources are clearly defined through a special Nisga'a law called *Ayuukhl Nisga'a*. The latter law represented a living tradition which offered evidential strength to the Nisga'a cause in two vital respects:

- 1) it proved that the Nisga'a without doubt was a culturally viable nation, where cultural difference played a meaningful role; 2) its clear regulation of land use patterns and control undoubtedly made the Nisga'a entitled to certain rights. Long before white man's contact they had arranged their life based on a set of rules contained in *Ayuukhl*. This customary law was not an item for negotiation; on the other hand it served as a crucial guide line, as it gave strength to those actively taking part at the negotiation table always to have their *Ayuukhl* in mind.

To serve its purpose the complex body of traditional knowledge derived from the *Ayuukhl* needed to be made comprehensible for the other negotiation parties. Consequently the Nisga'a conducted a "Land Use and Occupancy Study", which was about law and distribution of land based on custom. The study was completed with a map defining in great detail what is considered Nisga'a lands, named "Nisga'a Land and Nass Wildlife Area". As shown, customary law discourse can have an effect on political

processes as a fundamental strategy dealing with nation-state authorities, for example in land claims negotiations. In addition the Nisga'a also appointed a special *Ayuukhl Nisga'a Committee*, consisting of a group of elders who functioned as an advisory body for the Nisga'a negotiation team. The strong influence the *Ayuukhl* exerted during the negotiations proved that *law* was never a foreign conception to the Nisga'a. Nisga'a life was always based on and regulated by custom/tradition. And the predominant source for this is their *Ayuukhl*, reactivated in new contexts vital for cultural survival such as legal confrontations and land claims negotiations.

A sufficient land base is necessary for the Nisga'a to secure cultural sustenance and future developments which are culturally relevant. For a very long time it has been the number one issue to be resolved. For this reason the restated Federal policy, actualizing comprehensive land claims negotiations, was very timely. The court case tested out the apparent strength of the Nisga'a claim prior to such negotiations, and the customary law discourse, focusing on *Ayuukhl Nisga'a*, became instrumental in the long-lasting negotiation process as it dealt so explicitly with the duality between tradition and modernity. All elements mentioned are crucial for the outcome, the Treaty, and how it should be evaluated in Nisga'a terms. (For a more extensive account of the customary law discourse concerning this particular case, see Svensson, 2002) In the following we will turn to the Treaty and its implementation.

The Nisga'a Final Agreement (1998) is the specific document emanating from the negotiation process. By means of ratification by the three parties involved it is formalized into a Treaty. Even if the Treaty and the *Ayuukhl* are separate units in terms of shaping Nisga'a self-governance, there is a definitive connection between the two key factors. Nisga'a traditional territory, entirely owned by the Nisga'a Nation, is expressly defined in the Treaty. In this manner the Treaty has resolved the outstanding question of land rights; Nisga'a Aboriginal title is thereby affirmed. The Treaty, furthermore, recognizes firm rights to self-government, which

makes the Agreement rather unique. In terms of real political autonomy this Agreement appears, so far, as the strongest ever to be attained by any First Nations people in Canada; for the first time a Treaty includes a clause on self-government.

Due to its culturally defined power base, firmly attached to their traditional knowledge, not the least the *Ayuukhl*, Nisga'a self-government comes close to a third level of government within the Canadian political structure; in that capacity it relates directly to the Federal and Provincial governments; at the same time it differentiates itself from common municipal governments.

As a result of the Treaty, Nisga'a governmental jurisdiction covers a broad range of community management. Their authority is affirmed regarding such fields as culture and language, issues related to employment and public works, and land use; health, child welfare, education services and marriage are other sectors of daily life over which the Nisga'a will have authority; finally the Nisga'a will have their own police force and, if so desired, they can establish their own court. The legal instrument for the latter authorities will appear as their own system of laws, which in no way should be confused with the *Ayuukhl*.

To be fully operative, Nisga'a self-government requires a *Constitution*, which will function as a political steering instrument, the number one feature following upon the Treaty. This Constitution, formulated exclusively by the Nisga'a themselves, reflects the bridge linking modernity with tradition. Nisga'a self-government is modelled accordingly: first, a central government, the *Nisga'a Lisims Government*, which in a way replaces the former Nisga'a Tribal Council which was operative during the entire negotiation process; second, a *Village Government* in each of the four local communities; third, a *Council of Elders*. The latter council will serve and uphold a guiding function vis-a-vis the two levels of Nisga'a government. By such structure, there are enough guarantees that Nisga'a policy making corresponds to their

customary law and their managing and practicing of traditional knowledge, *Ayuukhl*.

The body of traditional knowledge embedded in the *Ayuukhl* does not only have an impact on the Nisga'a Constitution and the political structure resulting from the Treaty. In such vital areas of policy making as land use planning and establishing their own justice system, Nisga'a laws, tradition plays an equally strong role. Nisga'a laws are separate from, however not contrary to, *Ayuukhl*; at the same time this system of laws differentiates itself from Canadian Common Law and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. The latter two are prevalent whenever applicable, e.g. the Nisga'a are not ascribed criminal law authority. Certain legal autonomy no doubt emanated from the Treaty process. Two sets of principles are thereby specified: principles of rights and principles of dispute resolution. These principles merge traditional legal preceptions of the Nisga'a Nation, contained in *Ayuukhl*, with a set of newly created laws in accordance with the Treaty, including the Constitution, referred to as *Nisga'a laws*. The key principle of rights is that resources and responsibilities are shared within the community, based on a *unique spirit, dignity and independence*, as reflected in Nisga'a traditions, referred to as the "Common Bowl Philosophy". Dispute resolutions are primarily founded on *values* expressed in *Ayuukhl*, specified in the following conceptualization: unity of Nisga'a Nation, collective understanding of *Ayuuk*, healing and reconciliation, dignity and respect, restoring harmony. Such Community Based Justice, merging ideas of *Nisga'a laws* with *Ayuukhl*, emphasizes *restitution* not punishment. Finally, it should be stressed that having their own Justice system has political meaning for indigenous peoples; it gives to the people their voices, power.

Implementation of the Treaty also deals with the shaping of a Nisga'a relevant academic education, a "Nisga'a studies program". Building competence to meet new challenges following upon the Treaty is met in this way. In the implementation process their own

college, *Wilp Wilxo'oskwl Nisga'a*, (Nisga'a House of Wisdom) appears as a most important institution. The same can be said about the *Ayuukhl Nisga'a Department*, under the Nisga'a Lisims Government, set up to carry out basic research focusing in particular on Nisga'a traditional knowledge. The political awareness of the strength of tradition explains the importance put on education and research in such a culture specific fashion. This, moreover, reinforces the highly diversified degree of autonomy attained through the Treaty process, instrumental in shaping Nisga'a culture political actions in the future.

We can summarize this case by stating that a land claims settlement eventually covers much more than the specific question of land rights, as it settles also the issue of self-government. The Treaty negotiations turned out to have a dual purpose, making the Nisga'a case a model for future Treaty-making processes. It has set a standard for future Treaty-negotiated forms of self-government, proving that land claims settlement and self-government are inseparable in this kind of comprehensive negotiations. (For further information about Aboriginal self-government in Canada, including the Nisga'a lesson, see D. Russell, 2000) It should also be noted that the Final Agreement is constitutionally protected, i.e. under the Constitution Act, section 35, of 1982.

### c) The Ainu

Not until the 1980's did the Ainu in Hokkaido, northern Japan, appear on the international arena. Behind this was a growing cultural awareness and mobilization on ethnic grounds among the Ainu nationally. In counteracting a long-lasting official policy of assimilation, the Ainu wanted to view themselves as a distinct people; this was based on a notion of historical uniqueness with a rich tradition, and an idea of contrast, i.e. differentiation from the dominant population of Japan (Cf. Sjöberg, 1993). In consequence the Ainu decided that their principal political goal

was to launch a legislative process to force the enactment of a new Ainu law. The new law, *Ainu Shinpo*, was to replace the old Ainu law of 1899, the so-called Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act, a legal instrument affirming Japanese assimilation policy towards the Ainu. The main objective for the Ainu was to bring about a set of cultural and political rights; in addition, a formal recognition as *indigenous* was considered as a precondition for any resolution involving the Ainu as one partner in the dispute. Inspired by international movements, the Ainu claimed the establishment of a new kind of partnership, in which the Ainu and the national government can enter negotiations as equal parties, at least in symbolic terms. The premise for any partnership of this nature is that the Ainu are recognized as an indigenous ethnic minority, thereby being entitled to special rights. Only in this capacity, it is believed, can the prevalent assimilation policy be replaced by actual multiculturalism.

By initiating claims related to international law principles, in addition to a Fourth World discourse more generally, the Ainu entered a new era. *Ainu Shinpo* was originally drafted by the Ainu through their representative body *Utari Kyokai* (the Ainu Association of Hokkaido). The proposed law embraces both *political rights*, specified as special forest rights, including rights to self-determination, and *cultural rights*, meaning a strengthening and vitalization of the cultural repertoire (The drafting process began in 1983 and a final draft was introduced to the Japanese government in 1988). Special forest rights serve as a substitution for land rights proper. The Ainu have lost their land through the colonizing process inaugurated by the Japanese dominant society in the later half of the 19th century, a policy legally formalized by the old Ainu law of 1899. In other words, land lost cannot be reclaimed, nor can land rights be reestablished; however, the idea of a home land, *Ainu Moshiri*, is still maintained and reactualized as a predominant element in the Ainu formulation of their political



agenda. It is here the conception of special forest rights comes in; these are rights to resource extraction, especially hunting and fishing rights, which mirror the Ainu tradition of a forest way of life. These forest rights do not mainly refer to subsistence; their symbolic meaning is far more important, as Ainu ceremonial life is intimately connected to a forest life style. Thereby traditional values and concerns are revived and reinforced to meet new circumstances.

In their political rhetoric the Ainu pressed for actual land rights as a constituting part of their indigenous rights claim; any recognition of such a claim points to the issue of fair compensation for all the land lost. This has to do with strategy, converting the conception of land rights into rights to compensation, representing a significant component incorporated in the complex idea of Ainu Shinpo. The legitimacy of such rights emanates from the historical fact, maintained by the Ainu, that they are the indigenous people in Hokkaido; consequently they have a historical right to what is attributed as their home land, *Ainu Moshiri*. Ainu indigenuity is founded on that perception.

Why is the concept of *indigenous* so important? Why is the formal *recognition* as indigenous crucial? The concept of indigenous is part of a current international law discourse, therefore it has strategic value. It, furthermore, plays a role in adding legitimacy to specific claims concerning cultural and political/legal rights. If the designation as indigenous was not so commonly recognized internationally, endorsed especially by the UN, it would not have such decisive import. Most Fourth World peoples are recognized as indigenous by their respective state authorities. The Ainu, on the other hand, have not yet reached that point. In order to assume basic rights essential for their survival as people, they feel they need a similar acknowledgement.

Ainu Shinpo is thought to remedy the problematic situation the Ainu face at present. As a legal instrument Ainu Shinpo is complex; it refers to the improvement of Ainu living conditions, it

implies a promotion of Ainu culture, and, finally, it is a comprehensive claim founded on indigenous rights. The first two measures can be handled by means of affirmative action; the last issue has to do with legislation, including constitutional change, a demand for rearrangement which the Japanese authorities so far have met with complete restraint and even dismissal. In this respect we can notice a most consequential contradiction on the part of the Japanese government. The authorities are prepared to recognize not only welfare needs for the Ainu but also promotion of their cultural repertoire. At the same time, they refuse to recognize the Ainu as indigenous people despite recurring requests. It is believed that only Ainu Shinpo in total, as originally outlined by the Ainu themselves, can be effectual in trying to overcome all the difficulties and detrimental effects caused by this contradiction. Increased self-respect and cultural pride depend on being recognized as indigenous; to be efficient the continual struggle towards cultural survival requires such formal endorsement. This kind of acknowledgement is not merely of symbolic importance; its meaning is indeed real<sup>3</sup>.

In connection to the reconstruction of the Ainu culture and Ainu ethnic identity following upon a growing cultural awareness in general, i.e. the use of a notion of "Ainuness" for clearly defined political ends (Siddle, 1996), their cultural repertoire has been revived and given new meaning in an on-going ethnopolitical struggle. Without question the cultural repertoire will be given

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<sup>3</sup> In reinforcing their defined strategy, the Ainu frequently made use of diverse international arenas. The address to the U. N. General Assembly Dec. 1992 by Giichi Nomura, then President of the Utari Kyokai, bear witness of that. The following citation from the address sums up Ainu basic ideology: "*As an indigenous people living within a highly assimilationist and industrialized society such as Japan, the Ainu request that the United Nations move speedily to set international standards that guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples against various forms of ethnocide. Furthermore, as an indigenous people from the Asian region, where there has never been a tradition of considering the rights of indigenous peoples, the Ainu urgently request that the U.N. set up an international agency to clarify the situation of indigenous peoples. The Ainu desire rights of indigenous peoples, including right to self-determination as a people. We do not seek separation but a high level of autonomy based on our fundamental values of 'co-existence with nature' and 'peace through negotiation'.*" (quoted from *The History of the Ainu Movement 1988 - 1994*, Utari Kyokai, Sapporo)

extra strength and new opportunities for development based on the enactment of AINU Shinpo.

This process towards recognition culminated in 1997. First the Ainu attained a legal recognition in a court case, Sapporo District Court March 1997, with the explicit conclusion that the Ainu are an indigenous minority in Japan. The court stated, moreover, that the Nibutani Dam construction had caused expropriation of sacred Ainu land, which should be considered a violation of their human rights. The individual Ainu who filed the law suit did not expect to nullify an earlier decision to exploit the area for industrial purposes, but wanted mainly to draw attention to matters in principle, in particular the unsolved question of Ainu indigenity. In that endeavour they succeeded; transferring legal recognition into political recognition, however, turned out to be more complicated.

Soon after this verdict, the new Ainu law, *Ainu Shinpo*, was passed in the Japanese Parliament, *Diet*, in May 1997. For the first time ever, the existence of the Ainu as an ethnic minority in Japan was officially confirmed; the Ainu were not, however, acknowledged as indigenous. The latter would have implied that the Ainu are entitled to certain rights based on their indigeneity, which apparently still was unacceptable.

As shown, then, the contradiction on the part of the Japanese authorities continues by means of a half-way acknowledgement of cultural diversity. The new law, which displays many characteristics of a compromise, is named "Ainu Cultural Promotion Law"; emphasis is laid on culture and material welfare, not on rights from an international law perspective. For instance, the new law does not refer to such fundamental issues as rights to self-determination or land rights (Siddle, 2000), which indicates that the "Ainu voice" was not heard to the extent expected by the Ainu after such long strife, going back to the AINU Shinpo Draft, 1984.

We may conclude then that the AINU Shinpo process first involves *ethnification* of politics; the enactment of a new Ainu law is

certainly a political issue, an issue which can only be realized by means of political action, the legitimacy of which falls back on explicit ethnification. Second, the Ainu Shinpo process is an event in which ethnicity is *politicized* (Tambiah, 1994). The notion of certain welfare measures, combined with support for the Ainu cultural repertoire, is not a satisfactory solution unless it relates to the issue of indigenous rights in full scale. It is only then that the Ainu will become less marginalized and more equal, symbolically as well as from a real point of view, i.e. obtaining a position of parity in a multicultural context. Ainu ethnopolitics, no doubt, brought about political gains; a sense of Ainu nationhood, however, will continue to form part of the political rhetoric, as the issue of recognizing the Ainu as indigenous is still unsettled. And the political advantage emerging from the entire Ainu Shinpo process can be summarized as a challenge and gradual elimination of the dominant view in Japan of the Ainu as a "dying race"; instead, the Ainu appear as a nation persistently reacting to marginalization (Siddle, 1996). Ainu Shinpo is far from perfect and much remains to be accomplished, as this brief summons indicates. On the other hand, it represents a step forward in improving Ainu conditions as a distinct people, a new law for a new emerging nation within the Japanese nation-state. The nation-building process the Ainu initiated some twenty-five years ago, was heavily inspired and influenced by international law discourse. At the same time, it revitalized their rich cultural repertoire, in Siddle's terms "a politics of memory" (Siddle, 1996), and remains the most positive aspect of the Ainu Shinpo process.

### **Constraints and possibilities in attaining reconciliation of divergent normative orders**

The three cases discussed are commensurable in more than one way. First, the Sámi, the Nisga'a and the Ainu are all Sub-Arctic, partly Arctic, peoples. Second, they are deeply involved in

an aboriginal rights discourse to a large extent bringing together politics and law. Such combined strategy is essential for all indigenous minority groups who wish to meet the challenge of modernity, encapsulated as they are within nation-state structures. Third, focus has been laid on processes aiming at change, especially referring to clarification and improvement of their status (indigenous or not) and life conditions, generally, for these people, recognizing cultural distinctiveness. The Nisga'a Treaty process, the Sámi Rights process, and the Ainu Shinpo process without exception deal with law and politics. In different degrees they are all directed towards a counteraction of an official assimilation policy. In this respect the Nisga'a with their Nisga'a Lisims government, their own Constitution and a system of Nisga'a Laws are closest to reaching a point of real autonomy. The Sámi have acquired a sort of self-government, Sámi Parliament, with limited power, including constitutional protection of rights in principle; on the other hand, the recent special law, "Finnmarksloven", passed by the Norwegian Parliament, does not specify any substantial rights to land and water based on Sámi indigeneity, nor does it offer an essential power base specifically for the Sámi Parliament. For instance, the governing agency for land management is highly questionable. The Finnmark property, including much of original Sámi lands, is supposed to be administered by what is called the Finnmark Board of Land Management (See p. 6 concerning membership). This means adaptation to modernity, however primarily on Norwegian preconditions.

The basic change proposed deals with state-owned land (90%) of the entire county of Finnmark with substantial Sámi use rights being converted to regionally authorized land management rights, not ethnically defined. Sámi territorial rights will thereby be limited, maybe even reduced compared to former conditions. In this way the Sámi rights process at present must be reckoned as incomplete, to say the least. We can notice a striking contrast to the Nisga'a Treaty and its subsequent Constitution, which comes

very close to an adaptation to modernity appropriate to Nisga'a interests.

The Ainu, finally, have so far obtained the poorest result. No land rights to be discussed, no political assembly instituted, and not even a formal recognition of the Ainu as an indigenous people represent in sum a severe set-back. Emphasis is placed on non-controversial issues, such as culture, more narrowly perceived, and various welfare measures; more decisive issues dealing with rights and power are deliberately left out. The Ainu Cultural Promotion Law of 1997 does not meet the aspirations and requirements of the Ainu, and the acknowledgement of the Ainu as an ethnic minority only states an obvious fact and is far from satisfactory, as the question of Ainu indigeneity remains unresolved.

The essence of the processes discussed can be attached to the following sequence of conceptions: it starts with *recognition* of status as people and rights; without such recognition of an external party relevant for the cause, for example nation-state authorities, there can be no *reconciliation*. As a fundamental prerequisite the question of recognition is extremely complex; depending on the concrete situation, that which is at stake may refer to Aboriginal title, Aboriginal rights, including land rights and rights to self-rule, status as indigenous, customary law expressing indigenous justice, legal and cultural diversity, and resource management rights. At the same time, it is expected that a proper balance between tradition and modernity is maintained (Cf. Hoekema, 1995).

Reconciliation entails: a) acceptance of cultural diversity, and b) the relinquishing of any tendency of assimilation/paternalist policy on behalf of the nation-state. Assuming these two aspects to be accomplished *plural normative orders* in one way or another can be established to serve the interests of indigenous minority peoples. For example, treaty-making processes, like the Nisga'a case, are ideal for reconciliation in the way they handle Crown sovereignty in relation to Aboriginal rights. The essence of such treaties is the explicit recognition of Aboriginal title by agreement (McKee,

2001). *Legal pluralism*, or pluralistic legality (Hoekema, 1995), does not necessarily imply two or more coexisting legal systems, but rather that the acceptance and recognition of cultural diversity, incorporating also legal plurality, i.e. people's customs/legal perceptions, are to be considered in various legal conflict resolutions, in official courts and in other less formal fora.

Legal pluralism is a conceptional construction for placing state law and non-state law within the same society, without merging the two components into one legal system. In an earlier article (2003) I have argued that the distance between state law and non-state law is still rather great, which may cause negative implications for indigenous peoples. To shorten the distance without incorporation, thus creating a legal pluralistic order in a real sense, the two legal instruments, international law and customary law, which are mutually acknowledged, could serve as bridge-building factors. André Hoekema (1995) has penetrated in a convincing way the complexity of pluralistic legality, pointing to various elements to be included. Recognition of diversity within a nation-state depends on moral values which generate devolution of power to distinct social entities, in conjunction with the recognition of self-justice. It is, according to Hoekema, a question of making the competencies of indigenous people compatible with nation-state competencies (Hoekema, 1995: 237-38).

*Autonomy* exemplifies the final link in this sequence, connecting law and society. Attaining cultural-political autonomy for indigenous people does in no way challenge nation-state sovereignty. It is primarily a question of *devolution of power*, not separation from a nation-state arrangement. The notion of reconciliation presumes devolution of power in a real sense, not only symbolically in the form of verbal phraseology. As demonstrated, the Nisga'a come closest to establishing their own power base, which reflects functional autonomy. The Sámi have lately moved in that direction; the recent law on the issue of land rights, though, seems to have caused a standstill, at least

temporarily, in the process towards autonomy. When it comes to the Ainu, to this day there is very little autonomy to speak of. In other words, the Nisga'a are at present in a stage of consolidating progress obtained, while both the Sámi and the Ainu are forced to continue their struggle for autonomy in cultural as well as in political terms, considered a prerequisite for their survival as people. In the Sámi case the process towards autonomy is still unsettled and open, whereas for the Ainu the process seems to be closed, at least for the time being, as a result of recent legislation.

Common for these nations is also the manner in which they made use of a legal strategy for political ends, i.e. entering the legal arena of the dominant state societies to test their rights in principle in courts. The Calder, Nisga'a (1973), the Alta case, Sámi (1981), and the Nibutani case, Ainu (1997) all attempted to gain a clarification and a legally approved recognition of aboriginal rights, platform from which future ethno-political action could be launched.

As there is a built-in conflict of interest between an indigenous minority people and the larger society and its dominant population, the resulting change of the comprehensive transformational processes, as here exemplified, not infrequently ends in the form of compromise. This state of affairs constrains desired solutions defined by the rather powerless minority party. Looking at the three cases, the Nisga'a appear as the only people having real negotiation power. The Sámi have long wanted to be in a similar position; in the end they managed to demand something similar to actual negotiations to revise the proposed enactment "Finnmarksloven", thereby obtaining a legal framework for action more in tune with Sámi inherent rights and their unequivocal status as indigenous. For the Ainu, negotiation power is still non-existent. As demonstrated, the opportunity to enter negotiations more readily opens opportunities for influencing the end result than the formal procedures of expert inquiries preceding legislation. In Canada the Nisga'a lesson serves as a model for the continual



treaty-making processes. Currently more than eighty self-government negotiations are taking place, all looking at the Nisga'a treaty (Russell, 2000: 55).

What has been said so far points to evident contradictions, a situation which may come close to what is referred to as anomie. Both the Sámi Rights Commission and the Ainu Shinpo process, despite thorough preparation for legislation, concluded with new laws disregarding ethnic uniqueness. Consequently, neither the Sámi nor the Ainu are currently ascribed rights to land and water based on ethnicity and aboriginality. This is far from the original intention; only the Nisga'a have been able to avoid such contradictory, non-committed resolution. Through negotiation they attained a Treaty, clarifying and confirming their inherent rights as people concerning rights to land, title rights, and to self-government.

Land rights is a corner stone in developing the political and legal position of any indigenous people. It constitutes a power base; at the same time it has symbolic significance. The attachment to land, the notion of a home land - be it *Nass/Lisims*, *Sápmi* or *Ainu Moshiri* - forms part of contemporary rhetorical articulation; in a similar way it is a constituent element leading to actual empowerment.

Another common feature we can observe among indigenous people is the *customary law discourse*. Customs and their own legal perceptions are universal properties; the shape the discourse takes, on the other hand, is rather unique. In the general ethno-political strategy discussed, customary law appears as an important element, adding both strength and legitimacy to claims advanced. The advantage of the conception of customary law, furthermore, derives from its common use in state law; the legal views founded on custom are both accepted and considered relevant by the legal establishment of society. The difference relates to whether customary law is part of written law or mainly expressed as non-

written law. The latter is usually the case regarding customary law among indigenous people; for this reason its evidential power will in many instances be questioned. One outstanding question to be resolved, therefore, is to have aboriginal customary law clearly recognized as a *source of law*, i.e. its actual force in legal decision making procedures.

This brings us to the aspect of *codification*. In some cases codification of customary law may be advantageous and consequently desirable. The Sámi and the Ainu have lost much of the traditional knowledge on which their customary rights were orally sustained. However, after new basic research has been done, such codification is contemplated as positive. It is believed that it would facilitate conflict resolutions in the legal arena if they could refer to their codified customs/legal perceptions. As a contrast the Nisga'a maintain that their customary law, *Ayuukhl*, should remain oral. If it were transformed to a written document accessible to anyone, the risk for misinterpretation, or misuse, by various external parties, would be too great. Otherwise, to sustain this vast and rather complex body of knowledge, essential for Nisga'a identity, recording and converting the knowledge into a written text to be used for educational purposes is required. The Nisga'a with their autonomy are coping with this dilemma at present, compromising between educational needs and the balance between tradition and modernity, where tradition to a large extent connects to oral sustenance and transmittance. Having their own Constitution, their own Nisga'a Laws, they believe it is important to vindicate, at least publicly, the oral characteristic of their *Ayuukhl*.

For indigenous people a functional balance is desirable between rigid codification, in the sense of state law, and retaining the flexible nature of indigenous justice (Cf. Hoekema, 2001: 304). For this reason formal recognition of customary rights and its relevance in modern legal decision making appears far more important than codification per se. If codification of the same set

of rights is presumed, it should be modelled in accordance with legal standards traditionally ascertained by the indigenous people in question. Thereby a notion of diversity pertaining to codification is introduced. Obviously such differentiation falls back on the commonly accepted cultural plurality. Recent developments in the courts also point to an emerging acceptance of oral evidence, i.e. customary law and traditional knowledge being referred to as an adequate source of law. (See, e.g., *Delgamuukw v. BC*, Canadian Supreme Court, 1997)

Their own initiated *research* reflects cultural diversity and is essential for the relevant competence building the Nisga'a, the Sámi and the Ainu currently are engaged in. This research is governed by the interconnection between *tradition* and *modernity*, it is institutionalized and manned by indigenous personnel, and specific research projects are carried out jointly by indigenous and non-indigenous scholars. The establishment of the Ayuukhl Nisga'a Department (2000), the Nordic Sámi Institute (1973), and the Ainu Research Center (1994) represent steps in the right direction, emphasizing research as a strategic means to gain new grounds politically.

The case material described and analyzed are all about *politics of recognition*. In its form of action as well as goal orientation, each event is basically political, and it has to do with meeting the challenge of diversity, be it cultural, political or legal. A model for regional multiculturalism may be conceptualized as direct consociation, which means explicit state recognition of indigenous self-government related to a specific territory and based on customs (Hoekema, 2001: 295). Only the Nisga'a come close to such a position, however not completely, whereas the Sámi and the Ainu still are far from reaching that stage. If diversity did not have meaning, the aim towards formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness, including associated power, rights, promotion of culture, etc., would not have such import.

This points to the final aspect of the transformational occurrences treated, that of *nation-building*. Regardless of the outcome of each particular case, they have all contributed to a unification and mobilization of aboriginal people founded on ethnicity to engage in actively shaping their own nation. Such actions continuing for twenty or more years, are markedly conducive to nation-building, which undoubtedly should be viewed as a positive aspect of the above cross-cultural processes focusing mainly on legal concerns. Never before have the Nisga'a, the Sámi and the Ainu appeared as united people in the same manner working for common goals. This improvement on the ideological level has come to stay and is independent of the final outcome of the cases in question. To cope with new problems, fundamental conflicts of interests, and the challenge of diversity, defining themselves and being recognized as a nation are the most decisive steps towards real empowerment and autonomy, regardless of population size.

In summing up, what lessons of generality can be drawn from the argument pursued? Of the three strategies for change available, that of negotiation seems to give the greatest dividend, whereas both legal testing in court and enactment through legislation only to a limited degree generate favorable results. Notwithstanding strategy chosen, depending on the specific situation, i.e. whether there is a matter of choice or not, the time factor is comparable, the processes towards change are markedly slow and long-lasting occurrences. In most cases, for nation-states reaching compromises seem to prevail over a political will to actual devolution of power. Lastly the position of the majority society is often contradictory. Explicit recognition of cultural difference is not accompanied by the acknowledgement of substantial political and legal rights leading to relative autonomy, factors on which cultural distinctiveness are founded. Assets counteracting the constraints relate to international law, in particular the legitimate force of aboriginal rights discourse and the effect of nation-

building uniting relatively powerless indigenous people for common goals.

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# International Migration Expectations Among Icelandic Youth

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## Abstract

Migration intentions are moderate to strong predictors of actual migration and collective migration intentions of adolescents predict community-level migration trends. Beyond such direct predictions, attitudes among youth provide a sensitive indicator of global cultural, social and economic influences. Perceived affinity with the people of other countries and the choice of future residence is part of the process of identity formation in a world characterized by constant flux. Among Icelandic adolescents, emigration expectations increased substantially between 1992 and 2007. They feel the strongest affinity with neighbouring Faroe Islands and Denmark, but the United States is their dominant destination of choice. A lack of national identity, low national pride, and being raised abroad are the strongest predictors of emigration expectations. Parental educational attainment, non-traditional family structure, and urban residence are also associated with such expectations. Perceived affinity with other North Atlantic countries is associated with less emigration expectations, while perceived affinities with continental Nordic and European core countries are associated with greater expectations. Compared to the European core countries, adolescents who would prefer moving to North Atlantic or continental Nordic countries are more likely to expect emigration, while those who prefer North American destinations are more likely to harbour such expectations.

**Key words:** International Migration, Youth, Iceland, Expectations



## Introduction

Processes of immigration and emigration have continued to blur the already vague image of the European nation state as a simultaneously ethnic and political entity. Scholars have argued that a European identity is an abstraction and a fiction (Strath, 2002), that European integration does not supersede the national identities upon which it builds (Jones and Smith, 2001), and that the European Union itself may at best be a frail recognition order (Fossum, 2005). Nevertheless, the elimination of border control and the freedom of residence and employment within much of Europe have contributed substantially to an multicultural European population that increasingly transcends national boundaries and challenges both ‘ethnic-genealogical’ and ‘civic-territorial’ (Jones and Smith, 2001; Smith, 1991) notions of nationality and the nation state.

In the period 2000–2004, the proportion of foreign citizens within the European Union ranged from less than 1% in Slovakia to 39% in Luxemburg, with a proportion between 2–8% percent in most member states (Eurostat, 2006). While political debates over immigration have tended to focus on long-range immigration (de Laforcade, 2006; Small and Solomos, 2006), migration within Western Europe in fact accounted for 57% of the total immigration in the region in the period 2000–2003 (World Bank, 2006). The expansion of the European Union, further European integration, and forces of globalization in general can be expected to further amplify migration within Europe in the future.

Individual migration expectations have in general been found to be a moderate to strong predictor of actual migration in various societies around the world (Card, 1982; DeJong, 2000; Gardner *et al.*, 1986; Glendinning *et al.* 2003; Myklebust, 1993; Sandu and DeJong, 1996; Simmons, 1986). On the collective level, the aggregate migration expectations of adolescents in different communities have also been shown to predict demographic

changes in those communities later years, irrespective of the actual migration outcomes of the individuals that expected to leave (Bjarnason, 2004). More generally, prevalent migration expectations may signal a whole host of societal problems in addition to the prospect of future population decline. Migration expectations can therefore be regarded as a sensitive indicator of the general robustness of local communities and countries alike.

Migration expectations emerge in a complex interaction of individuals with their families and friends, communities, social structure, and cultural processes. The human, social and cultural capital of the family (Bourdieu, 1979, 1997; Coleman, 1988) may in particular both hinder and facilitate the formation of migration expectations. The children of educated and wealthy parents are more likely to have aspirations that can only be fulfilled by migration, and their parents have better resources to support such aspirations (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson, 2006). However, the decision to migrate also threatens to disrupt social support networks of family and friends, as well as emotional and instrumental bonds with the community as a whole (Elder et al., 1996; Pretty et al., 1996). Strong parental relations can therefore be seen as a type of social capital that can make it more difficult for children to leave their home community. Beyond the individual family, a close-knit parental society can also be expected to integrate adolescents into the community and regulate their aspirations (Bjarnason et al., 2005; Coleman, 1988). Research has indeed shown that migration expectations are lower among adolescents who have strong ties with friends and family or with their home community as a whole (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson, 2006; Elder et al., 1996; Glendinning et al., 2003; Pretty et al., 1996; Rudkin et al., 1994).

Adolescents may however also experience tight-knit communities as ‘oppressive, repressive, suppressive, and obsessive’ (Stockdale, 2002). In rural societies in particular, limited freedom to explore social and individual identities has been found to be a major reason for adolescents wanting to leave many rural

communities (Gabriel, 2002; Glendinning et al., 2003; Jamieson, 2000; King and Shuttleworth, 1995; Matthews *et al.*, 2000; Valentine, 1997). More generally, a pervasive 'urban ethos' and negative attitudes among adolescents toward the quality of rural life contribute to rural depopulation (Baeck, 2004; Tuhkunen, 2002). Metropolitan areas offer more diverse opportunities for education, employment, and leisure than rural municipalities, and they tend to draw female and younger migrants in particular (Olafsson, 1997; Stockdale, 2002).

While most research in this area has focused on the effects of local communities on adolescent migration expectations, similar processes can be expected to operate at higher levels of abstraction. The nation and the nation state can in particular be seen as important higher-order communities that influence individual decision-making processes in various ways. National identity fundamentally involves a personal identification with the imagined community of a particular nation and should decrease the potential for migration beyond the borders of the nation state. Indeed, national pride as the evaluative aspect of national identity has been shown to be associated with less migration potential (Datler et al., 2005; Jones and Smith, 2001). Conversely, the potential for migration should be higher among adolescents who do not feel they belong to the nation that defines a particular nation state. Adolescents that have lived in more than one country for an extended period of time should likewise be less likely to identify exclusively with a single nation state. This can be seen as a reciprocal process where an experience with migration decreases the salience of national identity and a decline in national identity in turn makes it easier to migrate (Datler et al., 2005; Dogan, 1994; Hafthorsson and Bjarnason, 2007; Jones and Smith, 2001).

The elimination of active border control decreases the physical barrier between countries as geographical entities. Similarly, the erosion of perceived differences decreases the mental barrier between nations as cultural entities. Adolescents who feel

close to the people of other countries should therefore more easily contemplate emigration. Such perceptions of affinity may be country-specific or reflect a more general cosmopolitan attitude towards different countries in an increasingly global world. Affinity with a particular country does however not necessarily make that country the most attractive destination for migration. On the contrary, the pursuit of adventure and excitement in unfamiliar territories may be an important objective of emigration, in particular among youth. Distant, unfamiliar or glamorous destinations may thus be associated with increased expectations of migration, while proximate destinations of choice may in fact reflect regional loyalties that inhibit migration expectations. In other words, a geographically close, culturally similar country may be the most desirable destination for those who would most prefer to stay, while those who would like to emigrate are more likely to have a more exotic destination of choice in mind.

These considerations suggest that social ties at different levels of abstraction may influence migration expectations. Family circumstances, community characteristics, national identities, and the mental world maps of adolescents may each inhibit or facilitate the formation of such expectations. Some of these effects can be assumed to be invariant across a diversity of countries, while other effects may be geographically, historically and culturally specific. The process of European integration can for instance be assumed to have differential effects in the large countries and cities that form the core of the European Union, in marginalized countries and areas within the European Economic Area, and in European countries that have remained largely outside the integration process. In this paper, such factors will be examined in the context of emigration expectations among adolescents in Iceland.

## The case of Iceland

With just over three hundred thousand inhabitants, Iceland is one of the smallest independent nations in the international community. Factors such as trust in the national army, the willingness to fight and die for the country, and distrust of neighbours (Dogan, 1994) are predictably not particularly salient in the identity of a nation that has never had an army and has no neighbours for hundreds of kilometres in any direction. The national identity of Icelanders has traditionally been more introspective, with a strong emphasis on the interconnected themes of Icelandic history, Icelandic language, and Icelandic literature (Hafthorsson and Bjarnason, 2007).

Iceland was settled by Norse vikings and their Celtic slaves in the late ninth and early tenth century. It came under Norwegian rule in 1262 and later Danish rule through the Kalmar Union of 1397–1524 (Karlsson, 2000). The Icelandic Sagas written in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century can be considered a body of historical fiction dealing with the origin and fate of prominent settlers and their descendents. Thorarinsdottir (2004) has argued that the medieval Christian authors of the Sagas were in part motivated by a desire to counter the popular image of their pagan ancestors as rapists and murderers and to project a more positive Icelandic national identity on the European intellectual scene. The Icelandic independence movement of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in turn romanticized the settlement period described in the Icelandic Sagas as a golden age of independence that had ended in brutal foreign subjugation. In the struggle against Danish rule, this proud heritage of independence, courage and honour was expected to provide the foundations for a progressive, independent Icelandic nation state (Egilsson, 1999).

Iceland's geographical position in the North Atlantic has to a considerable extent allowed Icelanders to choose their own neighbours (Bjarnason, 1999). Britain, Denmark, France,

Germany, and the United States have for example to a differing degree been in the vicinity of Iceland in different domains and historical periods. The independent Icelandic microstate entered the world of international relations during the Second World War. The country achieved full independence from Denmark in 1944, following the German occupation of Denmark and the British occupation of Iceland in 1940. The United States subsequently maintained a military presence in Iceland in the period 1941–2006.

Iceland formally entered the Cold War when the Icelandic parliament voted to join NATO on March 30<sup>th</sup> 1949, as left-wing and nationalist protesters clashed with police and right-wing activists outside the parliament building. The Cod Wars with Britain however represent the only direct Icelandic conflict with the military forces of another country. The dispute over Iceland's claims to exclusive fishing rights around the island led to a series of increasingly violent clashes between Icelandic coastguard patrol boats and British battleships in 1958, 1972–3, and 1975–6, but ultimately resulted in the international recognition of a 200-mile national fishing zone (Kurlansky, 1998). This hard-fought victory over the British became an important source of national pride, and the prospect of fishing vessels from Britain and other European countries returning to Icelandic waters has been one of the major barriers to Iceland joining the European Union.

Historical and cultural ties to the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Faroe Islands, Finland, Greenland, Norway and Sweden) have been very important to the international relations of Iceland over the past century. The joint Nordic labour market and passport union established in 1954 allowed the free movement of labour between these countries and further solidified Nordic cooperation in matters of economy, politics, and culture (Norden, 2007). This regional alliance of countries with a total of about 25 million inhabitants was in many ways eclipsed when Denmark and later Finland and Sweden joined the European Union. Iceland and Norway have remained outside of the EU, but the long-standing

Nordic cooperation contributed considerably to their inclusion in the Schengen agreement on joint European border control in 2001 (European Union, 2007) and the establishment of the European Economic Area in 2004 (EFTA 2007; European Commission, 2007).

The opening of the borders and the free movement of labour between Iceland and the European Union did not affect the long-standing Icelandic tradition of emigration and return migration for purposes of education and employment. Close to 1% of Icelandic citizens left the country annually in the period 1987–2006, and close to 1% returned to Iceland from abroad each year. The net emigration of Icelandic citizens was only 0.1% over this twenty-year period with annual fluctuations between -0.3% and +0.6%. Almost three out of four Icelandic emigrants in 2006 moved within the Nordic labour market (Statistics Iceland, 2007b). However, ease of employment only partially explains Icelandic patterns of migration. Although Iceland also became part of the joint European labour market in 2004, only 15% of Icelandic emigration in 2006 went to non-Nordic countries in the European Union. Conversely, despite the notoriously restrictive immigration policies of the United States, about 7% of all emigration of Icelandic citizens in 2006 to the United States and an additional 1% to Canada. The remaining 4% of the emigrants went to about 30 other countries around the globe.

Iceland has experienced a considerable immigration of foreign citizens in recent years (Statistics Iceland, 2007b). In 1996, the proportion of foreign citizens in Iceland was 1.9% of the total population, the same as in 1950. After three years of the European Economic Area in December 2006, the proportion of foreign citizens had reached 6%, the average percentage in Europe as a whole in 2000 (International Organization for Migration, 2005). As the result of these changes, Icelandic adolescents have an increasingly multicultural background. According to official statistics, 7% of 15–16 year old residents of Iceland were born abroad and 2% were citizens of another country (Statistics Iceland,

2007a). In 2007, about 15% of 15–16 year old students in Iceland reported that at least one of their parents was not Icelandic, 3% reported that neither of their parents were Icelandic, and 2% did not consider themselves Icelanders (Hafthorsson and Bjarnason, 2007). About 17% had lived abroad for a period of at least one year and 13% reported speaking a foreign language at home. Consequently, a large proportion of Icelandic adolescents have direct ties with other countries and the majority can be expected have friends or acquaintances that have such ties.

### **Modelling adolescent emigration expectations in Iceland**

In the following analysis, a structural model of emigration expectations among adolescents in Iceland will be developed and tested. In line with previous research, individual parental resources are viewed as facilitators of migration expectations, while closer parental relations are expected to inhibit such expectations. As non-traditional families tend to be characterized by both adverse economic conditions and structural deficiencies in parental relations (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994), adolescents growing up in such families should be more likely to expect to emigrate. Drawing upon Coleman's (1988) discussion of intergenerational closure, a close-knit parental society is conceptualized as a form of social capital that should inhibit emigration expectations.

Almost two-thirds of the Icelandic population lives in the capital region surrounding Reykjavik, while the remaining one-third lives in towns, fishing villages, and rural areas along the 5,000 km coastline (Statistics Iceland, 2007c). The rapidly growing capital area surrounding Reykjavik offers a diversity of professional, service, government, and business opportunities that cannot be matched in other areas of the country (Edvardsson, 2004). Adolescents living outside the capital region should therefore be more likely to expect to emigrate.



A weak national identity is assumed to facilitate emigration expectations. Adolescents who are not proud to be Icelandic, do not identify themselves as Icelanders or have lived abroad for an extended period of time should be more likely to expect to emigrate. The emigration expectations of Icelandic adolescents can also be affected by the strategic position of Iceland in the middle of the North Atlantic that separates Europe from North America. Affinities with the neighbouring North Atlantic countries, continental Nordic countries, core countries in the European Union, or North American countries should each increase emigration expectations. Controlling for such affinities, more distant destinations of choice should be more strongly associated with emigration expectations. In contrast, the choice of the Faroe Islands, Greenland, the Shetland Islands or Scotland, can be seen as reflection of a strong national and regional identity and as such it can be expected to decrease emigration expectations.

## **Data and Methods**

The current study is based on three national population surveys among Icelandic adolescents. The three surveys employed a common school survey methodology with questionnaires administered anonymously with a blank envelope procedure to all students present in class on the day of the surveys (Hibell, 2003). The first survey was conducted among 9<sup>th</sup> (14–15 years old) and 10<sup>th</sup> grade (15–16 years old) students in March 1992 and yielded responses from 86.8% of all Icelandic students born in 1976 and 1977 (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson, 1993). The second survey was conducted in March 2003 among all 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> grade students in the country and yielded responses from 80.3% of all Icelandic students born 1987 and 1988 (Hibell et al., 2004). The third survey was conducted in March 2007 among all 10<sup>th</sup> grade students and yielded responses from 81.8% of all Icelandic students born in 1991 (Hibell et al., 2008).

The multivariate analysis is exclusive based on the data collected in 2003. The dependent variable of emigration expectations was recoded from the question “Where do you think you will most likely live in the future?” As shown in Table 1, 15% of Icelandic adolescent males and 20% of adolescent females in 2003 expected to live in another country in the future.

The perceived *Family Economic Status* is measured by asking respondents how well off their families are compared to other families (1: much worse off; 7: much better off). The education of father and mother is measured on a five-point scale (1: primary school or less; 5: university degree). For the purposes of this analysis, *Parental Education* is defined by the education of the parent with the higher level of education. The proportion of adolescents that did not live with both biological parents (non-traditional family structure) was reported to be 29% among males and 30% among females in 2003.

The current study employs three measures of parental relations. *Parental support* is a two item summary scale ( $r = .76$ ) of the measures “I can easily get warmth and caring from my mother and/or father” and “I can easily get emotional support from my mother and/or father”. *Parental control* is measured by two item summary scale ( $r = .74$ ) including “My parents know where I am in the evenings” and “My parents know with whom I am in the evenings”. Finally, *intergenerational closure* is measured by two items ( $r = .55$ ), “My parents are familiar with the parents of most my friends” and “My parents are friends with the parents of my best friends”.

Icelandic communities form a continuum from being almost exclusively dependent on fisheries or farming to being for most parts independent of the primary industries. There is thus no natural cut-off point to distinguish between types of communities.

**Table 1 :Descriptive statistics for logistic regression analysis of emigration expectations among 14–16 years old students in Iceland, 2003**

	<b>Range</b>	<b>Males</b>	<b>Females</b>		
		<b>Mean</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>St. dev</b>	<b>s.e.</b>
Dependent variable					
Emigration expectations	0–1	.15	.20	.40	.007
Family context					
Family economic status	1–7	4.46	4.29	1.03	.018
Parental education	1–5	3.61	3.56	1.23	.021
Non-traditional family structure	0–1	.29	.30	.46	.008
Parental support	2–10	8.07	8.71	1.83	.031
Parental control	2–10	8.56	8.74	1.92	.033
Intergenerational closure	2–10	6.83	7.09	2.09	.036
Community context					
<i>Type of community</i>					
- capital region	0–1	.52	.55	.50	.008
- fishing village	0–1	.16	.15	.36	.006
- other town	0–1	.18	.20	.40	.007
- farming community	0–1	.09	.07	.26	.004
National identity					
National pride	1–4	3.55	3.53	.67	.011
Raised abroad	0–1	.04	.05	.21	.004
<i>Not an Icelandic</i>	0–1	.01	.02	.12	.002
<i>Perceived affinity</i>					
Northern Atlantic affinity	1–4	2.57	2.70	.95	.016
Continental Nordic affinity	1–4	2.76	3.05	.84	.014
European core affinity	1–4	2.73	2.77	.79	.014
North American affinity	1–4	2.68	2.70	.82	.014
<i>Destination of choice</i>					
- Northern Atlantic destination	0–1	.05	.04	.19	.003
- Continental Nordic destination	0–1	.19	.28	.45	.008
- European core destination	0–1	.30	.27	.44	.008
- North American destination	0–1	.42	.39	.49	.008
<b>Sample size</b>		<b>3,409</b>	<b>3,311</b>		

For the purposes of the current study, the home community of each student is defined by his or her own designation. The responses were recoded into binary variables of *Fishing Village*, *Other Town*, and *Rural Community*, with the *Capital Region* serving as the omitted contrast variable.

Three measures of national identity were included in the survey in 2003. First, *National Pride* is measured by the question “How proud are you of being an Icelander?” (1: not proud at all; 4: very proud). Second, the self-ascribed nationality of the respondent was introduced as the binary variable *Not an Icelander* (1: not an Icelander; 0: Icelander). Third, responses to a question about where the respondent was mostly raised were coded into the binary variable *Raised Abroad* (1: raised abroad 0: raised in Iceland).

Perceived affinity with other countries is measured by responses to the question “How much do you feel you have in common with the people of the following countries?” The response list of countries was not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to exemplify important categories of countries. Responses were collapsed into *North Atlantic Affinity* (Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Scotland or Shetland Islands), *Continental Nordic Affinity* (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), *European Core Affinity* (England, France, and Germany) and *North American Affinity* (Canada and the United States). The variables were assigned the highest score each student gave to any country within the group. Since affinities with different countries are not mutually exclusive, all four variables are included in the multivariate analysis.

Destination of choice is measured by responses to the question “Imagine you had to leave Iceland. To which of the following countries would you move if you had to pick one of them?” Responses were collapsed into four binary variables *North Atlantic Destination* (Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Scotland or Shetland Islands), *Continental Nordic Destination* (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), and *North American Destination* (Canada and the United States). *European Core Destination* (England, France, and

Germany) serve as the omitted reference category in the multivariate analysis.

## Results: Changes in emigration attitudes among Icelandic adolescents

Table 2 shows changes in the emigration wishes and expectations among Icelandic 10<sup>th</sup> grade (15–16 years old) students from 1992 to 2007. The proportion of students wanting to emigrate is substantially higher than the proportion expecting to emigrate in all three periods. In 1992, about 11% of all Icelandic 10<sup>th</sup> grade students expected to live abroad in the future and 26% wanted to do so. By 2007, the proportion expecting to live abroad had increased to about 20% and the proportion wanting to live abroad had increased to 33%. Emigration expectations increased significantly from 1992 to 2003 and from 2003 and 2007. The increase in wanting to move abroad was significant from 1992 to 2003, but not from 2003 to 2007.

**Table 2:** Percentage of 15–16 year old students that wanted and expected to emigrate in the future, results from population surveys in 1992, 2003, and 2007

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>All</u>	<i>Significance of gender differences</i>
<u>Expect to emigrate</u>				
1992 survey	10,9	11,2	11,0	<i>ns</i>
2003 survey	14,4	21,2	17,7	<i>***</i>
2007 survey	16,7	24,3	20,4	<i>***</i>
<i>Significance of change, 1992–2003</i>	<i>**</i>	<i>***</i>	<i>***</i>	
<i>Significance of change, 2003–2007</i>	<i>ns</i>	<i>*</i>	<i>**</i>	
<u>Want to emigrate</u>				
1992 survey	22,6	28,6	25,6	<i>***</i>
2003 survey	26,7	37,8	32,1	<i>***</i>
2007 survey	28,0	38,2	33,0	<i>***</i>
<i>Significance of change, 1992–2003</i>	<i>**</i>	<i>***</i>	<i>***</i>	
<i>Significance of change, 2003–2007</i>	<i>ns</i>	<i>ns</i>	<i>ns</i>	

ns: non-significant \* p < .05 \*\* p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001

**Sources:** *The 2003 Icelandic Youth Survey* (1992), and the 2003 and 2007 *Icelandic ESPAD Surveys*.

In 1992 the gender difference in emigration expectations was not statistically significant, but in both 2003 and 2007 a significantly higher proportion of females than males expected to emigrate. In all three periods, a significantly higher proportion of females than males wanted to leave the country.

Table 3 shows the affinity Icelandic adolescents reported with the people of other countries in 2003. The continental Nordic countries received the highest score of perceived closeness with 27% responding that they felt very close to the people of at least one of these four countries. About 21% of the respondents felt very close to at least one of the countries in the North Atlantic region and about 18% felt very close to either one of the European core countries or one of the North American countries.

Iceland and the Faroe Islands are culturally and geographically quite close, and both countries were under Danish rule for centuries. Accordingly, Denmark and the Faroe Islands received the highest scores of any single country, with 18–19% of the respondents feeling very close to each country. Other countries receiving double-digit nominations were Norway, Sweden and the United States with 15–16% and England with 12%.

Table 3 also reveals an interesting gender difference in perceived closeness to different countries. Girls clearly feel a stronger affinity with the continental Nordic countries than boys, while boys feel a closer affinity with the large European and North American countries. A closer inspection reveals that this gender difference is due to 23% of girls feel close to the people of Denmark compared to 15% of the boys, while boys are more likely than girls to feel close to Germany and the United States.

The second part of Table 3 shows where Icelandic adolescents would hypothetically move if they had to leave the country. The destination of choice does not follow the same pattern as perceived affinity. North America reaches the highest score of 43% with the United States receiving the lion's share of 37%. England and Denmark were the only other countries to receive double-digit nominations with 18% and 14%, respectively.

**Table 3: Perceived affinities and destinations of choice among 14–16 year old students in Iceland, 2003**

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>All students</u>
<i>How much do you feel you have in common with the people of the following countries?</i>			
<b>North Atlantic countries</b>	20.4 (± 1.3)	21.4 (± 1.4)	20.9 (± 0.9)
Faroe Islands	17.1 (± 1.2)	19.0 (± 1.3)	18.0 (± 0.9)
Scotland or Shetland Islands	8.1 (± 0.9)	5.1 (± 0.7)	6.7 (± 0.6)
Greenland	6.1 (± 0.8)	4.0 (± 0.7)	5.1 (± 0.5)
<b>Continental Nordic countries</b>	24.0 (± 1.4)	30.2 (± 1.5)	27.1 (± 1.0)
Denmark	14.9 (± 1.2)	23.2 (± 1.4)	19.0 (± 0.9)
Norway	15.3 (± 1.2)	16.6 (± 1.3)	15.9 (± 0.9)
Sweden	14.6 (± 1.1)	16.2 (± 1.2)	15.4 (± 0.8)
Finland	6.2 (± 0.8)	5.9 (± 0.8)	6.1 (± 0.6)
<b>Large European countries</b>	19.3 (± 1.3)	15.4 (± 1.2)	17.5 (± 0.9)
England	13.1 (± 1.1)	10.8 (± 1.0)	12.2 (± 0.8)
Germany	11.1 (± 1.0)	6.8 (± 0.8)	9.1 (± 0.7)
France	6.0 (± 0.8)	4.4 (± 0.7)	5.3 (± 0.5)
<b>North American countries</b>	19.9 (± 1.3)	15.0 (± 1.2)	17.7 (± 0.9)
United States	16.4 (± 1.2)	12.3 (± 1.1)	14.6 (± 0.8)
Canada	9.8 (± 1.0)	7.0 (± 0.9)	8.5 (± 0.6)
<i>Imagine you had to leave Iceland. To which of the following countries would you move if you had to pick one?</i>			
<b>North Atlantic countries</b>	4.8 (± 0.7)	3.6 (± 0.6)	4.3 (± 0.5)
Faroe Islands	2.6 (± 0.5)	2.1 (± 0.5)	2.4 (± 0.4)
Scotland or Shetland Islands	1.7 (± 0.4)	1.3 (± 0.4)	1.5 (± 0.3)
Greenland	0.5 (± 0.2)	0.2 (± 0.1)	0.4 (± 0.1)
<b>Continental Nordic countries</b>	19.7 (± 1.3)	29.4 (± 1.5)	24.3 (± 1.0)
Denmark	8.7 (± 0.9)	19.0 (± 1.3)	13.8 (± 0.8)
Norway	6.1 (± 0.8)	6.1 (± 0.8)	6.1 (± 0.6)
Sweden	4.2 (± 0.7)	3.9 (± 0.6)	4.0 (± 0.5)
Finland	0.4 (± 0.2)	0.4 (± 0.2)	0.4 (± 0.1)
<b>Large European countries</b>	30.9 (± 1.5)	26.9 (± 1.5)	28.9 (± 1.1)
England	20.5 (± 1.3)	16.3 (± 1.2)	18.4 (± 0.9)
Germany	3.9 (± 0.6)	7.5 (± 0.9)	5.7 (± 0.5)
France	6.5 (± 0.8)	3.1 (± 0.6)	4.8 (± 0.5)
<b>North American countries</b>	45.1 (± 1.6)	40.2 (± 1.6)	42.7 (± 1.2)
United States	40.8 (± 1.6)	36.3 (± 1.6)	38.6 (± 1.1)
Canada	4.3 (± 0.7)	7.0 (± 0.9)	4.1 (± 0.5)

Figures are percentage points. Confidence intervals are 95% probability, infinite population.

About 29% of the girls name a continental Nordic country as their destination of choice, compared to 19% of the boys. Again, this difference can be traced to 19% of the girls and only about 9% of the boys naming Denmark, while boys are significantly more likely to name England or the United States. While a much lower percentage nominates France or Germany as their first choice, boys are interestingly significantly more likely to name Germany, while girls are significantly more likely to name France as their destination of choice.

### **Multivariate analysis**

The study employs logistic regression analysis (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) to predict the odds of adolescent emigration expectations. In the first model shown in Table 4, expectations are predicted by background, family and community context. In the second model, national identity is added to the variables in the first equation. The third and final model includes measures of perceived affinity and destination of choice.

On the bivariate level, females are about 1.4 times more likely to expect to emigrate than males. This ratio does not change in the successive multivariate models. The adolescents of parents that are more educated and financially better off are likewise more likely to expect to emigrate. The effect of family socio-economic status becomes non-significant in the multivariate model, but the probability of emigration expectations increases by about 1.2 for each unit increase in parental education in all models. Adolescents who do not live with biological parents are about 1.2 times more likely to expect emigrating. Parental support and intergenerational closure are significantly associated with less emigration expectations but these effects become non-significant once national identity is controlled. Parental control does not have any significant bivariate or multivariate effects.



**Table 4:** Predictors of international migration intentions among 14–16 years old students in Iceland, 2003

	<u>Bivariate</u>	<u>Model1</u>	<u>Model2</u>	<u>Model3</u>
Background	1.41***	1.45***	1.39***	1.39***
<i>Female</i>				
Family context				
Family economic status	1.07*	1.07*	1.05 <sup>ns</sup>	1.02 <sup>ns</sup>
Parental education	1.22***	1.21***	1.16***	1.15***
Non-traditional family structure	1.22***	1.25***	1.22***	1.20***
Parental support	.97 <sup>ns</sup>	.96*	.99 <sup>ns</sup>	.98 <sup>ns</sup>
Parental control	1.01 <sup>ns</sup>	1.01 <sup>ns</sup>	1.03 <sup>ns</sup>	1.04 <sup>ns</sup>
Intergenerational closure	.96**	.97*	.99 <sup>ns</sup>	.99 <sup>ns</sup>
Community context <sup>b)</sup>				
- <i>fishing village</i>	.70***	.83*	.84*	.86*
- <i>other town</i>	.95 <sup>ns</sup>	1.04 <sup>ns</sup>	1.07 <sup>ns</sup>	1.06 <sup>ns</sup>
- <i>farming community</i>	.48***	.58***	.58***	.58***
National identity				
National pride	.63***	.63***	.64***	.64***
Raised abroad	5.05***	3.66***	3.66***	3.74***
<i>Not an Icelander</i>	2.72***	2.72***	2.06**	2.00**
<i>Pervasive affinity</i>				
Northern Atlantic affinity	.97 <sup>ns</sup>			.88**
Continental Nordic affinity	1.15***			1.15**
European core affinity	1.33***			1.32***
North American affinity	1.22***			1.02 <sup>ns</sup>
<i>Destination of choice<sup>b)</sup></i>				
- Northern Atlantic destination	.52***			.63*
- Continental Nordic destination	.93 <sup>ns</sup>			.77**
- North American destination	1.26**			1.17*
Explained variance			8.6%	10.7%
<i>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup></i>				
Coefficients are odds ratios				
a) Capital region is contrast				
b) European core destination is contrast				

Compared to adolescents in the capital region, adolescents in Icelandic fishing villages are less likely to expect emigrating by a factor of .70 and adolescents in farming communities are less likely to harbour such expectations by a factor of .48. In other words, fishing village adolescents are 1.4 times as likely to expect staying and farming community adolescents are 2.1 times as likely to expect to stay in Iceland. These effects are diminished somewhat when family context is controlled, but remain statistically significant in the final multivariate model.

The measures of national identity have substantial effects on emigration expectations. Adolescents who are raised abroad are about five times more likely to expect to emigrate and those who do not consider themselves Icelanders are 2.7 times more likely to have such expectations. In the final multivariate model those raised abroad continue to be about 2.8 times more likely to expect to emigrate and those who are not Icelanders twice as likely. The probability of emigration expectations decreases by .63 for each unit increase in national pride. In other words, such expectations increase by a factor of about 1.6 for each unit decrease in national pride on the four-point scale. The strength of this effect does not diminish in the multivariate model.

In the final model, measures of perceived affinity and destination of choice are added to the equation. Emigration expectations increase by a factor of about 1.32 for each unit increase on the four-point scale of perceived affinity with large European countries. A smaller effect of 1.15 for each unit increase is found for perceived affinity with the people of continental Nordic countries, while an affinity with the people of North-American countries becomes non-significant in the multivariate analysis. Interestingly, perceived affinity with neighbours in the North-Atlantic is associated with a .88 decrease in the probability of emigration expectations for each unit increase in perceived closeness.

Finally, adolescents are less likely to expect to emigrate by a factor of .63 if their destination of choice is a Northern Atlantic country rather than a large European country, and by a factor of .77 if the destination of choice is a continental Nordic country. They are however more likely to expect to emigrate by a factor of 1.2 if they have a North American destination in mind.

## **Discussion**

Adolescent expectations of future migration provide an important insight into the national and international context of identity formation among young Europeans. The proportion of Icelandic adolescents that expected to emigrate nearly doubled over the fifteen year period under study. In 2007, one in three adolescents wanted to emigrate and one in five expected to do so in the future. The increase in emigration expectations as well as the gap between wishes and expectations suggests that the migration potential of Icelandic youth has risen considerably in recent years. While this growing migration potential has not yet resulted in increased emigration of Icelandic citizens, the new opportunities for Icelandic youth within the European Economic Area since 2004 may lead to radical changes in this respect.

The effects of social capital on adolescent emigration expectations were found to be somewhat inconsistent. Parental resources in the form of educational attainment were associated with significantly higher emigration expectations in the theoretically expected fashion, but the economic status of the family was not. Adolescents living in a non-traditional family structure were also significantly more likely to expect to emigrate, but neither parental support nor parental control was associated with such expectations. Intergenerational closure was associated with less emigration expectations, net of other aspects of family and community context. However, this effect of a close-knit parental society was rendered non-significant when national pride,

being raised in a different country, and not considering oneself Icelandic was added to the equation. This raises the possibility that intergenerational closure may in part be a proxy measure for the relative isolation of parents of foreign descent.

The higher prevalence of migration expectations among females is consistent with the bulk of the migration literature dating back to Ravenstein's (1885) seminal study of the 'laws of migration'. Women are however not necessarily more likely to migrate between countries, and women were in fact exactly 50% of Icelandic citizens emigrating in 2006 (Statistics, 2007b). The findings of this study suggest that a higher female emigration potential among youth may be a recent phenomenon. No significant differences in emigration expectations were found in 1992, but in 2003 and 2007 girls were substantially and significantly more likely to expect to emigrate. This may signal a future increase in actual female emigration.

The findings presented in this paper also raise important questions about the gendered images of different countries. Both boys and girls have the strongest affinity with the continental Nordic countries, and the United States are the most popular destination of choice for both genders. However, Icelandic girls appear to have a particular affinity with Denmark that is not shared by Icelandic boys. Icelandic girls are also more likely than boys to want to move to Denmark and France, while boys are more likely than girls to want to move to the United States, England or Germany. Future research should explore to what extent adolescents associate certain countries with 'feminine' traits of e.g. interpersonal relations or welfare and other countries with 'masculine' traits of e.g. industrial relations or warfare, and what effects such gendered associations may have on actual emigration patterns.

Prior research has rather consistently shown a higher migration potential in rural areas, in particular among females (Dahlström, 1996; Hamilton and Otterstad, 1998; King and

Shuttleworth, 1995; Rafnsdottir, 2004; Stockdale 2002; Tukhunen, 2002). This does however not imply that international emigration rates are necessarily higher in rural areas. While Iceland has for instance experienced substantial internal migration to the capital area, the emigration rates in rural and urban regions of the country are quite similar (Statistics Iceland, 2007b, 2007c). This paper finds that adolescents in Icelandic fishing villages and farming communities are in fact substantially less likely to expect to emigrate than their urban counterparts. In the multivariate analysis this difference is found to be in part rooted in less parental resources that may support such expectations.

National pride has been found to be associated with substantially decreased migration expectations among rural youth in Iceland (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson, 2006). Jukarainen (2003) similarly found that rural adolescents in the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Russian borderlands actively use national identity to affirm their commitment to the local community. In this study, national pride and other aspects of national identity are also found to be substantially associated with less emigration expectations in the general population of Icelandic adolescents. The lower rate of emigration expectations in rural areas nevertheless remains significant, even after controlling for national identity, affinities with other countries and destination of choice.

Ultimately, the findings of this paper demonstrate the importance of studying adolescent emigration expectations in the context of mental world maps. Adolescents are less likely to expect emigrating when they are proud to be Icelandic, feel strong affinities with other small countries in the North Atlantic and would move to one of those countries if they had to leave Iceland. Affinities with continental Nordic countries or European core countries are in contrast associated with greater emigration expectations. Controlling for perceived affinity, Nordic destinations of choice appear to be less of a draw to adolescents than European core destinations. While affinities with North

American countries do not affect emigration expectations, adolescents who would prefer moving to these countries are more likely to expect to emigrate. The hegemony of the United States in popular youth culture may be one of the factors contributing to these findings. Perceptions of the United States as a different, exciting destination may thus outweigh the structural opportunities offered by European integration and perceptions of European affinities in the minds of Icelandic adolescents. Future emigration trends will however reveal the relative importance of similarities and differences in the actual decision making process of young adults.

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# Local perceptions of global climate change in the Komi Republic in Russia

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## Abstract

This article explores perceptions of climate change in the Komi Republic (Russia). It focuses on connections between local perceptions and global concepts as well as discourses of climate change in the local contexts. The study is part of the global change project TUNDRA and the research material consists of thematic interviews of occupational groups and policy makers as well as a general survey study. It seems that although we can perhaps speak about globalisation of the environment, it has only partly homogenized public perceptions and opinions. An individual's engagement with the surrounding environment, local conditions and socio-political contexts shape perceptions of climate change. It is important to grasp the difference between two kinds of strategies in perception research: one is to investigate "top-down" people's knowledge or attitudes of global environmental problems (defined by global discourses) via surveys, whereas the other strategy is to take the local context and individual's life-world within it as a reference point of changes. In the latter case, climate change in the Komi Republic is actually more a personal concern of daily existence (health and well-being) than an environmental, a societal or a global issue. However, it is a 'background issue' connected to other societal and environmental changes, and thus, not actively manifested in daily life.

**Key words:** Climate change, Perception, Glocalization, Komi Republic

## Introduction

It is an old idea in environmental discussion to refer to the globe, which is common to all people. During the past twenty years or so, an effort has been made to create a common framework of global environmental change – global warming as a major indicator – which is largely leading the creation and designing of global environmental institutions and discourses. This process is led by the Western industrialised societies. We may ask, if this kind of globalisation of the environment increasingly homogenises national environmental policies, public opinions and perceptions of environmental changes, as some scholars (e.g. Mol 2001, Frank et al. 2000) would have us believe. Some other scholars are more sceptical about this, and argue at least that the global discourse takes its shape in each country and in different locations on the basis of local conditions and socio-political context (e.g. Engels 2003; Bush et al. 2002; Burningham and O'Brien 1994). It seems to us that the concept of “Glocalization” (e.g. Robertson 1992; Ritzer 2004), developed in globalisation studies, is useful when approaching this problem.

In this article, we explore glocal perceptions of climate change in the Komi Republic (north-eastern European Russia). This region is particularly interesting, because the East-European Russian Arctic has experienced significant temperature increases over the last 50 years. Climate models suggest that in future warming, there will exceed that in Southern regions and, for example, in Northern Fennoscandia (Serreze et al., 2000; Kuhry et al., 2002, ACIA 2004). Warming in the East-European Russian Arctic could be as much as 5° C over the next 50 years, although cold years cannot be excluded due to the high variability of the regional climate.

Glocal perception means that an individual's perception of the environment is embedded in his/her everyday engagement with the surroundings -this is why it is local (Ingold 2000), but the

framework for interpretation of perceptions is influenced by global concepts and discourses (e.g. 'global warming'), and thus it is also global. Consequently, climate change may also have regional or national 'shapes' of interpretations or meanings. Kempton et al. (1995) have stated that people are capable of directly perceiving weather but not climates. However, people do interpret the validity of environmental information through their own local perceptions (see e.g. Bickerstaff & Walker 2001), and it is said that direct experience is a forceful shaper of attitudes (Fazio 1995 cited by Bord et al. 1998). However, is this also true in the case of climate change, in which long-term climate patterns are harder to perceive than are short-term, localised changes in weather?

We are interested here in the relationship between local perception of environmental changes, especially climates/weather changes, on the one hand, and the global environmental discourses, on the other hand. How do they 'match' in the Northern contexts of people's everyday life, and are perceptions of climate change indeed becoming similar all over the world? Before the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in October 2004, high-level Russian politicians and scientists impugned the Kyoto process and the scientific facts behind it (Tynkkynen 2005). It is interesting to find out what is the perception of climate change among lay citizens living in the area where climatic changes are projected to have major impact soon.

This article presents the results of a study conducted as part of a multidisciplinary project on global change, TUNDRA Degradation in the Russian Arctic (1998-2001). The TUNDRA project, funded by EU, focused on climate change, industrial pollution and social perception of environmental changes. We will try to integrate here the findings of a quantitative survey and in-depth qualitative interviews undertaken in the TUNDRA project, examining administrators' and local inhabitants' perception, knowledge, and risks of climate changes in everyday contexts in the Komi Republic.

First we present the idea of glocalization and apply it to the study of climate change. To put climate change perceptions in context, the next part is devoted to describing our research sites and methods. Next we will explore how climate change is situated among other environmental and social problems in the Komi Republic and in comparison to Russia as a whole and to other countries. We also compare two different kinds of data, thematic interviews and survey data, in order to find out if surveys overstate a concern over environmental issues, as has been suggested (Sterngold et al. 1994). In the glocalization of environmental change, specific local cultures and contexts give climate- change perceptions distinct characteristics, and this is discussed lastly by using our face-to-face interview data.

## **Glocalization of the environment**

It has been typical of environmentalism since its rise in the 1960's and 1970's to emphasise the international or global character of environmental problems. Today it is even more so, as global issues such as climate change and biodiversity largely dominate environmental discourses, and the focus of problems has shifted towards the 'global biosphere'. In the 1990s particularly, several important international environmental agreements were established. Surveys and opinion polls in Western countries have suggested that public concern has also shifted towards global environmental issues from more local environmental problems.

In this way, global environmental change has become a problem area which is largely approached by using a shared, common framework. In Arthur Mol's view, "since it is the Western industrialised societies that are leading the way in creating, designing and governing global environmental institutions and in determining environmental-induced transformations in all kinds of social practices and institutions, this institutionalisation of the environment is causing increasing homogenisation rather than

increasing heterogenisation” (Mol 2001, 222-223). A quite similar argument comes from the world society approach (Frank et al., 2000): the world society of international and intergovernmental organisations has diffused the norm of nation-state responsibility for environmental protection, and the high level of nation-states ties to the world society increases the likelihood of state environmentalization.

There are, however, many scholars who disagree strongly. Fred Buttel (2000) and Steven Yearley (1996) referred to the unequal and divided world order as a severe challenge to the “world society”. Similarly, Anita Engels (2003) believes that the common framework will come up against great economic, political and cultural inequalities, and that the “globalisation of the environment” is a process full of conflicts. According to Engels’ findings (mainly in Senegal), the global discourse takes its shape in each country about local conditions. The local environmental issues and global environmental discourse intertwine, and global issues will be approached largely from the local perspective (for another critical perspective, cf. Altvater & Mahnkopf 2002).

It seems that the concept of glocalisation and related theorising would be useful here. The word glocalisation originated in Japanese business practices and was employed by some Japanese economists in the late 1980’s. It was adopted by Roland Robertson and some other sociologists, who have used it, mainly in the cultural sphere. According to Robertson, globalisation is characterised by two distinct but closely connected processes. Globalisation is marked by an increasingly subjective consciousness of the world as a whole in that the social actors possess a greater sense of globality. It is also characterised by a global intensification of social and cultural 'connectivity', such as through telecommunications and international travel. Moreover, globalisation is marked culturally by processes of “Glocalization”, whereby local cultures adapt and redefine any global cultural



product to suit their particular needs, beliefs and customs (Robertson 1992; 2002).

According to Robertson (1992) in the globalisation process any particular experience, identity or social process must be understood through its relationship to be universal phenomena. The term Glocalization helps to explain how the symbiosis of the local and the global differs according to particular cultural circumstances, but when it is applied to explain broader cultural projects, it can be argued that the projects of Glocalization are the constitutive features of contemporary globalisation (Giulianotti & Robertson 2004). Adopting this argumentation, globalisation is not somehow externally imposed upon the environmental; rather, environmental discourse can be seen as one representation or manifestation of globalisation.

Perhaps we can tentatively illustrate the glocalization of environmental discourse by applying the phases of the glocalization of football, as analysed by Giulianotti and Robertson (2004). At first, some countries rejected environmental discourse when it was introduced. Second, after a more favourable cultural reception (and, in the case of environmental discourse, some kind of international pressure from the world society), it was localised according to a 'universalisation of particularism' process. Specific local cultures worked inside universal rules to establish their own 'traditions', as illustrated by distinctive environmental policies. Third, glocalization was marked also by the particularisation of universalism, as international treaties and different tiers of governing bodies were established.

Many social scientific research on climate change have been devoted to the perceptions, cognitions, concerns and attitudes of global warming in different strata of the lay public, particularly in Northern America and in Western Europe (e.g. Dunlap 1998; Bord et al. 1998 and 2000; O'Connor et al.. 1998 and 1999; Brechin 2003). Overall conclusions from these survey studies reveal that the public worldwide "demonstrates a general awareness and

concern for global warming” and perceives a substantial threat from global warming, but the threat levels tend to be perceived as significantly less than those from other environmental and social problems” (Bord et al. 1998, p. 83). Citizens in all studied countries are also prone to confuse global warming with other environmental threats, particularly with ozone depletion. Kempton et al. (1995) concluded, based on other studies in Austria, Sweden and Germany, that American environmental perceptions (which misapply the pollution model and overextend the ozone hole model to global climate change) are held in other industrialised countries as well. However, we may ask if this is the case in the countries of the former Soviet Union?

Less attention had been devoted to ascertaining how people perceive and experience global warming in their everyday lives and “in the comparative contexts of other social and personal concerns” (Bord et al. 1998, p. 76). It has been observed that surveys overstate respondent concern (Sterngold et al. 1994), and environmental issues, especially are topics, which generate ‘socially desirable’ responses. Bord et al. remark that almost no one in any country would like to be ignorant and uncaring in the case of environmental issues and say that they are not concerned for environmental degradation. (Bord et al. 1998.) In this study we have tried to avoid these limitations and put climate change in the comparative context of other social and personal issues, and we also compare the interview data with survey data in order to find out differences on responses.

Darier and Schule (1999) tried in their study among citizens of Manchester and Frankfurt to find out the “‘structure of feeling’ of segments of the population which do not have had strong predetermined interests in or knowledge of ‘climate change’”. They asked how people did “perceive and understand ‘global climate change’ and how did they relate it to everyday life” (Darier and Schule 1999, p. 316). Darier and Schule emphasise that for their participants climate change was a complex and interconnected set

of issues, which is not only 'environmental' but includes global (in)equalities, health, consumption and economic concerns. This seems very logical since climate change has been referred as a prime example of 'wicked problems' that cannot be separated from issues of social justice, values and equity (Ludwig 2001).

The salient point for the perception studies of global environmental problems is, as Tim Ingold (2000) says, that the global environment is not a life world, it is a world apart from life. He states that "with the world imaged as a globe, far from coming into being in and through a life process, it figures as an entity that is, as it were, presented to or confronted by life" (Ingold, 2000, p. 210). The global perspective (the environment as a globe) presumes one big 'Environment' "from the street corner to the stratosphere" (Cooper, 1992, p. 167). By contrast, if the environment is understood as a life-world, from the dwelling perspective, the 'environment' surrounds the individual (Ingold, 2000). From the dwelling perspective global warming is one tiny part or piece of worries (connected to/) resulting from globalisation processes and country/regional-specific issues. This means, as regards perception studies and global change research, that we should look carefully at the context-specific features in studying environmental concerns in order to understand responses to environmental changes. Some researchers have referred to this. E.g. Jaeger et al. (1993) note that differences between mountain regions and urban agglomerations can be hidden when national samples are used in climate change studies. Clearly not all the 'lay people' are similar in the case of perception and understanding of climate change. Furthermore, thus, "effective communication about climate change issues requires understanding of the frames of reference being used by all participants" (Thompson & Rayner 1998, 336).

In the Arctic regions, some climate change studies have been conducted among and in cooperation with indigenous people (e.g. Krupnik and Jolly 2002). The interest in the indigenous communities is pertinent because they are already witnessing disturbing and severe climatic and ecological changes (ACIA

2004). In addition, they have special and detailed knowledge about how their environmental conditions have changed and are changing since their means of livelihoods and the whole way of life and culture are interconnected directly with local ecosystems. The climate-change-perception research in the European and Russian North, Arctic and sub-arctic regions has, however, been marginal. This is especially true of the research among newcomers, people who came to the northern areas during the industrial boom after the Second World War.


### **The contexts and methods of the research**

Russian tradition regards Siberia and the Northern regions as a huge reservoir of resources and this can also be seen in the economic policies of the Soviet Union and in practice as a rather inefficient use of resources (e.g. Hedlund, 1990). For much of the Soviet period, the notion of conquering nature played a central part in the official ideology. According to the Stalinist version of Marxism, natural resources were without value until remolded by human labour. It followed, therefore, that in the Soviet Union all land, water, forest, minerals and other natural resources were allocated to users free of charge. Seeing natural resources as free goods has been inimical to their rational utilisation and conservation (Bater 1989).

The marks of the Soviet strategy of industrialisation are still evident in the Russian North, a tundra and forest region characterised by towns built for minerals and hydrocarbon extraction, housing a population of newcomers. Even today the area is marketed to investors as “rich in natural resources” (e.g. Borisova, 2002). The dominant frame of environmental and natural resource policy discourse in the Komi Republic emphasises industrialism (Karjalainen, 2001). Here the regional economy is seen within the framework of “economy based on natural-resource extraction”. The priority is therefore, seen in industrial and economic growth based on resource extraction.

The towns in the north of the Komi Republic can be defined as resource communities, because they were built to operate oil and gas fields (Usinsk) or coal mines (Vorkuta), and the main industry still constitutes the unifying social bond that sustains the community. Around Vorkuta as well as around Usinsk, indications of environmental pollution can be seen with the naked eye: layers of soot in the accumulated snow and areas of dead forest around the old oil wells<sup>1</sup>.

**Figure 1:** The research sites: The Komi Republic as part of Russia and two towns of thematic interviewing in 1998 (Vorkuta and Usinsk)



**Source:** Karjalainen, Timo P. (2006): "The environment in contexts: Environmental concern in the Komi Republic (Russia)", *Acta Universitatis Oulensis, Scientiae Rerum Socialium E 85*. University of Oulu, Oulu (Finland). Available also in pdf-format in the URL: <http://herkules.oulu.fi/isbn9514282507/>

<sup>1</sup> The oil spill that occurred in autumn 1994 close to the river Kolva, north of Usinsk, caught the attention of the international media, although it was neither a unique event nor the largest oil spill that has ever taken place in the North of Russia. After a number of smaller leakages in the pipeline leading from Khar'yaga to Usinsk, in autumn 1994 the situation culminated in a temporary closure of the pipeline, while an estimated 110,000 tonnes of oil poured out into the bogs of the forest tundra. A portion of the oil reached the river Kolva during the same autumn, but the main charge came down the river after the snow melt in spring 1995, at a time when the clean-up was still in its initial stage. The lower course of the Kolva, the mouth of the Usa and therefrom the Pechora suffered heavy pollution.

The Komi Republic<sup>2</sup> coped fairly well economically, at least by Russian standards, during the crises of the 1990s, but the economic development within the republic has been unequal in the various districts and industries. The adjustment of the coal mining industry to the new market conditions has been difficult. The low levels of processing and technology as well as the rise of transportation charges had made many of Vorkuta's coal mines unprofitable<sup>3</sup>.

During the 1990s, the city dwellers of Vorkuta underwent a crisis that affected the local economy as well as self-identification. The fact that the town is located in the treeless tundra with its harsh temperatures makes the plight of the city-dwellers of Vorkuta more severe; whereas Usinsk is located in the northern forest zone, where small-scale food production at the cottage (*dacha*) is to some extent possible. On the practical level, the work provided by the mines could no longer provide the same kind of social safety net as previously. Savings were devastated by inflation, and the government withdrew many privileges that were meant to compensate for the "hard living conditions of the North". On the symbolic level, Vorkuta and its workers lost their prestige and the dispensations they had been enjoying as 'élite workers' in one of the Soviet Union's key industries. In comparison to Vorkuta, Usinsk is affluent because the oil industry brings in revenues.

Our research material comprises thematic (open-ended) interviews among different occupational groups of the town dwellers (n=177) in Usinsk and Vorkuta in the Northern Komi Republic in 1998 as well as interviews among environmental policy 'makers' (7 state administrators<sup>4</sup>, 5 scientists and NGO actors<sup>5</sup>),

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<sup>2</sup> The Republic is inhabited by 1,1607 million people, 76 % living in towns, on land with an area of 416,300 square kilometres (Goskomstat, 2001).

<sup>3</sup> The fact that the town is located in the treeless tundra with its harsh temperatures makes the plight of the city-dweller of Vorkuta more severe. Usinsk is located in the Northern forest zone, where small-scale food production at the cottage (*dacha*) is to some extent possible.

<sup>4</sup> Three interviewees from the (Republican) Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (Minpriroda), one from the Centre for the Hydrometeorology and Monitoring of the

which were conducted in the capital of the Republic, Syktyvkar, in October and November in 1999. In addition, we utilise here the results of survey interviews conducted in two towns and five rural areas of the republic ( $n = 520$ ) in 2001.

In the TUNDRA project, we first dealt with environmental perception and awareness among the town dwellers of Usinsk and Vorkuta. Since we assumed from the start that environmental changes and issues are closely connected with other socio-economic issues, we examined people's living conditions and their ways of thinking rather extensively. Semi-structured, open-ended questions focused on the interviewees' life-history, hobbies and meanings in relation to the surrounding environment, perceptions and acuteness of socio-economic problems and changes in the state of environment. In addition, questions aimed to gauge interviewees' knowledge, responsibilities and solutions to environmental issues. Climate change was not stressed during the interviews, but it was studied as a part of other social and environmental issues. However, people's own definitions of global concepts, such as the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion were investigated.

Environmental perception and awareness were studied within three occupational categories: managers/administrators, teachers and workers. The research material was gathered in each town from August to October 1998 by interviewing. The base group of interviewees in Vorkuta ( $n=88$ ) and Usinsk ( $n=89$ ) totalled 177, of which 64 per cent were labourers ( $n=114$ ), administration staff ( $n=33$ , both in enterprises and state administrations) 19% and teachers 17% ( $n=30$ ). The groups studied were chosen because of

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environment in the Komi Republic (*Gidrometzel*), one from the Centre for State Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspection in the Komi Republic (*Gossanepidnadzor*), one from the Ministry of Education (*Minobrazovanie*), and one from the State Committee on the Northern issues (*Gosgomsever*).

<sup>5</sup> Interviewees (one each) from the Committee to Save the Pechora River, the regional office (Syktyvkar) of the WWF, the regional branch of the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Nature and the Komi People's Congress.

their “strategic” position. Administrators have, particularly in Russia, a great deal of influence over environmental decisions; teachers are largely responsible for environmental education. Furthermore, industrial workers, as a large and organised group, have their say in some social problems, as the miners in Vorkuta (Burawoy and Krotov 1994), for example, have shown. The selection of the groups was also influenced by the theorising of K-W. Brand (1997), and we will make comparisons between Oulu (in Finland), Usinsk, Vorkuta and Jaroslavl using Brand’s theoretical approach in future articles.

Within the TUNDRA project, we also conducted a survey in two towns and five rural districts (*raion*) in the Komi Republic<sup>6</sup>. This was originally needed for the comparisons with our material gathered in the towns of Usinsk and Vorkuta, in order to find out what environmental issues and problems can be considered specific (e.g. the evaluations of climate change) to these areas. The questionnaire was formulated partly based on the themes, which arose in thematic interviews in the Northern Komi, but we focused particularly on climate change questions used in global environmental surveys (Dunlap 1998) in order to be able to make comparisons.

### **Climate change among social and environmental problems**

First of all, it is interesting to see how the people interviewed estimated the importance of the environmental issues in

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<sup>6</sup> The sampled areas and towns in our 2001 survey differed strongly. Syktyvkar (n=204) is the capital of the republic with 242 500 residents and hence has most heterogeneous economic activities, including a major forest industry complex and administrative and educational structures. Uhta (n=101) is an industrial town with 125 000 citizens. Its economy is mainly based on oil refining and energy industry. Izhemskii (n=52, 23 200 residents in 2002) is a northern district (*raion*), where agriculture (along with reindeer herding and food industry) is the major field of industry. In the more southern districts, Ydorskii (n=55; 24 700 residents in 2002) and Ust'-Vymskii (n=28; 38 200 residents in 2002) and Ust'-Kulomskii (n=50, 36 400 residents in 2002) *raions*, forestry and forest industry dominate economic life. Syktyvdinskii *raion* (n=30; 27 500 residents in 2002), surrounding the capital, has a more diverse industrial life, where food and forest industries have the biggest share of production.



comparison to the pressing economic and social issues in Komi and in Russia as a whole. As shown in the table 1, environmental issues hold a low profile compared with other personal and social problems among the townspeople of Usinsk and Vorkuta in 1998. Under transitional or transformational circumstances income level and employment were clearly more important to people than environmental concerns. The survey results (2001) reveal that people in other regions also considered income levels the most acute issue for themselves and their settlement or town (table 1).

**Table 1:** The percentage of interviewees regarding the following social issues as most acute for oneself/for settlement or town in the survey 2001, and for oneself in the thematic interviews in the towns of Usinsk and Vorkuta in 1998<sup>7</sup>.

	Survey, for the settlement/town %	Survey, for oneself %	Interviews in Usinsk and Vorkuta, for oneself %
<b>Threat, problem</b>	(N = 520)	(N = 520)	(N = 175)
Environmental situation	13,6	4,9	6,9
Income level	24,1	39,7	26,9
Unemployment	19,1	5,1	25,7
Housing condition	6,3	14,9	6,3
Health Issues	6,1	22,6	16
Crime	13,6	2,9	2,9
General economic situation	11,9	5,3	10,3
Ethnic relations	1,2	1,8	0,6
Other	4,1	2,8	4,4
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

People in the Komi Republic are, however, very much concerned about the local environment (see table 2), especially about water pollution, because it affects their livelihood, hobbies

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<sup>7</sup> Question in thematic interview: What are the worst problems which threaten you at present? Question in the questionnaire formulated on the basis of thematic interview: What is the most important or acute problem from the listed questions above for your village/town and for you personally?

and health in multiple ways: fish populations in the rivers are decreasing and the quality of drinking water is poor in many settlements and towns. Water pollution is mainly caused by sewage water from industrial enterprises (and oil spills in the northern regions), but also from households. Air pollution is also an acute issue in most industrial towns.

**Table 2** Percentage of interviewees very concerned about the following issues in the Komi Republic in 2001.<sup>8</sup>

1. The water pollution	75,1
2. The nuclear Wastes	62,5
3. The decrease of forest resources	62,5
4. The air pollution	59,3
5. The transportation of toxic wastes	38,2
6. The climate change	32,2
7. The industrial and household wastes	24,2
8. The nuclear power stations	22,2
9. The pesticides in agriculture	21,2
<b>The average percentage</b>	<b>44,2</b>

In the same vein, they are also worried about nuclear wastes and the decrease in forest resources. Lively discussion on nuclear wastes has been going on at the regional and national level during the 1990's. At first the discussion was about storage of nuclear wastes somewhere in the Russian North, and at the end of 1990's it centered on the importing of nuclear wastes from the West. There is no nuclear power station in Komi but in some locations of the republic nuclear explosions were conducted with the purpose of testing the feasibility of using nuclear explosions in the

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<sup>8</sup> In single environmental issues the percentage refers to the proportions of those who regard the issue in question "very dangerous". NA's excluded.

mining industry and in diverting water from northern rivers to the catchment area of the Caspian Sea. In the Northern towns, some people are concerned about radiation spreading from the nuclear bomb testing area of Novaya Zemlya (an island located in the Arctic Ocean).

The research in another EU-funded project SPICE gave parallel results. The people surveyed living (n=255) in the Pechora region listed the severest environmental issues and climate changes below ten per cent of the first problem ranks (three ranks), whereas water pollution received almost 90 per cent, air pollution and the decrease of forest resources both about 30 percent (Kuhry et al. 2005).

International comparisons are essential here. Dunlap (1998) found that citizens in Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil and Portugal believed that global warming will occur in their lifetime, but that was not the case in Russia. Debardeleben and Heuckroth (2001), however, analysed worldwide public-opinion surveys and concluded that Russians are rather concerned about global environmental issues, even if their level of knowledge about global warming and other global issues is lower than that in Western countries. Our findings (based on data collected in 2001) are summarised in the next table and in comparison to the international comparison presented by Dunlap (1998, p. 478). Dunlap used data collected as early as the beginning of 1990's, which may affect the comparison.

**Table 3:** People concerned about global environmental issues (%) in Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, Russia and Komi.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> The percentage of people, who think that the issue is “very serious” represented in the figures (the other ratings including “somewhat serious”, “not very serious” and “not at all serious”. Likewise the alternatives of DK/NA are all included in the comparisons). The data for Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal and Russia is collected from Riley E. Dunlap’s (1998, p. 478) comparative analysis. The questions used in this survey were the same as Dunlap’s.: “How serious a problem you personally believe it to be in the world”?

	<b>Canada</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>Mexico</b>	<b>Brazil</b>	<b>Portugal</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>Komi</b>
Air pollution	61	60	77	70	78	71	64
Water pollution	76	71	78	69	81	74	72
Soil problems	57	54	77	56	71	63	62
Loss of species	58	50	81	74	68	61	54
Rain forest loss	70	63	80	78	82	66	37
Global warming	58	47	62	71	72	41	40
Loss of ozone	70	56	71	74	79	58	61

The attitudes of the people in the Komi Republic are very much the same as in Russia in general. However, the citizens of the Komi Republic consider air pollution, extinction of species and especially rain forest loss as less serious than the Russians in general. Global warming is regarded neither in Russia nor in Komi as serious an issue as in the other countries surveyed. This is partly due to the weakness of global environmental discourses in the Komi Republic and in Russia as a whole (Kotov 2002; Karjalainen & Habeck 2004).

**Table 4:** The self-assessed informedness of global warming<sup>10</sup>

<b>Level of understanding</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>Mexico</b>	<b>Brazil</b>	<b>Portugal</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>Komi</b>
Very well	13	11	6	10	3	4	3
Fairly well	47	42	19	34	18	19	33
Not very well	21	22	13	16	26	20	49
Not at all	15	22	51	17	36	29	14
DK/NA	3	4	11	24	18	28	1
Mean	2,61	2,44	1,78	2,49	1,84	1,95	2,26
N	1011	1032	1502	1414	1000	964	520

The (self-assessed) level of understanding of the global warming seems to be lower in Russia and in Komi than in the highly-modernised countries like the USA and Canada. It is, however, worth noticing that the differences disappear when in comparison to Portugal and Mexico. While the proportion of people not understanding global warming at all is 51 per cent in Mexico, it is only 14 per cent in Komi. This may, however, to some extent depend on the high level of DK/NA answers in Mexico and, in the case of Komi, also on the sampling method used. As Brechin (2003) notes, people in many countries actually share the misconceptions of the main source of anthropogenic contributions to global warming (Brechin, 2003, p. 119). Obviously there has been a remarkable change in people's knowledge and concern during the past few years at least in Western countries, but we have no space to comment on that here.

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<sup>10</sup> The data for Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal and Russia is collected from Riley E. Dunlap's (1998, p. 478) comparative analysis. The questions used in this survey were the same as Dunlap's: Thinking about the issue of global warming or the "greenhouse effect", how well do you feel you understand this issue – very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?"

## The perceived changes in the climate and the weather

Climate change is not regarded among our respondents as especially dangerous (table 2), and global warming has a low profile in comparison to local environmental problems (air and water pollution) and ozone depletion (table 3.). In general, global environmental issues are not much discussed in our research locations. This is in line with the results from other countries and among U.S. citizens who ranked water and air pollution highest, but global warming only ninth out of ten environmental problems listed (Brechin, 2003, p. 113). Global warming is not a 'front-burner' issue globally when in comparison to other personal, social and environmental issues (Bord et al. 1998).

However, when people living in the Northern parts of the Komi Republic were asked about environmental changes in their living area ("Has the state of the environment changed during the time you have lived in this area?"), 33 interviewees of 177 (18,6 %) talked spontaneously (without prompting) about their local experiences of climate or weather changes. When asking to depict in their own words how they understand the concept 'greenhouse effect', 10,2 per cent of interviewees (18 of 177) gave a scientifically acceptable answer<sup>11</sup> (most of those were teachers). Sixty four (36,2 %) said that it means a warmer climate globally; but here only ten (5,6 %) referred to local indicators of an enhanced greenhouse effect. It is clear that education appears as a critical factor in the precision of scientific knowledge in the issues of global environmental problems: administrators and especially teachers (i.e. those with more school education) knew better, for example, what the ozone layer is and what a 'hole' in it means. In many cases, the reasons mentioned for climate change and its

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<sup>11</sup> "Most of the heat energy emitted from the surface is absorbed by greenhouse gases which radiate heat back down to warm the lower atmosphere and the surface. Increasing the concentrations of greenhouse gases increases the warming of the surface and slows the loss of heat energy to space". (ACIA, p. 2)

causal links by the urban interviewees of Usinsk and Vorkuta are completely different from those presented in scientific models. A quite common reason given by respondents in the Northern town was Novaya Zemlya and nuclear tests, which were also associated with other environmental changes. These findings are in line with the results of other studies (e.g. Kempton et al. 1995).

Question: Has the state of environment changed during the time you have lived in this area?

*“...Winters are warmer now, and in my opinion this happens because of environmental change, like nuclear explosions”*  
(Novaja Zemlja) (worker, male, 30s, Vorkuta).

In the survey research, 86 per cent of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed with statement “you can already notice the effects of global climate change on the weather around here” (see table 5). The interpretation could be that the survey framework overstates the “degree of perception” as surveys often overstate citizens’ level of concern about some issues (Sterngold et al. 1994). This finding suggests – as in Kempton et al.’s (1995) data – that people overemphasise the extent to which the climate has already changed. However, in our case it is more the survey framework, which presumably made people exaggerate their own observations. The survey studies were conducted in the southern regions of the republic where climatic or weather changes are not so obvious as in Vorkuta and Usinsk, where the answers to environmental change questions and global concepts mentioned how winters have become milder in last decades.

Question: Has the state of the environment changed during the time you have lived in this area?

*“Worsened [the state of environment], oil spills have polluted water in rivers...Previously, winters were cold, but now they are more temperate and summers were previously warmer, lately they have been coldish”* (teacher, female, 40s, Usinsk).

*“Greenhouse effect... frankly speaking I don’t know, but 20 years ago here were really harsh frosts, and now I think the weather is warmer and warmer in summer and wintertime”* (administrator, male, 40s, Usinsk).

*“The environment has changed a lot. You can see changes clearly in forests. Big loggings have been carried out all over the district and many forest fires have occurred... And climate, previously winters were like winter, frosts lasted. In that time weather was sustained, but now rapid changes can happen. And the weather is windy now... Climate changes, all changes...”* (worker, female, 40s, Usinsk).

There were few spontaneous views about what kind of climate changes if any are desirable and whether a particular impact is perceived as negative or positive. However, most interviewees who said something about climate changes yearn for the stable climate and weather patterns which prevailed about 10 to 20 years ago. One could have expected that in the harsh Arctic conditions urban incomers would wish for warmer climatic conditions (if not thinking or knowing about the contingency of melting the permafrost), as the high-level politicians in Russia suggest. President Putin said at the Climate conference in Moscow:

In Russia you often hear that Russia is a northern country. Warming by 2-3 degrees is of benefit: we will have to spend less money on furs. And crop yield will increase (*Izvestiia* 29.9.2003, cited by Tynkkynen 2005).

Question: Has the state of the environment changed during the time you have lived in this area?



*“Changed (...). I think that the climate has changed to a bad direction, because of global warming, and here there are no more such freezes as there used to be. And summers are cooler now” (chief engineer, 40s, male, Usinsk).*

*“Previously freezes were 50-60 degrees, but now these kinds of freezes don’t occur any more. This affects birds; the course of climate change is good” (driver, 40s, male, Usinsk).*

**Table 5** People indicating how much they agree with the following statements. (%)

The statement	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
1. The weather has been more variable and unpredictable around here.	3	8	40	48
2. You can already notice the effects of global climate change on the weather round here.	2	12	48	38
3. Scientists are just speculating about global climate change. We shouldn't take action until they have proof.	32	41	17	10
4. We should be optimistic and assume that we are innovative enough to meet the challenge of global climate change.	24	31	30	15
5. I can't do anything about global climate change. I have no power.	7	15	30	48
6. We should have started dealing with the problem of global climate change years ago.	3	5	34	58

About 90 per cent of the people surveyed in the Komi Republic agree that the weather has been more variable and unpredictable and have noticed the effects of global climate change on the weather locally. The recent Arctic Climate Impact Assessment validates the citizens’ observations in this region: annual average temperatures have increased by 1-3 Celsius over the

past 50 years in the studied sub-regions II (Siberia and adjacent seas), and most of the warming occurring during the winter (ACIS 2004, p., 113)<sup>12</sup>. However, scientists from the Northern Komi do not confirm the statement about definitive local indicators of global climate change: it cannot be excluded that the temperature increases are just natural oscillations of the region's climate (Habeck 2003).

The findings among indigenous reindeer herders and fishermen of the Northern Komi Republic confirm the local scientists' statements. They also had observations about changes in the regional climate and weather conditions. However, J.O. Habeck's (2003) respondents suggested that extreme weather events can be associated with the high variability of the regional climate. These people gave contradictory conclusions about the question of whether there are general tendencies of cooling or warming. In our study in Utsjoki, Finnish Lapland, many interviewees stated that these climatic changes may occur in cycles between 3-7 years (compare the mechanism of North Atlantic Oscillation, NAO), which they see as part of normal climatic variation (Kuhry et al. 2002). Unstable weather patterns and sharp short-term variations are connected to the way of life in uppermost Lapland, and for local inhabitants it is as yet hard to see dramatic climate change and its impact on local life.

Most respondents in Komi felt personally powerless in the case of global climate change; this is in the line with the finding from other places (e.g. Darier & Schule 1999). What is different in Russia is that in the Russian context it is hard to find (from the main media or daily talks) any discourses of personal environmental commitment (especially regarding global environmental problems). Secondly, Russians still regard 'power structures' as responsible for solving these issues.

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<sup>12</sup> According IPCC (2001) report there is no clear agreement among climate scientist concerning changes in frequency or structure of naturally occurring atmosphere-ocean circulation patterns such as that of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO).

A majority of Kempton et al.'s (1995) interviewees in the USA also believed that climate has already changed, and they also reported noting milder winter and fewer predictable weather patterns. If climate is manifested by the long-term patterns of weather, Kempton et al. (1995) wonder how people claim to have personally observed weather changes during their lifetimes. They argue that "people have a historical propensity to perceive weather change, whether or not it is occurring, and to attribute it to human perturbations". They ponder several psychological factors: the "good-old-days effect", "in which we remember a distant past when the summers were consistently hot and the winters cold, just as they should be". Memories of more recent years of hot summers and mild winters outweigh and contrast with these more distant memories. The current publicity about global warming also gives people an appropriate framework within which they can interpret their own observations of more variable and violent weather (Kempton et al., 1995, p. 83).

The 'good-old-days effect' is also certainly a pattern working in Russia. This is especially related to the yearning for Soviet times in the heavily subsidised northern towns. The collapse of the old practical and symbolic world has caused a strong feeling of insecurity, especially in the heavily subsidised northern cities among middle-aged and older people. Environmental problems are considered part of the social instability faced after the collapse of Soviet Union, and thus, when people are yearning for a stable climate, they may actually pine after a stable society (see Karjalainen & Habeck 2004).

Now, in uncertain social circumstances in which former privileges are gone and the future is uncertain, the North now appears even colder and more confining; these are conditions from which inhabitants may wish to escape. Especially workers, who are threatened by unemployment and unpaid wages, seem to be less

comfortable in the North than government officials and teachers (Karjalainen & Järvikoski 2000).

Question: How do you enjoy your living in this environment?

*“...I don’t like these climate changes. Previously the weather was sustained, winters cold and summers sunny” (worker, male, 50s, Vorkuta).*

*“I like the natural environment here, but the climate, of course, doesn’t appeal.... These conditions are indeed harsh for living” (assistant manager, male, 50s, Vorkuta).*

*“For the sake of one’s health, Vorkuta is not a very good place - this isn’t the South. There’s no good health, and this is caused by the climate and working in the mines” (male miner, 47 years, Vorkuta).*

Question: Has the state of the environment changed during the time you have lived in this area?

*“Worsened. Some kind of abandonment of the North has happened. Previously we felt Vorkuta was needed... Now we feel no one needs us” (teacher, 40s, female, Vorkuta).*

We reason based on our data that when climate change is interpreted as the changes in the seasons (cooler summers and warmer winters) and the high and quick variability of the air temperature, it is perceived as a problem of personal health and well-being, especially for the newcomers in the harsh northern conditions where societal changes have been radical over the last ten years. People here view the deterioration of the environment

mainly in terms of the threats to their own and their children's health, and climate change is one aspect of this deterioration. Overall, health issues seem to have a very special meaning in the northern conditions, which is strengthened by the discourse of "the lack of oxygen in the atmosphere" in the high latitudes. This assumption is not supported by any scientific evidence; however, people talked about it.

It appears that weather, and climate, is given special local or regional importance. In the thematic interviews, we asked how interviewees enjoy living in their town, and, on the other hand, where they would like to live. Forty-nine per cent of respondents mentioned the harsh climate, and most of them pointed out that they would like to live in a region with a temperate climate. To conclude, climate change in the Komi Republic is actually more a personal concern about daily existence than an environmental, societal or global issue. However, it is a 'background issue' connected with other societal and environmental changes, and thus, not actively manifested in daily life.

In Russia, there is no great publicity either about global warming or other global environmental issues (at least during our research period 1998-2002; see also Tynkkynen 2005), which means that our interviewees do not have an applicable "global warming" framework within which they can interpret their own observations – although our research certainly somehow strengthened this framework. Actually, in Russia a counter discourse to global warming and its scientific consensus has recently emerged. Anti-Kyoto statements issued from the Russian Academy of Sciences, according to which the protocol "lacks a scientific basis" and would hinder Russia's economic development. These statements had presumably something to do with political debates and negotiations between EU and Russia over Russia's entry into the World Trade Organisation and ratification of Kyoto (Schiermeier & MacWilliams 2004).

Question: Do you see any risks for the Northern areas of the Komi Republic from climate changes?

*“The question is problematic, but for now there are not any risks. Human beings have not yet affected significantly climate patterns. At the moment a cycle of warming is taking place, this is nothing extraordinary. After this cycle comes a cycle of cooling. (...) This results from the activity of the sun. Scientists have known these risks [from global warming] for a long time, but they are not yet significant” (...) (meteorologist).*

*“I cannot see any risks for Northern areas, although in my opinion this problem has to be taken seriously. (...) In addition, my own perceptions tell me that it has become warmer in recent decades”. (professor in natural sciences)*

*“So far, we don’t know for sure. There are only different models, and climate changes can result from natural cycles and variations” (geographer).*

It has been said that the major human and ecological impact of environmental change is not so much about mean changes but about extreme events (Berkes 2002, p., 339). The current experienced climate changes are more corporeal, extreme and acute for the communities in the Western Canadian Arctic, Alaska, and now also in Siberia than in the regions we have studied (see Krupnik and Jolly 2002, ACIA 2004). These regional and group specific differences must be born in mind when planning and conducting perception studies of climate changes<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> In addition, social and occupational groups differ in their perception of environmental changes (e.g. ‘reading signs’ of changes in vegetation that are valuable for their activities). That’s because they mainly engage in different tasks; they have a different kind of functional relationship (e.g. reindeer herding and hunting as ways of life vs. recreational customs and a more aesthetic view to nature) with local ecosystems. Besides of occupational lines, an ethnic and rural-urban divide can be noticed,

## Conclusions

The main goal of this paper was to find out how local context-specific factors affect responses to global environmental change. Our results show that people in the Komi Republic are quite concerned about the environment. However, environmental issues hold a low profile compared with other social problems. Current Russian living conditions, e.g. income level and employment, are clearly more important to people than environmental issues. It is also clear that global warming or climate change is not a ‘front-burner’ issue – as it is not globally - when in comparison to other environmental issues, like the most evident problems of water and air pollution.

It seems that international environmental discourses and policies have had at least some influence on the ways people in Komi see environmental issues, although environmental concern is there obviously less dependent on media and global environmental discourse than in Western countries. More specifically, the discourse on climate change has also had some influence, although people's exact knowledge about the issue is rather minimal. When we made comparisons between the Komi republic and the Oulu region in northern Finland, it was clear that people in Finland were more prone to subscribe to the global environmental discourse (Järvikoski et al., 2008). Therefore, it would perhaps be an exaggeration to speak about the globalisation of the environmental discourse in Komi; it is more accurate to speak about glocalisation, in which global discourses and information emanating from the media has been adapted to local beliefs, customs and personal experience of everyday life. Furthermore, what is interesting in Russia, the counter discourse (the rejection of the idea of global warming) is still detectable both in international politics (the

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and this is connected mainly to the livelihood and subsistence patterns, but also to the time of being in a particular place or area (Karjalainen & Habeck 2004).

coupling the Kyoto protocol and the membership of WTO) as well as in science.

We assume that the process of glocalisation will gradually strengthen the climate change framework in Russia. International pressure and the profits from investments by Western countries will advance such development, although Russia with its Great Power syndrome (see Tynkkynen 2005) and its distinct contexts as a vast country will surely establish its own traditions.

In the conditions where environmental discourses are not clearly discernible among public discourses, people's own perceptions and experiences provide the crucial basis for environmental awareness and concern – although misconceptions about reasons and causal mechanisms (from the scientific point of view) are widespread. This is the case in local pollution issues, in which the influence of external sources of information on public perception is minimal (see Bickerstaff & Walker 2001): but in Komi primary personal experience also seems to be crucial regarding global environmental issues.

In general, scientific knowledge does not (straightforwardly) play a major role in influencing the public's formation of views on environmental issues. In reading signs of climate change, mediated and often incoherent scientific knowledge is evaluated against the background of personal memory, practical knowledge and experience of inhabiting particular locales. It is important to acknowledge that climate is recorded by meteorologists, but weather is experienced by locals (see Ingold & Kurttila 2000).

Because of the uncertain and long-term nature of climate change, evaluations of its effects and causes based on local observation and experience are mixed with effects of other societal and environmental changes. Thus, when taking the local context and individual's life-world as a reference point of changes, "relevant knowledge in the climate discourses is not composed solely of scientific facts about climate chemistry, dynamics, and impacts, but also derives from various experiences of social change



and societal responses to natural change” (Thompson & Rayner 1998, p. 336).

Local dwellers in the Komi Republic have noticed climate change(s), if this is understood as a weather-related or ‘local climate’ phenomena. It is evaluated based on individual perceptions and experiences of local situations: variations in weather and temperatures in different seasons during the past decades. Climate change is perceived mainly as changes in seasons. The seasons have supposedly become more moderate: the winters have become milder and severe freezes to occur less frequently, while summers are cooler nowadays than they used to be. Some respondents remarked that the weather patterns have become more unpredictable and unstable.

The cycle of seasons has a major importance on people’s experience of the weather in the far North (Ingold & Kurttila 2000), and thus the talk and observations of changes in seasons have to be put in this context. A distinctive feature of our data was that climate change was viewed among the newcomers of the Russian far North more as a personal concern for health and well-being than as an environmental or global issue. The climate in the far North has a special meaning, and it is experienced as harsh and having an effect on one’s health along with environmental (e.g. water pollution) and social problems (e.g. unemployment) and working conditions (in coal mines or on oil derricks).

However, climate change, interpreted as the unpredictable weather and the unstable cycle of seasons, can also be understood as a ‘background issue’ within the context of radical societal changes. When our interviewees yearn for stable climatic conditions, they actually pine for such a stable and predictable society, which prevailed during the time of the Soviet Union. At that time people living in the towns of far North used to have a steady and good income guaranteed by the Northern privileges. This supports the notion that global concepts and risks of

environmental change are always localised in particular socio-political and cultural contexts (Burningham & O'Brian 1994).

Although these findings describe the glocal conditions in Komi, they include matters, which obviously are not typical only of Komi. Most importantly, it seems reasonable to maintain that environmental concerns in general – not only in Komi - tend to have a glocal character. It appears that public knowledge of global climate change does not yet form a firm basis for the 'global concern' of climate change, as cross-cultural comparisons (Bord et al. 1998; Brechin 2003) reveal that most people are still poorly informed about the anthropogenic causes of global warming. Nevertheless, people are aware of the issue and believe that they can notice the effects of global climate change locally, as our results from the Komi Republic and from other places indicate.

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# Activation in Modern Governance

## The case of the Finnish Civil Participation Policy Programme 2003-2007

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### Abstract

This paper looks at the activation of civil society. By using the case of the Finnish Civil Participation Policy Programme 2003-2007 it analyses techniques of activation with respect to the empowerment of citizens. The three main techniques within the programme were fostering of formal electoral participation, civic education and systematic screening and dissemination of information. It is argued that these techniques constitute an approach that fits well the Finnish tradition of civic engagement but falls short of embracing a broader range of civic activities, in particular those that not only include fundamentally divergent views, conflictual action repertoires but also activities that are close to citizens' life-worlds.

**Key words:** Activation, Civic engagement, Civil society, Education, Finland, Governing, Information, Participation, Policy programme, Social movements.

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### Introduction

This paper discusses the activation of civic engagement in Finland by introducing the structure and focus of the Finnish Civil Participation Policy Programme of the first Vanhanen government



that was in power between 2003 and 2007<sup>1</sup>. The outline of the programme together with the measures taken in its course are instructive for the “official reading” of civic engagement. Formal participation, civic education and the use of information are central in the attempt to activate civil society.

Civil society as the sphere between the state, the market and the family is a central concept to underpin modern democracy. It goes along with an understanding that not only rules but also aspects of political culture are relevant for the working of democracy. The Nordic countries have traditionally enjoyed an image of consensual democracies with low levels of conflict in the public sphere. In Finland this had earlier found its expression in a strong president and oversized coalition governments that included a broad range of actors. Changes in the basic law have led to a modification of these phenomena. An awareness of Finland’s long standing democratic heritage with one of the oldest rights for general suffrage is central to the Finnish political culture. Participation and a commitment to an inclusive, egalitarian welfare policy are important values. This is deeply rooted in society and even political parties favouring market solutions are careful to assure their commitment to the welfare state. De-commodification of services remains a feature of the Finnish welfare state. Health care, social services and education are provided to a large extent by the public sector. But since the last decade third sector organisations and private firms play an increasing role in this field. This is underpinned by recent changes towards economic flexibility and a reorganisation of the public sector (Hämäläinen & Heiskala 2004). Civic engagement is embedded in this particular democratic culture and welfare arrangement.

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<sup>1</sup> Hallituksen politiikkaohjelmat - kansalaisvaikuttaminen (2006) ULR:  
<http://www.vn.fi/tietoarkisto/politiikkaohjelmat/kansalaisvaikuttaminen/ohjelma/fi.pdf> (retrieved 11.6.2009)

Activity of citizens that emerges from and is directed towards civil society can take many forms. Civic engagement encompasses social, political and other forms of involvement. It is debated from different perspectives, for example in the context of democracy, welfare reform, nonprofit economy and community integration and as such has also come to the attention of politics (Hilger 2006).

In many countries activation is in the first place associated with the activation of welfare dependent persons to enter or re-enter into employment in order to contribute to ones own subsistence (Dean 1995; Drøpping et al. 1999). Benchmarking reports of the OECD and the European Union that compared levels of unemployment, relative size of the active workforce and regulating frameworks have been influential in shifting the approach across countries (Keskitalo & Mannila 2002, 198). This is part of a larger movement that tried to establish a third way beyond market and state centred governing. It is inspired by a strong scepticism towards the abilities of the state to solve current problems by way of intervention as it was common in Keynesian demand side politics. The Third Way-approach stresses “equal opportunity, personal responsibility and the mobilizing of citizens and communities” (Giddens 2000, 2). Instead of relying on big government citizens shall take responsibility and be given the opportunity to solve their problems themselves. This also includes an activation of the agencies of civil society.

As Nikolas Rose (1999, 168) notes, this policy creates a paradoxical relationship. Constituting a third space next to the public and the economic sphere civil society is often seen as a counterweight to the state and its bureaucratic apparatus. Activating citizens to govern themselves, however, does not install citizens as a counterweight. The state acts as the promoter of autonomous citizens not in order to enrich the life of citizens but to solve problems the state faces and cannot cope with. This paper

addresses the Finnish understanding of civic engagement along these two poles.

We will first review general developments in governing and civic engagement (section 2 and 3) before we turn to the Finnish citizen participation programme (section 4) and discuss three techniques applied within it (section 5). They are formal participation, civic education and the use of information. The article concludes with an evaluation of the Finnish Civil Participation Policy Programme (section 6).

## **Governmentality, rule and governance**

The ideology critical perspective on power has usually focussed on hidden coercion in the workings of the state. Modern governments, however, try to use incentives instead of coercion in their repertoire of tools. Michel Foucault has proposed to closer investigate how, under conditions of autonomy of society, it is possible for governments to achieve certain effects in the population. He tried to analyse the art of government in its attempt to rule and administer society. This view is not necessarily limited to governments alone but encompasses the whole complex of societal institutions that have an impact on governing.

The avoidance of open coercion in liberal societies does not mean that coercion has ceased to exist. Even though the claim to freedom of the individual is constitutive for modern liberal governmentality only certain types of social conduct are accepted while others are not. Once certain types of knowledge are established this also effects the ways things are commonly done. In this sense, unwritten rules do the ruling. Liberalism still sees a necessity for governing the population, but it should not necessarily be the state that does the governing (Dean 2002, 42). Open coercion has been replaced by more subtle mechanisms. Modern techniques for the exercise of power make use of structures and agencies that are embedded within society.

The subjects of government are seen “as members of a population, as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimized” (Dean 1999, 20). Since it is the general goal of policy to bring about change in the behaviour of citizens this is not by itself a critical stance. The claim of the government for freedom and autonomy, however, is limited by the prevailing concepts of common sense about how individuals should run their lives. There are three major forms in which norms or practices generated outside the state are applied to substitute open steering by the state. These operations include less of traditional hierarchical steering but still enforce compliance with the rules of the game, most notably those of the market economy. They increase autonomy and at the same time “generate specific norms of individual and collective life” (Dean 2002, 40).

The first operation is the transfer of values and expectations of civil society to the state, the second is the application of market mechanisms to the operations of the public administration and the third is the use of agencies of civil society for governing (Dean 2002). These three operations are also central elements of the activating state approach. It is crucial to note the voluntary character of citizens’ participation in this project (Cruikshank 1998, 147-148). For this to be possible the establishment of certain types of knowledge and, connected to it, prevailing ideas about truth are highly significant. It is through the way the social world is interpreted and explained that inferences about certain routes of action are supported and legitimised.

### *Obligations, public management and governance*

A central element in the concept of the activation state is the idea that citizens are activated and enabled to take care for their own affairs. This is accompanied by emphasising a balance between rights, in particular entitlements to social welfare, and obligations. Obligations are justified formally as being the flip side

of the coins that make the system work. They are also grounded in an ancient principle of social conduct. Citizenship includes obedience of the law and respect of other person's rights. This view stresses obligations of those who are able to work for their own subsistence, take care for one's children and so forth.

Another crucial development is the reform of public management. Formerly, professional bureaucracy was promoted as the most rational way to govern society. Fiscal crisis and limitations of steering capacity in the face of demand in our more complex societies were among the reasons to call for a new approach. One answer was a partial privatisation and marketisation of the public sector. New Public Management introduced market-like processes and criteria into public administration. It emphasises efficiency, flexibility, minimising the state and the quantification of outcomes to benchmark them. This type of public sector reform creates a tension to fundamental principles of state activity such as legitimate procedures, equal treatment of citizens, reliability and the provision of crucial services.

A related means to enhance the problem-solving capacity and effectiveness of governments is informalisation. The notion of governance is commonly understood as the inclusion of a wide range of (non-political) actors into the process of political decision making. Governance has been introduced as a concept to unfocus steering from government alone. A central element is steering through a variety of parties beyond government, who are connected through network relations where roles are contingent and not formally legitimised. The role of government is increasingly understood as setting directions while the fulfilment of tangible tasks is left to other parties. This is often seen as providing for an increased role for citizens and their associations.

While some claim that such a practice increases efficiency and offers the state opportunities to regain steering capacity others argue that it weakens accountability and violates political equality (Greven 2005, 267). These critics argue that formal bodies and

legal procedures better guarantee influence for those weakly equipped with political, economical or social power. Stoker (1998, 21) notes that governance “push[es] responsibilities onto the private and voluntary sectors and, more broadly, the citizen.” Therefore it is disputable whether socio-political governance which not only includes corporate actors but also tries to activate the population (Kooiman & van Vliet 1993), really increases opportunities for citizens to influence decision making, or even, whether that is intended at all.

Consequently, citizen’s activity has moved into the focus of government. One result is the establishment of programmes to foster engagement of citizens. In the following two sections we will first take a brief look at some characteristics of civil society in Finland in order to get an understanding of the background of citizens’ activity and then turn to the governmental programme that tries to influence citizens’ engagement. Together both will enable us to evaluate whether the programme results in an empowerment of citizens or continues a tradition of citizens’ use as a resource.

## **Civic engagement in Finland**

Civic engagement is one out of numerous notions to refer to civil society and its activities. Citizens cannot be coerced into civic activity since it is intrinsically voluntary and thus requires a conscious decision. Part of the motivation can be an expectation of personal gains but it is not done for return on investment and personal material gain alone. It embodies a contribution to the common good. Its activities take place among people outside the private sphere of the family and are usually carried out with or in relation to others. In that sense it is often collective and co-operative. Important forms of civic engagement are associations, social movements, internet participation and volunteering.

Associations of the third sector are sometimes seen as an independent realm next to the public and the private business sector. In practice, even in liberal countries, the third sector is interconnected to the state and even to business. The third sector anticipates and reacts to needs arising in society, but it fulfils its tasks often in close cooperation with the public sector. While the public sector may set targets and provides for funding the third sector delivers tangible services. In recent years this mode of public private partnership has been introduced into the Finnish welfare state and became part of public management reform.

Structures of the third sector have existed throughout history. But during the crisis of the early 1990s the third sector received new interest in the context of self-help, service provision and as an employer. Two aspects have been of particular importance. Associations of the third sector were discussed as providers of those services the welfare state would no longer afford or deliver itself. The sector was also seen as a possible employer to compensate for a share of workplaces lost during the depression. From an initially supplementary role the sector has acquired increasing prominence in recent years (Matthies 2000, 213). The cooperative character of the third sector produces a tension between an advocacy role in amplifying citizen's interests and its role as a service producer.

Finland has seen several waves of social movements starting with those involved in nation-building in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. The 1930s saw semi-facist movements; and a radical left-wing movement emerged after WW 2 (Siisiäinen, 1992, 22-24). The late 1960s gave rise to a new radical movement, partly fuelled by students, before in the late 1970s strong environmental movements emerged. One decade later prominent issues were the protection of forests and squatting of empty houses. More recent issues have been animal rights activists in the 1990s. The latter movements involved between a dozen up to a hundred persons (Siisiäinen 1998, 229-232) and continue to mobilize citizens. At the

turn of the millennium also a larger globalization critical movement appeared (Lindholm, 2005, 36).

Although social movements emerge out of conflicts on particular issues, their trajectory in Finland is usually consensual (see for the following Siisiäinen 1998, 222-227, 238). While earlier the class structure between the political left and right has been dominant, the 1980s introduced the middle classes and students as main actors in protest events which are often based on educated social milieus. Protests are oriented towards the state and increasingly towards the media. Protests usually avoid conflict with officials, and, except for a few instances, private property is respected and preserved. Social movements rarely develop spontaneous activities. There is a strong membership culture characterized by a tendency to register citizen groups as formal associations. Protests are presented as a rational way to communicate interests, less as a way to represent identities by means of play.

The particular form of demonstrations is not rare in bigger cities, although many of them are small. In Helsinki there are usually somewhat below one hundred registered protest events every year<sup>2</sup>. Risto Alapuro (2005, 394-95) interprets the Finnish pattern of social movements as solidarity based on mandate instead of visibility of actors themselves. People have “more direct links to the attention of political decision-makers” (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002, 110). Representatives are close to the people, for example many members of parliament at the same time serve on municipal councils. Parliamentarians are easily invited to speak even to small groups of demonstrators in front of the parliament during sessions or they participate in debates of grass roots groups. The country has also seen huge mobilisation, for example in the course of the USA-Iraqi war in 2003.

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<sup>2</sup> In 2005 the number of protest events was exceptionally high (Metro/STT 9.10.2006).



In recent years classical street demonstrations have been complemented by internet based protest. These include networks that exchange information and citizen petitions that can be signed on the web. Besides information, networking and mobilisation internet forums are virtual meeting places where people exchange, support and enforce opinions (Häyhtiö & Rinne 2006). It is more and more common to give one's opinion in chat-rooms or web-discussions. Also the classical letter to the editor has re-emerged on the web with an enormous intensity. Every day the main Finnish newspaper receives hundreds of electronic commentaries, in particular when issues are contested. Email lists are increasingly used to prepare meetings, organise demonstration and deliver petitions.

Protests of the unemployed are situated within the framework of traditional associations (Alapuro 2005). Street protest is more common on human rights issues whereas protest connected to welfare services takes more often place among experts who act as watch-dogs and use the web to coordinate themselves. Activists constitute overlapping circles that involve a core of persons concerned about public services. Members and contributors are often based at separate organisations, e.g. trade unions or associations. Such a network is itself connected to other networks. It distributes information and discusses interpretations of political developments and eventually mobilises for protest activities.

Volunteering probably constitutes the least formalised form of engagement. Volunteering and activity in association in welfare related fields are well appreciated. They are considered to contribute to the common good and bring people in contact to each other. Both self-oriented and other-oriented motives play a role (Nylund 2000, 123) in volunteering which involves more than one third of the population (Yeung 2004, 89-90). Volunteering is largest in the field of culture and recreation. The second largest field is civic activity including local interest organisations, consumer and patient organisations as well as political

organisations outside political parties (Helander & Laaksonen 1999, 54).

Although these forms of engagement bear a potential for resistance, they also fit smoothly into the idea of society steering itself. They are an expression of social conduct that takes responsibility for usefulness. As a general rule, not opinions as such are seen as legitimate but rather opinions loaded with societal benefit. Civic engagement is appreciated foremost when it reduces social distress (Julkunen 2000, 66). One can conclude that that in Finland there is a rich history of civic engagement which is usually well accepted as long as it takes a constructive form.

### **The Finnish government's approach to civic engagement**

Politics on engagement have rarely been researched, mostly with respect to policy formulation only (Kendall 2000). Since engagement policy does not constitute a policy field of its own there is usually no single department in government to deal with these issues (Hilger 2007, 153). The Finnish approach consists of measures centred on a cross department policy programme.

The creation of this specific policy programme was based on perceived negative developments in civil society. Reviewers of Finnish civil society noted that civic skills and abilities for dialogue had decreased in recent years. Lack of public debate is a known feature of Finnish civil society, partly as a consequence of social homogeneity. Other current problems were a decreasing turnout at elections. The former minister of Justice, Leena Luhtanen<sup>3</sup>, responsible for the Civil Participation Policy Programme, warned that membership in political parties, associations and participation in daily affairs was not satisfactory. This added to down going trust into societal institutions and elected representatives. As a result,

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<sup>3</sup> Leena Luhtanen, Minister of Justice, speech delivered at the seminar on the knowledgebase for democracy (demokratian tietopohja), Helsinki, 17.3.2006.

citizens experienced power as remote and did not feel to have much influence on decision-making. Against the background of Finland's democratic tradition, the important dimension of municipal self-governing and the widespread involvement in civic associations these developments called for intervention.

The period of growth that followed the depression of the 1990s had focussed on technology and innovation but in the new millennium the Jäätteenmäki government had put the welfare state back on the agenda (Kantola 2004, 87). Furthermore, it also established a specific programme on participation. This was adopted as one out of four priorities when the government took office in June 2003. The aim of the programme was to activate participation on various levels. It operated with the general notion of citizen influence (*kansalaisvaikuttaminen*) and civic activity (*kansalaistoiminta*), both broader than the concept of (political) participation (*osallistuminen*).

The programme was coordinated by the Ministry of Justice. Co-operating partners were the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Education with a focus on civic education. Further, the Ministry of the Interior brought in an interest in municipal democracy, the working of municipal trustees and elected officials. The governmental programme provided for basic funding for coordinating purposes. The projects under its coordination themselves were financed by the respective ministries. They were also responsible for carrying out the projects (Niemelä 2005, 23-24).

To realise the goal of enhancing participation the government used a number of well-known measures (Hilger 2008, 184). Legal measures were the preparation of changes in the electoral system, referenda and changes in the position of municipal representatives. Another type of measures were financial support for projects mainly to collect information about civic activity, and, to a certain extent, also to prepare new web-based platforms for participation. Projects were financed to research indicators of participation, the

inclusion of youth and educational practices. But the range was not limited to the repertoire of hierarchy and money. It also included symbolic measures like publications, discussions, dissemination seminars to communicate results of the studies conducted under the coordination of the ministry. Further, political speeches of ministerial staff and the dissemination of information in brochures, reports and on websites were important. These activities presented facts in the frame of an official interpretation of the current state of participation. Finally, organisational measures consisted of direct activities of the state. The state itself established new entities that worked on the enhancement of engagement. Examples were the establishment of workgroups, committees and web-portals to produce and disseminate information. These included web based portals for democratic communication, committees on civil society and representative democracy, the preparation of a portfolio for democracy within the Ministry of Justice as well as research efforts to monitor the development of democracy in Finland. A number of projects were carried out by staff of one or more ministries who reorganized themselves by forming thematic workgroups for a given period.

Altogether, the policy programme was a step towards a more centralised activation of engagement. The concept of civic engagement that was presented here is centred around legal participation in established channels supported by a general sense for civilisation and education and supplemented by the gathering and distribution of information. Projects to experiment with new forms of involvement were only minor elements of the programme although there were few projects aiming at participation via the internet. They provided for information on the state of civic activism, web-based portals to encourage participation and the provision of information that could enhance participation. Next, we will take a closer look at the programme's three main techniques of activation, namely formal participation, education and information.

## Techniques of activation

If we ask for the rationality of activation it is crucial to understand the working of the activation programme. Governments have long reacted to citizen engagement with scepticism. Often they have tried to repress movements by applying law, police, counter movements or 'underpinned' them through labelling. They have also tried to co-optate movements or integrated engaged citizens' causes by adapting the political system to realise these goals, as it has happened with environmental concerns. The measures of the citizen participation programme relate to three techniques of governing. These techniques can be used to activate citizens for its own sake but they could also be seen as a way to govern the population.

### *Formal participation*

Legal measures envisaged were closely related to electoral processes. They structure the allocation of individual will to produce lists of preferences among citizens. Voter turnout in elections is the basis of legitimacy in pluralist democracies. They are complemented by referenda that provide for additional input on preferences on particular issues. The conception of engagement we find evaluates such electoral participation highly. It gives rise to a formalistic understanding of democracy. This is not to criticise formal participation as such. However, a vivid version of democracy has to face the fact that elections are only a mechanism to make democracy work on a very basic level. All debates in modern democratic theory go beyond a formal understanding and address the issue of involvement in other forms of collective regulation of interest. The concept of civil society as it saw a revival in the past two decades rests on the assumption that beyond elections other forms of involvement in associations, demonstrations and self-organised platforms are needed.

Another element is important for the constitution and formulation of Finnish activation policies. Benchmarking reports on civic knowledge and citizen involvement created concern that fostered the programme on citizen participation<sup>4</sup>. The establishment of the programme is not merely an expression of concern for the state of democracy; it is also an attempt to improve reputation. Finland is ranked highly in international comparative studies on democracy. Among other democratic standards this means reliability of legal public procedures, freedom of expression and association. From the government's point of view this is an asset vis-à-vis the population (and foreign powers) that increases leverage to act. This is supported by recourse on the democratic tradition which is central for the production and maintaining of Finnish identity. For example the 2007 centennial anniversary celebrations of the parliament and the right for general suffrage, including that for women, underpinned a central pillar of this identity.

One might, however, worry that the concern for reputation outweighs concern for inclusion. This is supported by recent developments in the public sphere. There is a thin line between participation and expression. Participation is a solid concept that has the governmental process of decision making as its object. Often the expression of own world views are a first step to involvement. Recent protest events in Finland had the intensity to dramatise civic action. In their course, however, citizen engagement got a bad name. Animal liberation activists who in the 1990s freed animals from fur farms were an exceptionally radical movement and got labelled as “eco-terrorists”.

Even more significant, after a “Euro-May-Day” demonstration on April 30<sup>th</sup> 2006 bottles and stones were thrown at officers while a fire brigade and the police were trying to close a

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<sup>4</sup> Head of the Programme Seppo Niemelä at the Seminar on the information base of democracy (Demokratian tietopohja-seminaari, 17.3.2006, Helsinki, Ministry of Justice, Säätytalo).

fire in a yard. This was perceived as a dramatic change in the form of public protest. It remained unclear whether the aggression had a political ground connected to a demonstration earlier the same day. It can also be seen as the outcome of traditional “Finnish craziness”<sup>5</sup> on the eve of May Day where usually alcohol is involved. To much surprise, a few days later almost the whole building, a symbolic store house that was due to be torn down in the week to come, burned down in a spectacular fire. Many saw an immediate connection to the earlier incident.

The debate that emerged is telling for the interpretation of civic activity. A new rise of activism was foreseen and it was suggested that violent models of contentious action are spreading to Finland. The most general effect was probably that the notion of civic activity received a negative connotation along the lines of: If that is what citizens do when they are active, we don’t need this!<sup>6</sup> The event also triggered a harsh course of the police towards demonstrators a few months later. In the course of a demonstration (“Smash Asem”) on occasion of an EU-Asem meeting in Finland in September 2006 a large number of people was arrested albeit the demonstration had hardly started and did not take a violent form. Remarkable was the reaction of the Minister of the Interior and the head of the police who appreciated the arrest of 134 persons of whom a considerable fraction were only bystanders.

Such suspicion towards spontaneous action fuelled reference to established channels. Both incidents show some difficulty in accepting engagement of persons who represent difference. In the wake of these events also the “precariat-movement” that criticises a competitive and coercive labour market was de-legitimised. Angriiness was projected on the organisers of their demonstration

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<sup>5</sup> I am grateful for this notion to Dr Henrik Stenius (University of Helsinki, Centre for Nordic Studies), Interview on 6.9.2005.

<sup>6</sup> See different articles that appeared in Helsingin Sanomat after the incident, in particular: Miska Rantanen: Kriisipalaverin paikka, Sunday 7.5.2006.

that called the dominant lifestyle in question. At the same time also this particular form of expression of interests was de-legitimized. A coordinated process of gathering policy preferences is clearly preferred to a self-organising and spontaneous formation of interests. The ballot, as it is promoted by the policy programme, is an individualised activity that does not account for the social setting in which political decisions acquire relevance. It assumes an ideal speech situation with options that are not available in the real world. Electoral participation, as important as it is, is not sufficient to foster involvement according to modern conceptions of democracy.

### *Education*

A second important element of activation was education. Civic education was seen as the key to civic engagement. It includes knowledge about political matters and structures but it goes far beyond that. Civic and political skills of dispute and debate as well as cooperation and conflict are crucial elements of a political sphere which is inclusive of citizens. Education produces knowledge. Historically it has been connected to obtaining skills that enable the population to use their labour force efficiently. It also helps integrate the community into a common pattern of thinking. The development of schooling, paradigmatically portrayed in the novel *The Seven Brothers* by the Finnish classical writer Alexis Kivi, was closely embedded in local parishes of the church. Foucault has analysed this as the pastoral power to shape patterns of thinking. Education in this sense not only serves the provision of information and problem solving capacity. It includes socialization into a style of behaviour, for example respect for the rhythm of industrial time instead of the agrarian daily cycle. It also includes the creation of a larger community and its construction as a sphere of common interests. The latter was emphasized in civic education. It directs attention away from individual interests



towards a concern for the community. This goes along with a non-conflictual image of civil society, a sphere, however, that in a pluralistic and heterogeneous society does not form a unity of similar interests.

Civic education includes tangible information about institutions, but it first of all refers to the rules of conduct in the public sphere. Teaching dispute and tolerance for difference, however, runs empty when a “non-event” like the afore mentioned “Smash Asem”-demonstration is used by the state to define and underpin norms of conformity in the public sphere. What remains is an action repertoire defined by those already in power. Education is both enlightening and disciplining. The potential of certain forms of expression is not well understood in the approach of the Civil Participation Policy Programme. This leads to the third point, the public use of information.

### *The public use of information*

The civil participation programme also intended to monitor the state of democracy by using a large number of indicators. The selection of the indicators defined the scope of what counts as citizen engagement. A proposal for an index of democracy included (Borg 2006, 335-342):

- Electoral democracy: turnout, experienced influence, relation to political parties.
- Social capital: interaction with politicians and administration, knowledge about politics, participation in (electronic) forums of decision making.
- Associations: information about registered associations and citizens’ views on associations.
- Attitudes: views of own identity as a citizen and attitudes towards political institutions and actors.
- Information: technical resources and the provision of opportunities to use different kinds of media.

- Institutions: opportunities for civic education, participation of youth, climate of participation in organisations, forms of participation in local democracy.
- Democracy and equal rights: information on social structure in different forms of participation.

These indicators ought to be traced through register data and surveys. They should produce a fairly encompassing knowledge about the state of participation. Gathering of information is a precondition for steering. On the condition of an analysis based on acknowledged facts, measures for improvement can easier be applied and justified.

Foucault's reasoning about discipline strongly rests on the establishment of statistics as a key science. This is a well known exercise in social regulation. The population is analysed according to gender, birth rates, illnesses, and so forth. The civil participation programme adds political indicators to this body of information.

Information works in two directions. Government transmits information to citizens. In critical cases this has been analysed as propaganda, but it is fundamental in every government's striving to disseminate opinions, plans and facts. More innovative is the other direction, the collection of input of citizens through different platforms. These can be used to equip the government and the administration with information about the range of preferences and topical points as well as for criticising the government. Thus, there are two sides to information, control and enlightenment.

Citizens today widely use internet forums of newspapers such as Helsingin Sanomat to express their views. To a much lesser extent they use official channels provided by cities or those that have been established by the Civil Participation Policy Programme. The latter are remote from daily life. The formal interest in democracy as it was advocated in the Finnish policy programme falls short of a connection to citizens' life worlds. Citizens participate when and where issues are on the table, not to satisfy formal requirements of a democratic system.

## Conclusions

The three central techniques applied in the Citizen Participation Policy Programme are formal participation, education as well as screening for and the dissemination of information. Voting, the formation of associations and feedback in channels through the internet mainly work as input channels that do not expose the government to intensive scrutiny and debate. Education provides for knowledge about these formal channels. It trains citizens to understand the processes involved and to make use of information in order to give input into the system of decision-making. Education of citizens also ensures the diffusion of accepted norms of rights and duties connected to citizenship. Finally, information provides the authorities with an instrument to monitor the state of participation and prepare intervention when it seems necessary. These measures rest on the assumption of a rationalized mode of expression. Action taken by the Finnish government enforces this model that, on first sight, suits well the tradition of civic engagement in Finland.

Participation is often sketched as rational communication of arguments and interests. However, actual instances of participation, e.g. in citizen forums or demonstrations, often do not conform to this model of speaking. People present their interests and opinions in idiosyncratic or even irrational ways. Iris Marion Young (2000) has criticised the Habermasian model of rational argumentation with a convincing argument. As a moral standard Habermas' model is applicable only when we consider certain types of speech, namely unconstrained, open and sincere argumentation. Young points out that there are other forms of expression which are also widespread and significant. For an inclusive model of democracy these forms have to be regarded in order to assure that speakers who are not socialised and trained in the model of rational speech get access to public deliberation. The difficulty is to find ways to take this type of contribution serious as

a form of participation. This is not an easy task because of the large gap between rational argument and idiosyncratic speech. The rational argument style is based on the assumption that there is an orientation towards the common good. Idiosyncratic speech by definition is oriented towards own interests and can as such not be generalized.

The Finnish civic sector is mostly characterized by a rational way of argumentation. Its cooperative trajectory brings it into close relation to the state. An independent sector, however, always bears the potential to develop adversary tendencies. In order to be credible, activation cannot take a peaceful trajectory for granted, but has to allow for leverage. Fostering only formal participation results in disregard of spontaneity.

There are a number of reasons why the activation of engagement can be in the interest of governments. Engaged citizens solve problems themselves by producing services. They allow for better decisions by contributing relevant points to decision-making. Inclusion of citizens also produces more legitimate decisions, lacking participation therefore can be interpreted as a quiet form of protest and withdrawal. And ultimately there is the freedom not to participate, the freedom not be a “good citizen” who fulfils his civic duty. The role of government is to create order while the political consists of conflict and creates disorder (Pekonen 2006). Since active citizens cannot be controlled completely, they always bear a potential for resistance.

The general concept of citizen engagement also rests on the assumption that not only involvement in common affairs but also altruism and social contact are relevant goals for the active. Against this background it is notable that forms of engagement in welfare related fields are not considered in the Finnish Civil Participation Policy Programme. More than the political sphere proper, which always only includes a small fragment of the population, the broad realm of engagement in social, cultural, environmental and other

fields bears potential for participation. This tradition of social volunteering seems to have no connection to the wider discourse of civic activism. There are two Finnish ministries that are concerned with social and health affairs, but none of them was included in the policy programme. While participation in fact is about shaping one's own social environment, involvement as it is presented in the Civil Participation Programme focuses on structures of explicitly political and representational participation. The rationality of the programme was to provide for information on how to participate, not to enhance participation where it generates in a basal form.

Participation can be fostered in two directions. Deepening participation would refer to the inclusion of more vertical levels of society into the process of political decision making. Not only formal institutions but also informal bodies and associations of citizens were to be included into this process. Broadening participation would refer to the involvement of citizens in fields beyond what is commonly understood as the institutional core of politics. This latter approach is particularly relevant with regard to civic engagement. As a concept that goes beyond political engagement it offers a way to realize participation in fields that are commonly not seen as areas for collective decision making. But also in these spheres tangible societal relations and conditions of citizens' life-worlds are being shaped.

What effective participation needs most are issues; conflictual fields where something is at stake. The serious impression that participation could make a difference is an enormous motivator. This is probably more easily to achieve in fields near to life-world contexts than in high politics. While citizen activity and civic engagement are concepts that embrace activities ranging from political participation and cultural engagement to social help, activation politics do not reflect this scope yet. As long as participation is conceptualized in a narrow way, the resource view is prone to prevail over the empowerment perspective.

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# The Mountain and the Sea as Mirrors of the Soul

## An approach from Georg Simmel's AEsthetics and Gaston Bachelard's Poetics \*

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### Abstract

Two different thinkers, Georg Simmel and Gaston Bachelard, made brothers in spirit on account of both their intuitions genius, a singular approach to the world of life and the senses, to the mysteries of certain elements of Nature as well. Simmel raises the problem of the landscape and the understanding thereof in its quality of a deeply spiritual fact that can only be solved within such a context. It could be said that this is a self-enclosed vision that is experienced as a self-sufficient unit however intertwined with an infinitely remote extension thereafter aimed at overflowing even though enclosed within borders that do not exist with regard to a feeling toward a divine One –the total of Nature living, however, at a lesser level, on a different stratum.

Separated from Nature, the “civilized” man gets back to It, changing It, however into a landscape –a fact that, as far as Simmel is concerned, is a spiritual tragedy –in other words a tragedy wherein a part from the whole becomes an autonomous whole arising from the “other whole”, while pretending to be

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endowed of its own right –a tragedy that, in modern days, caused the strongest repercussion by tearing away the conduction of the cultural process. When facing elements –the sea, the mountain- humans are joyfully *alone*. This is so because –as Bachelard warns us, we are facing a loneliness ideal so necessary for the cosmic challenge psychology. Should you wish to project your will pursuant to the best possible way, you should be left on your own.

Soil, rocky masses, heights, a chaos becoming order and mystery. Says Simmel that the Earth realm as such can be seen there, fully endowed with its unparalleled momentum even though far away from any type of life as well as any signifié of form proper. It is Simmel's contention that the ultimate secret of the impression the Alpine ranges causes us lies in their being "far away from life".

Bachelard tell us about the birthright of the children of Nature: *the primeval rocks*. So, in a kind of dialog between rocks and clouds, the sky seems to imitate earth: in a kind of dialectic between master and slave, both the rock and the cloud need one another, they both suppose and imagine one another. This is so because, out of its own immobility, mountains always give us an always active impression of uprising.

Simmel confronts the mountain geography and the maritime geography –the latter is more representative of a moving, multiform life, oscillating between dead calm and storm, thus setting free the "immediate presence" and the "pure, relative magnitude of life" thanks to a crushing dynamics exceeding the very life through its own, ever changing forms. A mountain range grants a fresh power to shouts due to the swarming of echoes that remind us the par excellence echo, the inner echo, the echo that imprints itself and feeds on silence, the vibrating echo you can hear in the deepest depth. The (relative) *verticality* of a mountain range throws us back to transcendence, to the plenitude of existence, to the unlimited limits of climbing we can reach at without even attempting.

Heroism, fights, dream, feats. In that sense no wonder that Simmel devoted one of his delicate analysis to *adventure*. Thus,

both the mountain and the sea appear as mirrors of the soul, a soul that has become mountain ranges, deep gorges and ravines –and, at the same time, the soul is likely to shelter both violent waves as well as sleeping waves in search for a silent and calm ocean. Hence, these are the roots for the primeval fight, the gallantry and heroism that protect us when we feel overwhelmed by the *extrinsic immensity*.

**Key words:** Mountain, Sea, Simmel, Bachelard, Landscape

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## Introduction

Two different thinkers, Georg Simmel and Gaston Bachelard, made brothers in spirit on account of both their intuitive genius, have offered a singular approach to the world of life. As if they were great serpents leading us on the way, we will allow them to take us along and the senses, to the mysteries of certain elements of Nature as well.

Why Simmel? why mainly by the **device** his essay on "The Alps" represents? Is this an aesthetic essay anticipating the advent of the expressionist style in painting, as Habermas (1988) implies in the epilogue to Simmel's *Philosophische Kultur*? Is this an anthropological-philosophical reflection? A critique on culture? All this, all that leads us, calls us to read the works of an accomplished interpreter of his time –thanks to the loftiness of his writings and his thinking, places us at a privileged watchtower from which we will be able to examine our times closely. And also, why not Bachelard, a faithful devotee of Nature's poetics and living space – besides his classical works in the realm of the Philosophy of natural sciences, and his contributions... we should say his foundations on the epistemological cut (1935, 1938), a faithful devotee of so sophisticated an hermeneutics that, if at all possible, it takes us to a kind of meta-poetry?

We have to take into account that, as far Simmel is concerned, the core of Philosophy is not –well, at least, is not only a content that is constructed and shared, but also a determined intellectual attitude focused toward life and the world, a way and a 'functional' mode to approach things and treat things intimately. This is how impulse is recovered. –as a metaphysical process –and this is closely related to the Philosophy of landscape –a most adequate frame at that if we are eager to grasp fully his meditations over the Alpine mounts and their (apparent) counterpart: the sea.

This is so because, at times, a landscape is much more than a landscape. Simmel (1998:1975) foresees the question, and expresses it in a way as simple than complex: "Our consciousness has to possess a new "whole", unitary, higher than elements, unbound to their isolated meaning and not mechanically arranged on the basis of those elements: this is what a landscape is". He means that we are not seeing "a given element", a piece of the planet we are able to gaze upon in an immediate way: this –as represented as a landscape, in Simmel's opinion (1998:176) demands "maybe an optical, maybe an aesthetic being-for-itself pursuant to a feeling, a singular exemption, apt at characterizing the world from this indivisible unit of nature wherein each fragment can only serve as a channel for the total forces of existence.

In actual fact, Simmel formulates here the problem of landscape and the understanding thereof, as a strongly spiritual fact likely to be solved there, only. It would be "a vision closed upon itself, that is felt as a self-sufficient unit, intertwined, however, within a infinitely more faraway extension that, afterwards, flows out between borders that do not exist as far as the feeling of a divine One, of the total of nature living at a lower level, at another stratum are concerned (1998: 176). Could it be possible for us, just here, to resort to the paleographic palette a poet uses to paint and reproducing, more and more increased, the actuality of the rocky

landscape and its irreplaceable diamond, sharp edge –to be sure, Bachelard would approve.

Yes but, all the same, a human being (even though devoid of any poetic insight –even ignoring if he has one, at least at the level of either a preoccupation or an aspiration...) -a human being stops in front of a landscape and, in his own way, he paints it, in spite of not being a true artist.

This is why Simmel (1998:176) reminds us that "Nature –that in its being, its profound meaning is deeply ignorant of individuality, is reconstructed by the human eye which divides and recomposes things divided into isolate units within "the landscape"-an individuality in its own right. Separated from nature the "civilized" human gets back to It, converting It into a landscape. This, says Simmel, is a tragedy of the spirit –that is, the tragedy lies in the fact that some part of a whole becomes an autonomous whole "[...] arising from the "other whole, "while pretending to be endowed of its own right [a tragedy] that, in modern days, caused the strongest repercussion by tearing away the conduction of the cultural process" (1998:177).

Simmel, however, under a pantheistic appearance, resorts to the primitive, constitutive religiosity present in human life. Are we allowed to think that the perfect contemplation of a landscape –or, more directly, a contemplation of Nature, a way to get tied again with the Other, thus founding unity, the Whole –the fact of seeing? Perhaps –not willingly, who knows, we resort to the image of the world, to the image any landscape evokes for us and claims for us –however it could be (or it certainly is) that we resort to our ultimate senses -actually the first senses, such an image has awoken for us.

This is why, as far as Simmel is concerned (1998:185-86) the *feeling* of the landscape and the *landscape visual unit* are just two different moments of a unique phenomenon: "This is precisely there when the unity of the natural existence is successful in wrapping us inside it, as this occurs when facing a landscape: a

scission between an Ego who is watching and an Ego who feels –a scission appearing wrong twice. In front of the landscape we stand as whole humans –and same goes for the natural landscape or a landscape that has been converted in a work of art. So the action that creates it for us becomes immediately an action that looks and an action that feels and, for the first time, smashes into pieces those separations for the first time and, this, thanks to the following reflection".

This work is not going to referred explicitly to important questions such as identity construction and deconstruction, patterns of regional identity, or essential and imagined identity, among other related issues, very well developed by different authors (Allen *et al.*, 1998; Paasi, 1991, 2003; Van't Klooster *et al.*, 2002; etc.), and also the suggestive works of the Japanese philosopher Tetsuro Watsuji (2006) on cultural phenomenology of the landscape. Nevertheless, many times all these phenomena are implicit while analyzing Simmel's and Bachelard's approaches.

## **Mountain, Sea, and Soul**

When facing elements –the sea, the mountain- humans are joyfully *alone*. This is so because –as Bachelard warns us, we are facing a loneliness ideal so necessary for the cosmic challenge psychology. Should you wish to project your will pursuant to the best possible way, you should be left on your own. A loneliness, however, that is at the same time a company endowed with a growing innerness. An only apparent reclusion anticipating all the facets of heroism. Such a loneliness of the existing being is, at the same time, unique and different, and we can find it either in mountain ranges, the altitude –all types of altitudes, or facing the sea, the movements thereof –all types of movements. Resonance of the soul feeding itself by both facing and embodying those elements –the only way to secure some victory even though such victory implies the defeat of our longing for a growing authenticity.

For Georg Simmel, the Alps offer an aesthetic impression unlikely to be reproduced through a work of art: it is true that, opposite to such a colossus, the existential experience becomes something unique, something impossible to repeat. Now, this is also true as far as the aesthetic experiment is concerned, the aesthetic experiment felt by any person recreating a landscape through a work of art.

Simmel (1988: 126) tells us that "the peculiar meaning of what is of a massive nature is based on the singularity of the alpine shapes. If seen as a general expression, the configuration of the Alps owns, as a general characteristic, something anxious, something accidental that escapes from any possible unity of shapes. This is why, for many painters only interested in the formal quality of Nature, the Alps are barely tolerable for them".

Beyond genial intuitions that permeate the Simmelian thought, we must, nevertheless, point out that, actually, a painter gives ex post a shape to an aesthetic experience –not to say an existential experience, as cases might be, a shape operating ex ante as an efficient cause for the future work. In turn, the work triggers an infinite number of echoes among the viewers who are the re-creators of that landscape. Indeed, if there is a landscape the enormous magnificence of the mountain range overwhelms, it is the landscape of the soul, so full of heights and abrupt slopes, valleys and rivers at peace, rocks, enclosed paths, eternal snows and suns. Reflects and projects that beautify the soul with all the possible hues, preparing the soul to grasp in a better way Mother Nature's magnificent display.

The overwhelming silence of the Alps at times either calls us or placates us according to the depths of the observing soul. It is since the soul that we see Nature's elements and call out to them – in the same way that we call out to the work of art.

A part of this question, however, does not slip Simmel's mind (1988: 127s) –most especially indeed when he states that "The question of the shape forwards the impression the Alps cause on



us down to the very ultimate categories of the soul [...] The high mountain –that is, the inaccessible and muffled fury of its purely material mass, united to the simultaneous, more than terrestrial thrust, as well as the transfigured calm of the snow are for us a source of inspiration while melting both aspects in a one and unique, intimate resonance. The absence of an own and authentic meaning of its shape achieves that both the feeling and the symbol of the great powers of existence melt in the high mountain –which is less than any possible shape but more than all shapes possible".

We are facing a dialectic of what is ethereal and what is rocky and shapeless, between immensity and finiteness, between unreachable heights and abysses we imagine on account of both need and support. All these aspects, conjugated, as a polyphony, in search of a recondite sense ruled by intuition, only accessible from the heights of a contemplative, silent soul.

However, at the point where "shapes are juxtaposed in such accidental way, without any leading instruction uniting them or giving them a meaning –as it occurs in the Alps, any shape whatsoever would find itself painfully isolated, deprived of any supporting point within the whole should the accumulated material mass –the homogeneity of which is to be found even under the highest peaks, fail to offer a body unitary apt at encompassing its individuality that, in itself, is devoid of meaning. For the chaos of the solitary, indifferent silhouettes to find, so to speak, a counterbalance and a commencement [...] of cohesion, the shapeless matter has to acquire an unusual predominance" (Simmel, 1988:126s). Oh yes, rock is fundamental, even church-like.

Soil, rocky masses, altitude, peaks, a chaos becoming order and mystery. "The undulating disturbance of shapes and the massive materiality rising out of the mountain own dimension get propitious, in their tension and counterweight, an impression wherein excitement and peacefulness appear to melt down jointly, in a most singular way (*ibid.*, 126s.). Says Simmel that the Earth real

as such can be seen here, fully endowed with its unparalleled momentum even though far away from any type of life, as well as any signifié of form proper. So, ice abysses, frozen summits –that are already deprived of any relationship with soil depressions arise as "[...] symbols of the transcendence raising the mirror of the soul to the site wherein lodge what we could attain even being in great danger, a site we cannot reach at on the sole strength of our will (*ibid.*, 127).

Simmel considers that clouds contribute for a more human, more terrestrial vision –our vision, of the heights. Now that clouds make the mystical roof of heights much more at our reach, much less supernatural –and same goes with the voice of the heights calling out to us from transcendence "[...] the aesthetic impression disappears at the same time than mysticism with which it is intimately mixed when clouds cover the snowy summits because, at that moment, mountains are reduced to an earthly dimension thanks to the clouds that crush them and unite them to the rest of the earthly domain. Only when the sky is limpid mountains aim to the supernatural in an infinite, uninterrupted way while appearing to pertain to an order different to the earthly order" (*ibid.*, 127). Precisely, for Simmel, the ultimate secret of the impression the higher alpine region causes to us lies in this "distancing from life".

As far as he is concerned, Bachelard (1996:208) –via Novalis, advises us about the birthright of the children of Nature: *the primeval rocks*. So, in a kind of dialogue between rocks and clouds, the sky seems to imitate the soil. "The rock and the cloud fall into one another. The rocky abyss is a kind of motionless avalanche. The threatening cloud is a disorderly movement" (*ibid.* 208). In a kind of dialectic between master and slave, rock and cloud need one another, they both suppose one another, they imagine themselves mutually. "Among its peaks, among its rounded soil, among its rocks, the mountain is a belly and teeth. It devours the cloudy sky, it wolfs down the bones of the storm and even the bronze of thunder (*ibid.*, 210). The fact is that, starting from its

own stillness, a mountain, nevertheless, "gives us an always active impression of uprising" (*ibid.*, 213-214).

Hence, it could be useful to have the *provoking* imagination Bachelard is so fond of revisited as it is certain that "[...] an active contemplation of rocks rises and rises upward, from that very moment, until it becomes a challenge. A participation to monstrous forces, and dominion upon overwhelming images" (*ibid.*, 215).

Rocks *force* us to see, to imagine, to live within the real realm within all its dimensions, cavities, and escarpments. With its lights and its shadows. Just as the soul.

Now, of course, the rock surges as an instigator of terrors and the indispensable correlate thereof: heroism. The fact that Bachelard (1996: 216) tells us that the function of the rock lies in inspiring terrors into the landscape is not unwarranted a statement: "This is the required condition for contemplation becoming courage, and the world we are looking at becomes the circle for an hero's life".

The rock as a *grave* but, also, as a re-birth. This is so because, without such a correlate, the Sepulcher would not find its ultimate meaning. Ultimate, and first meaning. Inasmuch as –says Bachelard, the idea is living the stone. He is surprised at the number of people who take a walk nearby a stone quarry. Almost anybody, however, is brave enough to enter down. This is why he says that a poet is *the most primitive of paleographers*. At the end of the day, as the saying goes, the only person apt at settling the controversy with the primeval rock, is the person who, at the same time is *the higher and the deeper one*, in accordance with which the poet asserts himself / herself intimately while he / she breaks the barrier with his / her gaze.

In turn, Simmel opposes the mountain geography to the sea geography. Sea geography is much more representative of life "moving, multishaped, oscillating between calm and tempest, letting free the 'immediate presence' as well as the 'pure, relative

magnitude of life' thanks to an overwhelming dynamism apt at overcoming life through its own, continuously changing shapes.

To the contrary, in the high mountain process is just conversely set up. "This release from life, considered to be both fortuitous and exhausting, both isolated and minuscule is allowed to us in the high mountain in an opposite sense: in spite of coming from the stylized plenitude of vital passion, this release comes from the time faraway. Here, life is like a prisoner -a prisoner, however, intertwined with something more silent and rigid, purer and higher than life could ever be" (1988: 128-129).

All this, Simmel (1988: 129) accentuates it when approaching glaciers –the site where landscape gets isolated, and the shapes thereof get also isolated from temporality. "Glacier [...] is the absolutely a-historic landscape. In glaciers –the image of which is unaltered by neither summer nor winter, any association with the ups and downs of human destinies –that, more or less, accompany all other landscape, any association is just destroyed. The mind image of our surroundings is rather likely to give a meaning to our spiritual existence. It is only thanks to the timelessness of glacier that this extension of our life is deprived of all and every possible foothold".

Simmel has presented us with important contributions for a Sociology, and a Psychosociology of space, and properties thereof (a matter we have analyzed elsewhere –in some of our works: del Acebo Ibáñez, 1985, 1996). Consequently, he has also contributed to the concept of limit –either implicit or explicit according to the case at stake, in his essays on aesthetic. Hence, his contrast between mountains as limit, border, or division, and the sea as union, link, an entity aiming at making human contacts easier. A paradox between the (apparent) neighborhood of *the other side of the mountain* –which, however marks distance and difference, and the (in)appearing distance of the sea horizons the horizontal immensity of which accelerates our craving for encounters, for establishing bridges.

It is the enthronement of verticality –into its dialectic of up and down, of height and depth, of mountain and valley, insofar, precisely, as verticality flies off, getting rid of the opposites: lower and deeper“[...] Which is unusual and wonderful it the fact that all the height and majesty of the Alps can only be observed near the glaciers, when all the vallees, vegetation, and human dwellings have disappeared from our eyes. That is, when nothing hollow is likely to be seen –even though hollowness could condition the impression of altitude. All those elements, implicitly, carry depth within them –mainly vegetation which always causes us to think of roots penetrating down the deepness upon which everything is based upon. Conversely, here, the landscape appears as completely 'finished', free from everything else [...] not any more perfecting is needed, not any more release for us to contemplate that world, not any more artistic configuration is needed –the insurmountable fury of the landscape own existence is against such a possibility" (Simmel, 1988: 130).

And all this occurs in a typical, ideal way with the glacier: “[...] no doubt –and only within the extreme region of glaciers, it would seem that depth has lost any possible influence on things. Due to the fact that the valley has disappeared, it the pure presence of the heights that imposes itself. In other words, a position is not relative, now, it is simply 'in a lofty position' and we do not think any more if at so and so meters over any determined level. This is why the mystical majesty of the impression summits cause on us becomes absolutely incomparable thanks to what simple people call "the beautiful alpine landscape" wherein mountains are nothing more than the crowning of a landscape placed at a lower level, nice and charming with woods and prairies, vallees and Swiss-style cottages. It is only when you have left all that behind that you are in a position to have access to a radical, metaphysic novelty, access to an absolute height with any relationship whatsoever to the corresponding depth. One element only among the elements included within a correlation –that, actually, could not

exist if the other element is absent, states, nonetheless, a clear self-sufficiency" (*ibid.*, 131).

So is Simmel's contention (1988: 131): this is the actual paradox of high summits and glaciers, wherein "high" gets emancipated from "low", thus crashing against humans' mood: "The liberation feeling that the landscape of summits and glaciers offers us at the most solemn moments, this feeling maintains an utmost close relationship with the feeling we have about the contradictions of life, inasmuch as life is the unending relativity of the opposites, the permanent conditioning of contraries, the fluid mobility within which things are likely to exist provided, however, they exist under conditions. From the impression that summits cause is also derived the symbolic intuition that life gets released when it aspires, in a supreme momentum, toward whatever is no more accessible to any life form, because this very fact is not only overwhelming but also opposite to life".

The *verticality* of the high summits –as a preexisting growth, stirring immobility, height that, paradoxically enough, emancipates itself from its own deepness, a climbing that becomes a permanent arrival, a thing infinite which confirm our limits –hence, however, a metaphysic resonance, such a verticality finds an echo into the ultimate character of the soul of anyone who opens himself / herself, and accepts an aesthetic and existential over joy.

Mountain gives a new power to the scream, due to the swarming of echoes, reminiscent of the par excellence echo, the deepest one, the inner one, the echo that imprints itself and feeds on silence, the vibrating echo you can hear in the deepest depth. The (relative) *verticality* of a mountain throws us back to transcendence, to the plenitude of existence, to the unlimited limits of climbing we can reach at without even attempting. Because the summit is far over the maximum height: it is a craving, a vocation, a call which becomes an echo so that search is likely to go on. And the idea is keeping growing on. A summit is a confirmation of the climbing process –and this is why it is a haven: there, you forget

any tiredness caused by the efforts you have already made, a haven too because you are hopeful with regard to the distance you are still to cover.

Bachelard reminds us that Nietzsche instructed patiently his will of power during the long hikes in the mountains, wherein his existence was nurtured fully by the wind of the highest summits. "He loved summits" says Bachelard (1993: 242), in search of the "abrupt divinity of the wild rock".

Walking in the mountains is at the same time a climbing process and an effort, it also mean fight. This is why Bachelard says that Nietzsche "with his thought against the wind has converted walking into fighting. And even more: walking becomes his fight. [...]. Against the wind, a fight is almost always triumphant because... a hero of the wind just falling down under a of wind would become the most ridiculous of the defeated generals [...]. A brave walker splits himself in front of the wind, against the wind. His walking stick crosses the hurricane, pierces the soil, stabs the gust of wind. [...]. The tears of the fighting water have nothing to do with sorrow, they have to do with rage. Their anger is a response to the anger of the tempest. [...]. So, a walker, devoured by the storm [...] becomes [...] a flag, a banner. The sign of courage, the proof of strength, the power of a capacity. The coat badly treated by the storm becomes also a kind of flag, the unvanquished flag of the hero of the wind" (*ibid.*, 242-243).

In his psychoanalysis of the man walking up a mountain, against the wind, Bachelard considers this is the more efficacious exercise to vanquish the inferiority complex. Indeed: "hike without any aim whatsoever, thus *pure walking*, similar to *pure poetry*, offers constant, immediate impressions of power. [Thus] profoundly shy people are great walkers: each step ahead is a symbolic victory for them, each time they hit their walking stick against the soil, they compensate their shyness. Far away from the cities, far away from

women, they hunt for the *pure struggle*, the struggle against the elements" (*ibid.*, 242-243).

Instead, the sea smothers all the screams, anything the sea seizes becomes the sea whichever lives within its depth, whichever floats over its waves: this is indeed the confirmation of its reign, starting from such a (non superfluous) superficiality covering belonging and rhumb line.

The (relative) *horizontal*ity of the sea throws us back to the almighty rhumb line at all costs, it forces us to display ourselves while starting from a partial sinking. Beyond every possible limits limited, however, by the winds (the winds of our soul as well as the winds of Nature) and it throws us back to current alien to our will.

Bachelard's poetics also offers wealthy contributions to those aspects: water as a contemplation, deepening as an element of the materializing imagination. As far as he is concerned, the sea – probably more than any other element, is a complete poetic reality: a living water, a water born again from itself, immutable water, a food for customary phenomena, a vegetative element, *the body of tears* (1993: 23). Thus, it is from the sea –i.e. "starting" from the sea that we try and aim to attain the element, the "substantial water", the "water we have dreamed of within its own substance" (1993: 24). Couldn't we say that a reflection on the water, as poets say, is the first vision the universe grasps of itself?

A continuous and irresistible birth: "In its own violence, water acquires a specific anger [by receiving] all the psychological characteristics of a *type of anger* (*ibid.*, 29). Actually, for Bachelard there exists a duel of indignity between the human being and the sea: "The water that treats us violently becomes quickly enough the water we treat badly [...] Ebb and flow of an anger that wails and resounds" (*ibid.*, 29). This is so because, as a source of energy, the being, for Bachelard, is an *a priori* anger. This is why he states that the four elements are different types of anger, of provocations inasmuch as we do not know immediately the world by means of a peaceful, tranquil knowledge. (1993: 239s.).



When facing the provocation lead by, and generated by Nature's elements, any victory over the water is not only scarce – real scarce, but also much more dangerous –hence more praiseworthy than any victory we might carry off against the wind and the mountain. Indeed, a swimmer and a sailor conquer one of the elements that are the strangest to their own nature. This is why, for Bachelard, while the initiation of humans at sea gives way to a fright they are able to overcome [...] the mountain hike is unaware of what we could call the threshold of heroism" (1993:244).

Should we were talking about heroism, we would be facing a call to the integral human being, while the call of the sea, one way or the other, claims for a total, intimate surrendering. It could be called a waves active invitation: "the sea calls us as a motherland"; "looking at the sea, it's for us, the willingness to delve within" (1993:247). Now, such invitation from the sea is neither painless nor unwarranted". Conversely, it could be seen as a "dangerous, hostile initiation" –a good representation of the *jump into the unknown*.

Says Bachelard that, at sea “*above all we are watching the fight of the fighters*” this is why his quotation from Lafourcade is so appropriate when pointing out that “[...] the ocean is an enemy who tries to vanquish, and that we have to vanquish; its waves are bodies we have to confront, any swimmer feels that he / she is crashing his / her whole body against the limbs of his adversary. (1993: 251). It would seem that the ocean is no longer a body we are able to hug: "it is a dynamic realm that respond to the dynamics of our insults" (*ibid.*, 251).

So, we would be facing a struggle *per se*. In his psychoanalysis of the pride of the swimmer, only preoccupied for his / her next feat, says Bachelard “[...] this feat our will is dreaming of is the experience –*vécu*- poets sing with regard to violent water. An experience which is much less made of remembrances and much more made of anticipations. The violent water is a guideline of

courage" (*ibid.*, 252). Moreover, we can say the same thing about farewells on the seaside: : "[...] these are, at the same time, the most heartbreaking as well as the most literary of farewells. A poetry exploiting an ancient heritage made of dreams and heroism" (*ibid.*, 117). This is so because, for some dreamers "water is the new movements inviting us to a travel we have never done [because] this departure, if materialized, uproots ourselves from the soil" (*ibid.*, 118).

Heroism, struggle, dream, feat. In that sense, no wonder that Simmel (1999) had devoted one of his delicate analyses to *adventure*. In his opinion, the "form of adventure" lies in escaping from life control but we are due to fall into such control –a fruit, so to speak, of movement proper. In adventure, a synthesis between activity and passivity takes place, between we have conquered and things that have been given to us. The fact is that, any adventurer "always believes that he is safe" (1999: 24).

Thus, we would be facing "an integration of the casual and the external, within the internal-necessary [...] even though adventure seems to be supported by a difference as regards live, life to be felt, totally, as an adventure" (*ibid.*, 20).

## **(In) Conclusion**

So, the mountain and the sea surge as *mirrors of the soul*, a soul which is now a high summits range, narrow passes, valleys, and deep gorges –however, the soul is likely to shelter both violent waves as well as sleeping waves in search for a silent and calm ocean. These are places wherein the ontological echoes sound best, the places wherein you are able to listen to yourself at best. "It seems, says Bachelard (1993: 287) that, to fully understand what silence is, our soul needs seeing things that are kept secret. To be sure about rest, the soul needs to have next to her a large natural being asleep". This is why the greatness of the human being is fed by the greatness of the world, as well as measured against the

measurements of the world inasmuch as *noble thoughts* are born out of *noble sights*. Finally, this *intimate immensity* Bachelard calls us to, as a philosophical category of the dream, directs us toward depth and truth.

The sea and the mountain –elements that awake us at dawn to delve into daydreaming, offer us the late evening twilight so that more dreams are born.

So, says Bachelard, we should be made aware that "in the kingdom of the imagination and daydreaming, day has been given to us so that we are able to check the experiences of our nights" (1993: 276).

When all's said and done, this a victory of the soul upon elements (sea, mountain) that defeat us, as we have just said, so that we believe we are authentic. Rock and water should be seen as challenges and foundations.

Indeed, this vastness you can pronounce is, says Bachelard (1975: 235), the one who "teaches us how to breathe the air resting on the horizon, far away from the walls of the chimerical jails, the source of anguish".

Hence, these are the roots for the primeval fight, the gallantry and heroism that protect us when we feel overwhelmed by the extrinsic immensity. In other words, a dialectic between the vast extension of the world and the vast extension of the human mind, solved within a growing existential synthesis.

You are entitled to think that this is an excess of optimism. However, we would be sure that Bachelard would intervene to remind us that "[...] we must accept that the poetic image lives under the sign of a new being. This new being, is the happy human" (1975: 21). This is so because poetry implies a happiness of its own, independently of the drama likely to be discovered. This is so because immensity is within, inside us, and the only thing a poet does is showing us the way.

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# *Reports*

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## **A talent campus for cultural diversity activists**

**Report on the U40-Capacity Building Programme  
„Cultural Diversity 2030“ Constitutive Workshop**  
(September 19-20, 2008, Barcelona / Catalonia / Spain)

### **What is the programme and workshop about?**

The interdisciplinary capacity building programme “**Cultural Diversity 2030**” was initiated by the German Commission for UNESCO in 2007 as part of the German EU Council presidency. The U40-process offers young European Under 40ies – postgraduates, PhD students, young professionals, and similarly qualified young experts – the opportunity to participate in the international debate on cultural diversity and the implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the protection and the promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions (hereinafter the Convention).

The U40-group committed itself to co-develop and participate in the U40-World Forum (to be held in summer 2009 in Paris) as well as in a European evaluation workshop to be held in Istanbul, European Capital of Culture in 2010.

The main objectives of the Convention are the following: “to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions; to create the conditions for cultures to flourish and to freely interact in a mutually beneficial manner; to encourage dialogue among cultures with a view to ensuring wider and balanced cultural exchanges in the world in favour of intercultural respect and a culture of peace; to foster interculturality in order to develop cultural interaction in the spirit of building bridges among peoples; to promote respect for the diversity of cultural expressions and raise awareness of its value at the local, national and international levels; to reaffirm the importance of the link

between culture and development for all countries, particularly for developing countries, and to support actions undertaken nationally and internationally to secure recognition of the true value of this link; to give recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles of identity, values and meaning; to reaffirm the sovereign rights of States to maintain, adopt and implement policies and measures that they deem appropriate for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions on their territory; to strengthen international cooperation and solidarity in a spirit of partnership with a view, in particular, to enhancing the capacities of developing countries in order to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions.” (UNESCO Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2005.)

The constitutive workshop for this two year process has been held – following the invitation of the Catalan Government – in Barcelona on 19<sup>th</sup>/20<sup>th</sup> September 2008. Over 20 young specialists from the Europe region with proven competence and interest in the area of the relevant aspects of the Convention have been identified by a Call for Contributions. This group acts as core group during the whole programme cycle 2008-2010.

As solicited in the run-up to the workshop, the participants exercised a country scanning on the respective status of the Convention in their countries regarding the following questions: Did my country of origin (and/or current place of living) ratify the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and the Promotion for the Diversity of Cultural Expressions? If so, did the Government name a national focal point (Art. 9) and/or did they install some special legal structures for its implementation? Does a Coalition for Cultural Diversity exist in my country? Who are the political, academic, and cultural professional and/or civil society leaders, journalists and other important groups in the field of the Convention in my country?

The scanning has been effected for 14 European countries. It has been considered an excellent tool for getting insights on the implementation status of the Convention in European states. Moreover, participants got in touch with the various relevant authorities – often for the first time – even though the access to information was often difficult and limited.

### **Cultural diversity as a multidimensional field of expertise**

The U40-group has been hosted at the Representation of the European Commission in Barcelona and welcomed by its director Manuel Camós i

Grau. The European Union considers cultural diversity as advantageous in a globalized world. Àngel Cortadelles i Bacaria, Director General of International Relations, Government of Catalonia, emphasized that Catalonia has the capacity to promote Catalan culture and cultural diversity and, with its new Statute of Autonomy, it is a strong international actor in international relations.

Minister of Culture and Media of the Catalan Government, Joan Manuel Tresserras i Gaju, emphasized the crucial importance of democratic quality in modern societies in his opening statement: How can cultural diversity be democratically represented in a globalized world? How can decisions be taken in a hybrid, globalized world? Homogenisation effects of economy, markets and global institutions threaten cultural diversity. Globalisation and homogenization of cultures discriminate small cultures. Therefore, a debate about quality of democracy is needed. He stressed out two goals: 1) Democratic representation of cultural diversity: All cultures are equal at their roots, regardless of the political entities to which they belong; this equality has to be represented globally in institutions like UNESCO, 2) Struggle for internal diversity within societies.

Christine M. Merkel, head of the Division for Culture within the German Commission for UNESCO explained why the U40-programme is to look at 2030: Prospects for diversity of cultural expressions and their embeddedness in human and cultural rights need a long term view. Diversity is a key issue of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Therefore, it is necessary to create spaces in which diverse and innovative voices can be heard in order to avoid reinventing a common interpretation of cultures (and of history). Under 40ies will be the decisions-makers in 2030. They are those persons who have the innovative ideas and the needed energy for projects on promoting and living cultural diversity.

The results of the country scanning done by the participants followed the introductory speeches. As a summary of country scanning it might be said that: (A) the convention is ratified in almost all of the countries represented by the U40ies. However, there have been fears in several countries that the Convention might interfere too much with the WTO procedures. This has caused a tension among the authorities, e.g. between those representing Ministry of Culture and those of Ministry of economics and finances. Responsible and the most active actors in the ratification of the Convention in the represented countries have mainly been ministries of Culture, culture departments and ministries of foreign affairs, but other



national authorities and administrative instances as for instance National Commissions for UNESCO as well. Also NGO's have participated the ratification and implementation processes in these European Countries, although the legal and institutional implementation of the Convention has been relatively miniscule so far. Only 6 countries out of 17 have established Coalitions on implementation of the Convention so far, for instance.

The following main issues were raised and discussed by the workshop group after the country scanning:

- International obligations offer the chance for dialogue / domestic coherence between Ministries in member States (for example Ministry of Culture (Convention) and Ministry for Finance and Economy (WTO- or WIPO-obligations).
- How can we ensure that the Convention will not be restricted to cultural policy?
  - o Fiscal Policies can be the most effective cultural policy nowadays, cultural mainstreaming is important.
  - o Holistic approach from creation to reception of cultural expressions is needed.
  - o Operational guidelines are one important tool.
  - o EU: seven directorates involved, *inter*-service group is vital
- Maybe a critical mass of ratifications is needed before progress can be made at the WTO.

### **Current challenges of the Convention from a local perspective**

Jordi Pascual, Coordinator of the Culture Committee of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) held a committed input on the local perspective of the Convention. The word "local" is used in the following articles of the Convention: 1e) promotion / awareness raising; 2.4) creating and strengthening cultural expressions on the local level; 4.6) Definition of cultural and measures; 14.a, 3) Cultural industries in development countries should be local; here local means national. According to Pascual, Local is in the position of an object in the Convention: local means sub-national. And cities are not a substantial but a declarational part of the Convention. In the context of the leap of scale brought forward by globalisation, local governments are shaken; they have difficulties in finding their place.

After the reading the Convention through the local lens, three open points remains: 1) Cities are not mentioned in the Convention; 2) How will the national reports be shaped and will they reflect the situation in cities? 3) Will

civil society groups evolve (Greenpeace for Culture)? Jordi Pascual states that questions of cultural diversity will not be solved without local governments and cities. Cities and local governments are not adequately recognised as stakeholders in the implementation process. They are often recognised as Civil Society (what they cannot be by definition).

UCLG was initiated in 2004 in order to become the "UN of Cities". It claims to be recognised and be heard on international politics and agreements, especially in the implementation process of the Convention. Cities have already been active in the drafting process of the Convention. In 2004 the UCLG adopted the Agenda 21 for culture: It is the first document with worldwide mission that advocates establishing the groundwork of an undertaking by cities and local governments for cultural development. Networking of Cities (Eurocities-Networks etc.) on the international level on cultural issues needs a common understanding and guidelines. This was the birth of the Agenda 21 for culture. The triangle (social, economy, ecology) for sustainable development does not include culture. The Agenda 21 for culture claims culture as fourth pillar of sustainable development.

Finally, Jordi Pascual defines **bottlenecks** of the local perspectives in the international context:

1. What does "local" mean, when the word is used in international standard setting instruments?
2. Lack of capacity on the local level / local Governments are rather weak.
3. Lack of research on what role local governments play in international cooperation.
4. The landscape of local governments is confusing.
5. Local Governments are not recognised as potential for the governance of cultural diversity.
6. Lack of coordination of local governments worldwide in the area of culture.

### **European Commission and the implementation of the Convention**

The international cultural community pays special attention to the EU and its implementation of the Convention. Therefore, the implementation of the Convention through and within the European Community is a central topic of the U40-programme. Hence, the workshop organized a video-conference with Valérie Panis-Cendrowicz, Legal Expert of the Cultural

Policy and Intercultural Dialogue Unit within DG EAC, European Commission.

Valérie Panis-Cendrowicz recalled that the implementation of the Convention is effected over Article 151 EU-Treaty and other economic agreements. The Communication on a European Agenda for Culture reinforces the necessity of mainstreaming culture (Art. 151.4 EU-treaty). The three main objectives of the agenda are cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; the promotion of creativity in the context of the Lisbon Agenda; and culture as an element in international relations. As working methods the open method of coordination within the Council has been projected, as it highlights and recommendations of best practices. Furthermore, platforms, binding reporting, and a European Cultural Forum are foreseen. The aim is to incorporate cultural diversity into all European considerations as Article 151.4 in EU-treaty requires.

The discussion between the U40ies and Valérie Panis-Cendrowicz brought up that open method of coordination tries to combine the different levels of governance and EU-objectives shall be implemented at all levels in coordination with national objectives. The Convention has implications on Media Policies, as for example the MEDIA Programme, audiovisual service media directive that coincided with the birth of the Convention. According to Panis-Cendrowicz it is always worth to stress, that the Convention is not about cultural diversity but about the diversity of cultural expressions. She said that the Convention has to be anchored in the countries that ratified the Convention. It appeared that the European Commission and EU's Intercultural Dialogue Unit are discussing and cooperating in cultural mainstreaming through internal negotiations before the ratification of the Convention. Afterwards they have built a platform to bring together key competences (from media, intellectual property rights, copyright, audiovisual media, heritage, creativity). Measures that are designed to protect the diversity of cultural expressions within EU are: Regulation for the production of local content, subsidies, training, strengthening of civil society, capacity building; co-production- and development agreements, for instance. These measures are normally taken by Governments on the legal level to make the local voices emerge. Example: Danish TV now has a market share of 38 % with the help of EU Programmes.

Finally, Valérie Panis-Cendrowicz **recommends** to the U40ies to have a look at the intraregional and local level. As many of the academics

now concentrate on the supra- and international level, the local level is often forgotten.

### **Main themes of the U40-programme**

The Call for Contributions for the workshop defined three main topics for the focus of the U40-programme. In order to deepen the discussion, the U40-group split up into these thematic groups.

Group 1 considered “Diversity of Cultural Expressions and Sustainable development”. Its major goal is to think of the implementation of culture as the fourth pillar of sustainable development. The group expressed that culture has to be considered as a development process and should not be restricted to cultural goods. Sustainability requires long-term perspective for planning and new financial mechanisms. What is also required is the rethinking of paradigms: what will be the position of territory in the future as the states are becoming more and more “hybrid”? Other considerations moved among the relations of public and private, and developed and underdeveloped countries. The main question that group thought should be developed further was, what would be your proposals for governments and civil society and other relevant stakeholders for integrating culture in development policies (article 13)?

Group 2 split up according to two themes. Group 2a considered the implementation of the Convention through the EU and group 2b the implementation of the Convention within the EU. First, group 2a presented that U40ies should encourage coherence of EC action (between Directorate Generals, and different levels), and EC to formulate a clear and usable definition of culture and cultural diversity, as the Convention tries to provide. The group also put an emphasis on the relationship of the Convention to other legal instruments, WTO negotiations, IMF, cultural diplomacy and international support action - how to support international alliances? Emphasis was also put on the community’s internal affairs, especially in relating cultural diversity to trade issues (Directorate General Competition, Directorate General Internal Market). In addition, this group discussed about authors’ rights, net-neutrality, circulation of audiovisual content in Europe, and concrete policy practices: AVMSD, MEDIA Mundus, forthcoming Creative Content Online Recommendation. In its future discussions this group will focus on questions like, what should be the priorities for ensuring that the principles and objectives of the Convention are mainstreamed across EC policies? What policy mechanisms should be developed?

Group 2b focused on media and audio-visual policy in EU, concentrating mainly on two instruments: (1) Audiovisual service directive: explicit reference to the Convention, and (2) EU's Media Programme: ensuring diversity in production, distribution and promotion through access and training. Group aims at mapping and measuring diversity in media. In its further discussions this group will develop the question, how to ensure cultural diversity of media content in all modes of delivery through European policies?

Group 3 focused on public awareness-raising under the title "Communication strategies for the Diversity of Cultural Expressions". The discussion focused especially upon actors. There are three stakeholder groups concerned with the Convention (core group): regulatory institutions, public administrations and productive sector. They are seeking solutions for effective implementation, benchmarking and how to generate action. In its discussions about concrete action, this group ended up developing strategies on such things as the communication of the Convention goals through stories, diversity brands, diversity channel, festivals, education/training, and mobilize relevant actors as advocates. Question to be developed further: What could be combined efforts within European member states in 2009 for the promotion of the Convention at all levels?

### **Grasping the questions of the Convention in the World Café**

The questions the World Café tables tackled were: 1) What would be your proposals for governments and civil society and other relevant stakeholders for integrating culture in development policies (Art. 13 in the Convention)? 2) How to assure cultural diversity of media content in all modes of delivery through European policies? 3) What could be combined efforts within European member states in 2009 for the promotion of the Convention at all levels? 4) How do we organize our further communication and working process? 5) How can we contribute to the development of the U40 World Forum?

By summarizing the discussions of the World Café, the main conclusions and action proposals of the discussions were the following:

State parties of the Convention have the responsibility to get the ownership and lead the awareness raising process regarding culture in development policies under the Convention at the national level. Interdepartmental coordination and coherence within the governments

should be enhanced in order to ensure effective policymaking in cultural development policies. Despite the expertise and remarkable leadership of different civil society agents in the process of implementation of the Convention, there are still too few third sector agents playing an active role in the implementation process of the Convention. There is still a lot to be done in order to motivate and coordinate all civil society agents which might be involved in cultural development policies in both national and international levels. The very concept of development should be applied internally at the national level. Culture should also be incorporated, for example, in both rural and urban development cultural policies. Hence, it is necessary to strengthen and introduce culture deeper into governmental development cooperation master plans and long-term strategies. Culture should be considered a cross-cutting approach and, furthermore, a specific line of work on cultural development policies should be established. From an organisational perspective, an interdepartmental working group on cultural development policies should be created in order to ensure coherence in governmental action as well as to improve awareness-building within governments. Good coordination with local governments is needed. Ideally, after the works of intergovernmental coordination have reinforced government's leadership, participation instruments bringing public administrations and civil society together should also be created. It is important to point out the fact that the debate around development policies might still be based on old ideas. Fair trade agreements are crucial for the achievement of the goals of the Convention, including good implementation of cultural development policies. Rather than focusing on national-based policies, the best contribution to enhance development through cultural policies would probably be a better coordination among the main International Organizations dealing with the contents of the Convention. (Table/theme 1)

What media content should be promoted along the lines of Convention? Structures of the *Audiovisual Media Services Directive* provide a good framework for action. While the scope identified in Audio Visual Media Services Directive (AVSMD) is wide, its being dependent to a large extent on EU Member States for its implementation was identified as a possible drawback on its effectiveness. The convergence of media technology supports cultural diversity in media content (small internet radio stations etc.). However, it was underlined that minority groups need to be provided with more possibilities of media content production. One of the questions raised for further discussion was how private media institutions could be motivated

to respect principles of cultural diversity. The new technological possibilities brought about by technological convergence were presented as being paralleled by the convergence of business interests in the media production chain, which needed to be counterbalanced by ensuring not only the access to but also the production of (and hence real participation in) media content which reflected society's diversity. Regarding the target group media institutions, it was underlined that all media should be considered. A campaign on Cultural Diversity could be initiated by the European Broadcasting Union. Journalist trainings on the Convention's content could be organized. (Table/theme 2)

In order to promote the Convention in the general public it was emphasised that the elaboration of a catalogue of actors in each country as well as best practices could be useful for communicating how cultural diversity can be protected. The promotion of the Convention should have four pillars. Firstly, the *political pillar*. UNESCO should create the "UNESCO Convention" label, with which all the events dealing with cultural diversity would stress the Convention project. The European Commission and/or the European Parliament should coordinate themselves with the Francophonie and Commonwealth organisations in order to promote the ratification and implementation of the Convention. Culture Ministers EU Summits should establish the Convention as a permanent topic in their meeting agendas. The EC should launch a public questionnaire to ministries and regional and local administrations on UNESCO Convention promotion. Secondly, there should exist *educational pillar*, among which didactic material for schools should be elaborated and distributed, and teacher training meetings should be organized in order to inform, form and share good practices. Thirdly, the *media pillar*. For spreading the values of Convention a TV programme should be produced, distributed and uploaded in an open web, and – especially in developing countries – it is as important to take advantage of radio. A promotional campaign should be launched in the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which coordinates all public service broadcasters in Europe. Considering the *civil society pillar*, it was discussed in the learning café that a catalogue of institutions and professionals dealing with cultural diversity should be done and put at public disposal, as well as a catalogue of best practises and prizes. UNESCO Convention Clubs should also be created, generally hosted in cultural institutions (i.e. modern art museums, universities, etc.) These clubs would allow non-specialized people to receive information on UNESCO Convention. (Table/theme 3)

Participants of table four proposed installing an intranet site to organize the further communication and working process. The intranet – already created – includes a list of all U40 members and their CVs, and a possibility to upload central documents and documents on specific relevant topics in respective online folders, for instance. It was suggested to draft a project description on the U40-World Forum to be distributed to external partners in case of fundraising, promoting the programme etc. Moreover, the issuance of a press release on the programme / on results of the programme was proposed. Next step after the Barcelona meeting is that U40 continues its work via internet-based group work on the themes mentioned here, and communicates about “who we are” and “what we do” with Ministries, NatComs, NGOs, etc. Stakeholders to be involved in the selection process of U40 World Forum participants should be National Commissions for UNESCO, UNESCO regional / cluster offices, civil society organizations. (Table/Theme 4 & 5)

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# **International Association of Circumpolar Sociocultural Issues (IACSI)**

### **What is the IACSI?**

IACSI is an international scientific association devoted to the study of different socio-cultural aspects related to the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The Association is integrated mainly by scholars from Social Sciences, Anthropology and Humanities, and also from individuals with different backgrounds but interested in these perspectives and themes. As a new association which looks for integration and cooperation, we are also looking for new members in both circumpolar regions.

### **What are we after?**

Assuming the importance that the socio-cultural approach has for a holistic understanding of the circumpolar phenomenon, we have also considered the need to study the "circumpolar theme" in its bi-polar dimension: the Arctic and the Antarctica, in order to look for convergences and divergences under the debates "local/global", "North/South", "development/sustainability", and also looking for the production and transference of knowledge. In this sense, we privilege scientific investigation with reference to:

- Local Communities in Extreme Environments
- Social Problems and Human Well-being
- Participation and Community Attachment
- Habitat and Identity
- Minorities and Native people

- Migration
- Environment and Sustainable Development

### What do we do?

- Generate scientific and academic projects bound up with circumpolar socio-cultural issues.
- Organize once a year an international seminar on the circumpolar socio-cultural issues.
- Organize cultural events, such as Films and Documentary Festivals related to these issues.
- Support academically the "Arctic & Antarctic International Journal of Circumpolar Socio-cultural Issues", published annually.
- Encourage relationships and academic collaboration between Universities and Research Centres sited in one or both circumpolar regions.
- Promote international workshops, seminars, and conferences.
- Contribute and award prizes to investigations, and activities concerning to solve problems in one or both circumpolar regions.
- Establish nets with national and international institutions, associations and NGOs linked to the matters which are the interest of the IACSI.

According to the aims of the International Association, were organized different scientific meetings where papers from different countries and regions were submitted:

- a) In April 26th, 2005, was run the ***1st International Seminar on Circumpolar Socio-Cultural Issues***, at the University of Jyväskylä (Finland), organized by the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy of this University and the IACSI.
- b) In April 7th, 2006, was run the ***2nd International Seminar on Circumpolar Socio-cultural Issues***, at the University of Iceland, organized by the Faculty of Social Sciences of this University, the Icelandic Sociological Association, and the IACSI.
- c) In November 31st, 2007, was run the ***3rd International Seminar on Circumpolar Socio-cultural issues***, at the University of Oulu

(Finland), organized by the Thule Institute of this University and the IACSI.

## **Membership**

The members can be individuals or institutions. Individual membership: € 30 (thirty Euros), including one copy of the annual issue of "*Arctic & Antarctic...*". Institutional membership: € 100 (one hundred Euros), including two (2) copies of the annual issue of "A&A-IJCSCI". In order to apply membership, take contact to the chairperson nearest to your geographical location and pay the membership fee to the bank account mentioned in the very same context. Membership fee contact and bank account information:

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# Universidad del Salvador (Argentina)

Founded in 1956, is the first private university in Argentina, and one of the largest in the country. It has different locations, namely: headquarters in the city of Buenos Aires, in Pilar and Mercedes (province of Buenos Aires), and Virasoro (province of Corrientes).

The main objectives of the Universidad del Salvador are: a) to emphasize academic excellence, b) to value diversity and pluralism, c) to form competent professionals and researchers with a critical judgement, d) to promote the development of knowledge through teaching and research, e) to impact the society as a whole not only through the theoretical analysis of the problems but also providing the possible solutions, f) to foster the internationalization of the students and staff.

The Universidad del Salvador has international joint programs in both undergraduate and graduate levels. It has different Faculties, namely: Administration Sciences; Economic Sciences; Education and Social Communication Sciences; Law; Social Sciences; Philosophy, History and Literature; Medicine; Psychology and Psychopedagogy; Science and Technology. The University also includes the Graduate Schools of Agronomy, Veterinary Medicine, and Food Technology, and the Schools of Theatre Arts and of Oriental Studies.

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- *Research Institutes and Laboratories*

Within the scope of the Vice-Chancellorship of Research and Development are Research Institutes which form part of the Vice-Chancellorship itself such as the Institute for Drug Addiction Prevention, the Institute for Environment and Ecology, the International Institute for Complex Thought ; the International Institute of Corporation and Economy Law of the Mercosur and the International Institute of Studies and Formation on Government and Society. Taking these institutes into account, there are within the USAL: 26 Institutes, 4 Centres, 10 Areas and 1 Extension Chair that perform research activities. Similarly, the USAL has 52 laboratories, 1 room for Sylvan Prommetric Examination, 1 AATP room, 3 Weather Stations, 2 Hydrologic Stations, 4 Hydrometric Stations, 1 biotherium, 3 workshops and 1 astronomic observatory.

- *Research at the USAL: Thematic Areas*

The USAL does research on several thematic areas such as: the environment and sustainable development, health, history, geography,



linguistics and literature, psychology, psychopedagogy, psychoanthropology, Eastern studies, agronomy, food technology, biodiversity, the use of the energies, Environmental Law philosophy, complexity, social networks, sociology, social management, local development, volunteer work, territory distribution, urban planning, heritage, leisure, tourism, informatic development, Mercosur, law, distance learning, mathematics, social communication.

- *Multidisciplinary Research Programmes*

Within the Research Department multidisciplinary research programmes are coordinated by network with other institutions. At present, there are nine ongoing multidisciplinary programmes being developed; foreign institutions participate in three of them: Geo Cities; Globalization; Circumpolar Studies Program; International University Laboratory of Social Studies. Ethics and Globalized Economy: Volunteer Work and Social Networks; Society and Culture in the Globalization Processes; Legislation Harmonization; District, City and Local Community; Environmental Intergenerational Volunteer Work; Research Management and Administration at the USAL.

**For more info about the Research Department, please contact:**

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# University of Iceland (Reykjavík, Iceland)

The University of Iceland was established in 1911. The university is organized into 5 academic schools, and 25 faculties. The university offers diverse program on all levels. The University of Iceland is the only university in Iceland offering undergraduate and graduate studies in all the main disciplines. In addition, the University of Iceland is an internationally renowned research university and our academics have received a great deal of international recognition for their scientific work.

The University operates around 40 research institutes, and research-based graduate studies are also offered. The number of students is currently around 15,000. Most academic disciplines are pursued, closely linked with the professional sector and Icelandic society in general. The university employs a group of well-educated and experienced teachers and scientists; it has a standing tradition for research and collaborates actively with universities and institutions abroad. The University is at once a national scientific and educational institution and a part of the international academic community. Year after year surveys have shown that the Icelandic people have more confidence in the University of Iceland than any other institution; the university enjoys the confidence of more than 90% of the nation.

## **Faculty of Sociology**

The Faculty of Sociology at the University of Iceland is the largest and most robust institution of its kind in Iceland. The Faculty has been a leader in educating managers and experts in the field of social sciences and research in these fields in Iceland for over three decades. The Faculty's role is to increase and impart exemplary and internationally recognized knowledge in the field of social sciences through scientific research, teaching and services to the Icelandic labour market. The Faculty has been a leader in this field from its establishment in 1976.

The Faculty is divided into seven departments:

- Department of Library and Information Science
- Department of Antropology and Folkloristics
- Department of Sociology
- Department of Social Work
- Department of Political Science
- Department of Psychology
- Department of Pedagogy

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**Faculty of Humanities**

Faculty of Humanities has a lot to offer both exchange and regular international students. One of the main attractions for international students is the studies that are unique to Iceland. Examples of those are Icelandic Studies for International students and Medieval

Icelandic Studies.

*Department of Languages, Literatures and Linguistics*

The Faculty offers diverse academic programs in Asian studies, Nordic languages, the major European and American languages in addition to classical languages.

Programs covering the following subjects are offered:

- Asian studies: Japanese and Chinese
- Nordic languages: Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish
- Major European and American languages: English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish
- Classical languages: Greek and Latin (a key to European culture from the beginning)

*Programa de español*

Spanish and Hispanic Studies have been taught at the University of Iceland since the early nineteen-eighties. The instruction takes place in Spanish, the study program is demanding, and students are required to acquire excellence in academic work methods. Students are expected to have completed a matriculation exam from an Icelandic secondary school (or its equivalent), have completed two years of Spanish as a foreign language, and/or be near to fluent speakers of Spanish when entering the program.

First year students refresh their knowledge of the language and exercise writing and reading skills in Spanish. Simultaneously they survey the cultural and political history of Spain and Latin America and are introduced to the study of literature. During the second and third years, students enhance their fluency and knowledge of literary history and theory, literature and cinema, as well as linguistics, language history and translation.

The study of Spanish can be combined with other program within (and/or outside) the School of Humanities. After a B.A.-degree has been obtained, the postgraduate degrees of M.A. and M.Paed are now on offer in the Faculty of Foreign Languages. An M.Paed-degree grants a qualification for the teaching of a foreign language within the Icelandic secondary school system, while an M.A.-degree is aimed to

further the student's knowledge within the field of language and literature, as well as in other fields of Hispanic and Latin American Studies.

The Department of Spanish at the University of Iceland collaborates with a number of Universities in different countries of Latin America and in Spain. Students are urged to complete a semester or a year of their study abroad, to further merge themselves into a Spanish-speaking cultural environment. A good knowledge of foreign languages has proven to serve many fruitful practical purposes and a proficiency in foreign languages becomes ever more valuable on the international scene. Knowledge of Spanish can serve as a passport into an ever more international job market in the field of tourism, business, mass media, politics, teaching and science, as well as for diplomatic posts.

Furthermore, an excellent knowledge of a foreign language opens many opportunities within the fields of translation, interpretation and cultural communication.

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## *Imaginaire du Nord*

# **The International Laboratory for the Comparative Multidisciplinary Study of Representations of the North**

## **University of Québec in Montréal (Canada)**

The *Laboratoire international d'étude multidisciplinaire comparée des représentations du Nord* is a centre for research, documentation, publication and expertise on the Nordic and Winter imaginary in literature, film, the visual arts and popular culture. It is intended primarily to encourage

comparison of the different Nordic cultures as exemplified by Québec, the Inuit community, Scandinavia (Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden) and Finland. The Laboratory was founded by Daniel Chartier and is directed by him.

The Laboratoire has led to the creation of an open, multidisciplinary research network, based on a decentralized yet collective work plan and supported by advanced information technologies. The research objectives of the Laboratory are three-fold:

(a) To study Québec literature and culture from a northern perspective by examining the aesthetic use of the North as a component and the underlying issues, while bearing in mind a more general and dialectic objective, which is the establishing of the parameters for a definition of northern culture.

(b) To carry out a comparative study of the different literary and cultural forms produced by Québec, the Inuit community, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Greenland, English Canada and Finland.

(c) To determine how representations of the North operate and are received both diachronically and synchronically: how the North, from the myth of Thule to popular representations in the visual arts and film today, constitutes an aesthetic and discursive system that maintains constant tension between the representation of the real and the creation of an imaginary world.

## **Research and Projects**

Since it was set up in 2003, the Laboratory has brought together some 15 researchers from about 10 universities (in Québec, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, France, Israel, Canada, Germany, England, Iceland and Spain) who have used the infrastructure developed at UQAM to study the Nordic imaginary. The Laboratory is a research infrastructure that brings together, in a free and open manner, researchers interested in studying the Nordic and Winter imaginary. In addition to projects directed by associated researchers and dissemination activities, a number of funded research projects are being carried out at the Laboratory on the theory of the imaginary and representations, cultural and literary history, comparative studies, as well as popular and media-based culture.

## Teaching

Students may enroll in a research group in the Laboratory. Research groups receive credit in the M.A. and Ph.D. programs of the Département d'études littéraires at the Université du Québec à Montréal. A B.A.-level seminar is offered periodically. Depending on the semester, individual and group work may involve establishing the corpus and analyzing literature and film; it may take the form of a student symposium.

About 10 students from different universities work at the Laboratory as paid research assistants. Graduate students are welcome to participate in the Laboratory's research activities. All activities are part of a universal framework in which students contribute as researchers.

Lecturers are invited by the Laboratory to come and speak. Postdoctoral researchers also participate in the Laboratory's activities.

## Documentary Collection

The Laboratory has one of the largest specialized libraries on the Nordic imaginary and the issues related to its study. Its documentary collection includes 6,000 literary works, essays, films and articles. Its researchers have developed an innovative series of data banks (containing works, illustrations and quotations) which are continually updated. As of May 1st, 2007, these banks contained some 35,000 records, including:

- An annotated bibliography of more than 6,000 literary works with a Nordic component written by the Inuit community or in Québec, Finland and Scandinavia.

- An annotated bibliography of more than 8,000 studies on the Nordic imaginary and Nordic cultural issues

- An annotated filmography of more than 1,000 films

- A bank of more than 11,000 citations related to the Nordic imaginary, classified according to elements, figures, constructs and themes

- A bank of more than 8,000 illustrations of a Nordic nature, described and annotated.

Since the banks are interconnected, they can be queried by means of multiple criteria and key words; these criteria enable users to

link thousands of representations of the North derived from literature, the visual arts, popular culture and film.

To perform its work, the Laboratory has premises equipped with 12 computers, 2 servers and a variety of video, photographic, digitization and viewing equipment. All researchers are welcome to use the Laboratory's resources. Access to the collections and data banks is based on the principle of collective and reciprocal contribution.

## **Publications**

The Laboratory disseminates works on the Nordic imaginary through its own print series and other publications.

The "Jardin de givre" series reissues significant, out-of-print works on the Québec and circumpolar imaginary for research and education purposes.

The "Droit au pôle" series disseminates literary and cultural studies and analyses that enable readers to understand and interpret the Nordic imaginary.

The works published by the Laboratory are distributed by Presses Universitaires du Québec ([www.puq.ca](http://www.puq.ca)) To contact the Laboratory, please refer to its website: [www.imaginairedunord.uqam.ca](http://www.imaginairedunord.uqam.ca), or email: [imaginairedunord@uqam.ca](mailto:imaginairedunord@uqam.ca)

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# **Master's Programme in Cultural Policy University of Jyväskylä (Finland)**

The Master's Programme in Cultural Policy is a study programme in social sciences networked with various disciplines via teaching and research both in Finland and abroad. The programme in Cultural Policy trains students for expert, development and organisational tasks in local, national and international contexts.



Programme prepares students for critically applying and acquiring scientific knowledge and methods in cultural policy and politics. Graduates from the programme work in cultural management, art institutions, higher education, media, research, and cultural and arts associations.

Key study areas are models and practices of cultural and art policy, questions of citizenship and cultural participation, relation between art and technology, and economy and administration of culture, as well as geography and urban cultural politics. Programme consists of 120 ects and lasts two years. Education is given in English and Finnish, the whole degree course can be taken in English.

The Master's Programme in Cultural Policy is aimed at students with a Bachelor's Degree (majoring in social policy, political science, sociology, philosophy, art history, art education or literature), both of Finnish and international origin. The Programme leads either to a Master's Degree in Social Sciences (MSocSc) or in Humanities (MA), and consists of studies in the major subject, studies in Cultural Policy and the Master's Thesis. The programme cooperates with the Department of Arts and Culture at the Faculty of Humanities. Some students will have the possibility to carry out their Master's Thesis in projects led by the Foundation for Cultural Policy Research (CUPORE). Studies can be pursued in a PhD Programme in Cultural Policy.

Key areas of the research expertise of the programme are:

- Theory and History of Cultural Policy
- Multiculturalism and Cultural Policy
- Art World, Culture and Technological Change
- Actors, Instruments and Impacts
- Place, Identity and Cultural Politics

Cultural Policy collaborates with Foundation for Cultural Policy Research (CUPORE) and is coordinating the organizing of the 4th Nordic Conference of Cultural Policy Research. Master's Programme has also been responsible of coordinading the Erasmus Intensive Programme called "Comparative Cultural Policy Studies - Sharing the Variety of European Cultural Policies". Professor of the programme is Anita Kangas, who is internationally well known researcher in the field.

For more information check our website:  
<http://www.jyu.fi/ytk/laitokset/yfi/oppiaineet/kup/en>

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## Foundation for High Studies on Antarctica & Extreme Environments (FAE, Argentina)

The Foundation for High Studies on Antarctica and Extreme Environments (FAE) is an NGO devoted to know and divulge everything about local community problems in extreme environments as well as Antarctic and circumpolar matters in a broad sense. This task is carried out through an holistic approach – a process of integration that includes a great variety of combined factors: social, cultural, territorial, psychological, economic and environmental ones.

The notion of extreme environment is considered from a point of view which tries to go beyond an ethnocentric notion of “extreme”, namely:

- a) environments with “determining geographic factors” which turn difficult the community life and human settlement, although these native populations develop significant socio-cultural adaptations;
- b) environments with “determining social economic factors” which in some cases lead big population sectors further the “resilience phenomena” (survival in spite of serious determining effects) that could

happen responding to the demands of the moment or structurally.

Every environmental issue is considered inside “local/ global”, natural/ built-up” and “sustainable /non sustainable” dialectic. For this reason the Foundation attaches great importance to environmental assessment and socioeconomic impact of any human undertaking either local, national or regional.

Teemed up by a body of professionals and scientists from different areas with broad experience on sociological, psychosociological, educational, anthropological, and environmental issues, the Foundation tries to find production and transference of knowledge with reference to Extreme Environments in general terms and Circumpolar Regions in particular ones, by means of:

a) Scientific Research and transference of the results to public and private institutions either national or international with reference to: Natural and Built-up Environment, Local communities, Social Problems, and Sustainable Development.

b) Drawing up educational & cultural programs for the different levels emphasizing the use of multimedia distance education modality.

### **Main activities**

a) Generate academic- scientific projects bound up with extreme environments, either natural or built-up as well as convergences and divergences between different circumpolar regions.

b) Publish books and Journals about issues bound to the subjects the Foundation deal with.

c) Design, develop and assess seminars, intensive academic programs, tertiary and university syllabus for presential and distant education modalities.

d) Design general policies in areas the Foundation is interested in, both in the academic/scientific and the cultural/artistic themes.

e) Carry out environmental impact assesment on socio-cultural and socio-economic undertakings.

f) Promote national and international workshops and/or scientific conferences.

g) Contribute and award prizes to investigations, and activities concerning to solve problems taken into account by the objectives of the Foundation.

h) Tend to establish nets with national, foreign and international institutions and NGOs linked to matters which are the interest and purpose of the Foundation.

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## *Notes for Contributors*

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### **a) Submission of Papers**

Authors should submit an electronic copy of their paper in Word format file with the final version of the manuscript by e-mail by attached file to the responsible Editor and the co-Editors:

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